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Preface
An earlier version of Chapter 4 has been published on “Quaderni di Economia e 
Lavoro” (1993). Chapter 7 in part draws on joint work in progress with Stephen  
Jones and John Micklewright.

Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of this work is to shed further light on the determinants of the 
duration of unemployment. The methodology employed for the analysis in 
the thesis is applied econometrics. The data used relate to Great Britain. 
They are taken from the Survey of Living Standards during Unemployment 
(LSUS) collected by the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys on behalf 
of the Department of Social Security in 1983/84.
Why is it important to study unemployment duration? The main reason 
is for economic policy purposes. Unemployment is currently considered as 
one of the biggest structural problems of most Western European economies. 
The analysis of the determinants of individual unemployment duration should 
help to identify economic policies that could be implemented in order to 
reduce unemployment. If, for instance, the unemployed with certain socio­
economic characteristics are found to be less likely to find a job then economic 
policy can be used to attem pt to correct at least in part for this disadvantage. 
For instance, examples of such policies are training courses organized or 
sponsored by government agencies. Another importance issue is whether the 
probability of leaving unemployment diminishes with the lengthening of the 
unemployment spell, all things equal.
The rate of unemployment at a certain point in time can be decomposed 
into the proportion of the labour force that enter unemployment at that 
point in time (inflow rate into unemployment) multiplied by the average du­
ration of unemployment. Jackman et al. (1991, pp. 219-224) look at this 
decomposition for a number of countries in 1988. The authors find that un­
employment durations are very low in North-America and inflow rates quite 
high. In the EC instead inflow rates are rather low but durations are “huge”, 
to use their words. The authors conclude by looking at time series evidence 
that the change in the rate of unemployment in Britain is mainly explained 
by changes in average unemployment duration rather than by changes in the 
inflow rate. By contrast, in the USA the answer is about half and half. These 
findings highlight the importance of analyzing unemployment duration, es­
pecially in the case of Britain.
The rate of unemployment has recently attained high levels in most West-
9
era European economies and it appears to be increasing. In the UK it has 
gone up from about 8 % in 1990 to over 1 2% in 1992-93 l . The data that
I employ cover a sample of the unemployed in Britain in 1983-84 when the 
rate of unemployment was also high and close to the current levels, equal to 
about 13%. It has been pointed out that the behaviour of the unemployed 
in search of a job may differ in times of high and rising unemployment rates. 
For instance, awareness of the fact that there is probably going to be severe 
competition for the jobs available should make the unemployed less likely to 
refuse any job offer. This is at least a good reason to analyse the LSUS data 
given that most published applied UK studies on unemployment duration 
relate to the seventies when the rate of unemployment was much lower and 
less than 1 0%.
The literature on unemployment duration is huge as reviewed, for in­
stance, by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) and Devine and Kiefer (1991). 
There are, however, some issues that present in my opinion scope for original 
contributions. The originality of the analysis carried out here stems from the 
elements that are briefly reviewed below.
A first element of originality lies in the data used for the analysis. These 
data are a longitudinal sample of the inflow into registered unemployment 
of household heads in Great Britain. They contain interesting and useful 
information for the analysis of individual unemployment duration as will be 
discussed in Chapter 2 . For instance, detailed information is collected on 
the level of savings and debt of the unemployed and their spouses. These 
data have not yet been object of any study except for the descriptive anal­
ysis carried out by the survey planners (Heady and Smith, 1989). It seems 
interesting to see whether the predictions of previous studies of unemploy­
ment duration for Britain are confirmed. It is also important that the public 
money spent on the survey sees a return in terms of economic analysis of the 
data collected. Not least, it seems fair to the unemployed that participated 
in the survey replying to several questions to exploit at best the information 
they provided.
A second element of originality is to be found in the methodology of 
analysis. Although already established techniques will be used, an attem pt 
is made to compare different ways of specifying the (conditional) probability 
of leaving unemployment using the LSUS data. The importance of using a 
flexible baseline when modelling the hazard rate and of distinguishing the 
destination states entered upon leaving unemployment will be assessed with 
respect to the LSUS data, by means of intuitive arguments and formal testing. 
This is the object of Chapter 4. The specification of single risk models 
and the use of a monotonie baseline hazard rate has been the practise until 
quite recently. It seems interesting to gather more evidence on the possible 
implications of these alternative specifications of the hazard rate, especially in
’The level of the rate of unemployment may vary slightly depending on the source 
adopted. The figures quoted here were extracted from Table 2.2 of different issues of the 
Employment Gazette.
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light of the fact that there is only one previous applied study for Britain that 
has taken these two methodological issues into account, Narendranathan and 
Stewart (1993). I should anticipate that their conclusions are quite different 
from those of the present study.
These problems are important for the purpose of economic policy plan­
ning. The baseline hazard rate is used to model the variation in the in­
dividual (conditional) probability of leaving unemployment which is due to 
the elapsing of the time spent in the state of unemployment —the so-called 
time dependency effect. For instance, findings of negative time dependency 
would indicate that the unemployed that experience longer unemployment 
spells stand less chances to leave unemployment all things equal. The as­
sumption of a monotonic functional form for the baseline hazard rate does 
not allow the sign of the dependency on time of the (conditional) probability 
of leaving unemployment to vary over the course of the unemployment spell. 
However, this assumption is not backed up by theoretical arguments. On the 
other hand, the use of a competing risks specification allows one to take into 
account the economic states entered upon leaving unemployment. This is 
particularly important since the impact of the explanatory variables —and 
also the sign of the dependency on time modelled by means of the baseline 
hazard rate— may vary with the economic states exited to. For instance, 
the impact of age might differ if one distinguishes the probability of leav­
ing unemployment to take up a full-time job from the probability of leaving 
unemployment to withdraw from the labour force.
A third element of originality is to be found in the analysis of the influence 
of socio-economic factors on the individual (conditional) probability of leav­
ing unemployment to take up a full-time job. Previous applied UK studies 
have focused on estimating the impact of the level of unemployment benefit 
on the duration of unemployment. The present study considers a large range 
of explanatory variables, some of which proxy individual characteristics which 
normally are not observed such as psychological feelings about financial con­
straints or leisure. The focus of interest is the re-employment probability, 
which is modelled using a competing risks model. Previous UK studies have 
estimated single risk models except for Narendranathan and Stewart (1993).
I anticipate that while most of the variables considered are found to have the 
expected impact on the re-employment probability, the estimated impact of 
the level of unemployment benefit turns out not significantly different from 
zero. The robustness of this finding is discussed in Chapter 5 together with 
the estimated impact of the other explanatory variables considered.
The fourth element of originality stems from the analysis of the relation­
ship between the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit and the 
individual probability of leaving unemployment in the case of the UK. This 
issue is especially important since the November 1993 Budget in Britain an­
nounced that the duration of the national insurance unemployment benefit 
will be cut down to six months in 1995. There are no previous studies that 
use individual data for the UK to look at this issue. There is, however,
11
some evidence from cross-countries time series studies that the duration of 
the unemployment benefit contributes substantially to explain the rate of 
unemployment and the duration of individual unemployment in the UK and 
other OECD countries. This topic is developed in Chapter 6 .
A final element of originality is to be found in the analysis of the relation­
ship between the unemployed’s savings and debt and the individual duration 
of unemployment. Previous work in this area is very limited. There are al­
most no other applied studies on the relationship between financial resources 
and unemployment duration, at least to my knowledge. Job search models, to 
be introduced in the next section, normally assume that individuals are risk 
neutral with the consequence that the unemployed’s levels of savings and 
debt are not expected to affect the individual duration of unemployment. 
If the unemployed are risk averse, the level of the unemployed’s financial 
resources might instead influence the individual probability of leaving un­
employment. The level of financial resources will also affect the probability 
of leaving unemployment if those without financial resources are liquidity 
constrained. In general, one would expect that on average a higher level of 
financial resources results in a higher reservation wage and a longer unem­
ployment duration. This hypothesis will be discussed and tested using the 
LSUS data in Chapter 7.
Some background information on the topics that are dealt with in this 
thesis is provided below. This is meant to be for the reader that has no pre­
vious knowledge in the field. In Section 1 .1 , the main features of job search 
models which normally provide the theoretical underpinnings for the analysis 
of unemployment duration are outlined2. In Section 1 .2 , the expexted im­
pact of the level of unemployment benefit on the duration of unemployment, 
which has been the focus of most previous UK studies, is briefly discussed 
and some of the most relevant findings reviewed. In the same section, the ex­
pexted impact of other variables such as the intensity of search and the value 
attributed to leisure relative to labour is discussed. The expected impact 
of the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit on the individual 
probability of leaving unemployment is the subject of Section 1.3. Some de­
scription of the methodology used for the analysis follows. The approach 
adopted to modelling unemployment duration is presented together with the 
basic statistical concepts in Section 1.4. The use of competing risks models 
is illustrated in the same section. In Section 1.5, some insights into the issue 
of the dependency on time of the individual probability of leaving unemploy­
ment are provided. A description of the structure of the thesis concludes the 
chapter.
2 So me authors, as for instance Moffit and Nicholson (1982) use the standard labour 
supply model of individual choice between leisure and labour to model unemployment 
duration.
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1.1 The theoretical framework of job search 
theory
The theoretical framework of models of unemployment duration is the theory 
of job search, which has the advantage over the more conventional neoclassi­
cal labour supply models of explicitly allowing for the dynamics of the labour 
market arising from uncertainty and imperfect information. The pioneering 
work is Stigler (1962).
Job search models assume that the unemployed —and in more recent 
developments also workers that might be dissatisfied with their current job— 
look for jobs in that segment of the labour market which is most suited to 
their qualifications. The job searchers are rational individuals that maximize 
their present discounted value of lifetime income net of job search costs and 
subject to information constraints.
In the simplest job search model, job offers are characterized in terms of 
the associated wage and job seekers are assumed to to know the distribution 
of wages which characterize their potential job offers but not which offer 
they will receive at which in point in time. The job seekers are assumed to 
receive a job offer each period of time and jobs once accepted are assumed 
to last for ever. The offer distribution, the individual’s income, the costs of 
search and the the discount rate are also assumed constant over time. Under 
these restrictive assumptions the job seeker’s optimal policy turns out to be 
a reservation wage policy, a reservation wage is formed and the first offer 
that exceeds the reservation wage is accepted. The reservation wage is that 
wage that equates the marginal costs and the marginal benefits of search.
In recent developments of job search models, the restrictive assumptions 
of the earliest models are relaxed. The reader is referred to Devine and 
Kiefer (1991) for a review of the job search literature. Some simple facts are 
described below.
Within a job search framework, the probability of leaving unemployment 
at a certain point in time, 9(t), can be expressed as follows:
«(i) = o((M«)(i--iW), (i-i)
where a  is the probability of coming across a suitable or desirable job va­
cancy (and of applying for it), r) is the probability of being offered the job, 7  
is the probability of rejecting the offer and 1 —7  is the acceptance probability. 
The probability of leaving unemployment is allowed to vary over time. Some 
analysis of non-stationarities in job search models is developed for instance 
in van den Berg (1990). The above probabilities are affected by individual 
characteristics and by the conditions on the demand side of the labour mar­
ket, such as the local unemployment rate or the vacancy rate in that segment 
of the labour market in which the job seeker is searching.
The key element of job search models is the reservation wage, defined as 
that wage at which the job seeker is indifferent between continuing to search
13
and accepting the job offer. In the traditional model of job search, the reser­
vation wage is assumed to affect the probability of leaving unemployment 
via the acceptance (rejection) probability. It is also assumed to remain con­
stant over the unemployment spell. By allowing the probabilities to vary 
over time in 1 .1 , the reservation wage has been allowed to vary over time. 
Devine and Kiefer (1993) in their review of applied studies point out that 
that the reservation wage might be less important than previously thought 
in explaining unemployment duration. This follows from two types of ar­
gument. The first is that if the job seeker applies only for “desirable” jobs 
then the rejection probability should be almost zero. The second is that in 
times of high and rising unemployment rates the offer rejection probability is 
probably close to zero. In both cases, the reservation wage fails to affect the 
probability 9 via the acceptance probability. One of the consequences is that 
the level of unemployment benefit would then fail to affect the probability of 
leaving unemployment, at least in the conventional models, as it is discussed 
below. However, the the reservation wage might still affect the probability 
of leaving unemployment by contributing to determine which job offers are 
to considered as “desirable” or “acceptable” .
One of the most recent developments of the job search model is due to 
van den Berg and Ridder (1993), who take into account at the same time 
the behaviour of firms and job seekers. One of the particular feature of the 
model is that the distribution of wage offers is endogeneous to the model 
since firms take into account the job seeker’s reservation wage when making 
their wage offers.
1.2 The im pact o f unem ploym ent benefit, 
search intensity and leisure
The disincentive effect of the level of unemployment benefit on the probability 
of leaving unemployment has been the focus of most previous applied studies 
of unemployment duration. In the traditional job search model, higher levels 
of unemployment benefit relative to the expected earnings from work are 
shown to influence the probability of leaving unemployment by raising the 
reservation wage and with it the rejection probability. If the role played by 
the reservation wage in explaining unemployment duration is minor then also 
the impact of unemployment benefit becomes less important.
The UK literature — from the first pioneering studies of Nickell (1979), 
Lancaster and Nickell (1980), Atkinson et al. (1984) to the most recent stud­
ies of Narendranathan and Stewart (1993, 1993a)— has paid considerable 
attention to the impact of the level of benefit on the duration of unemploy­
ment. The first studies of Nickell (1979) and Lancaster and Nickell (1980) 
found a significantly negative impact of higher levels of unemployment ben­
efits on the (conditional) probability of leaving unemployment. Atkinson et 
al. (1984) argued that these findings were not robust, showing that they were
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sensitive to the measures of unemployment benefit and expected income used. 
In particular, the authors found that the estimated impact differed from zero 
only when an unrealistically overgenerous pattern of benefit receipts was 
assumed. Narendranathan et al. (1985), used administrative data on un­
employment benefit receipts and unemployment spell durations (the DSS 
Cohort Study of the Unemployed 1978-79) and concluded that the findings 
of a significantly negative impact of higher levels of benefit on the probabil­
ity of leaving unemployment were robust. Narendranathan et al. (1985) were 
the first to use a longitudinal dataset (to analyse unemployment duration in 
the UK) and to have access to administrative information on benefit receipts 
— the previous studies used cross-section data such as the Family Expendi­
ture Survey and had incomplete information on benefit payments. However, 
Narendranathan et al. (1985) and Narendranathan and Stewart (1993a) — 
who used the same data— found that the benefit effect becomes statistically 
insignificant after the first five/six months of unemployment.
In other countries such as the US higher levels of unemployment bene­
fits have generally been found to affect negatively the probability of leaving 
unemployment as, for instance, in Katz and Meyer (1988, 1990).
The effect of unemployment insurance might, however, be more complex 
than that expexted by the traditional job search model. Mortensen (1977), 
for instance, pointed out that the effect of an increase in the benefit paid 
by unemployment insurance schemes on the probability of leaving unem­
ployment is ambiguous. The author’s argument was that in addition to the 
disincentive effect of the level of benefit on the probability of leaving unem­
ployment there is also a positive impact which applies to the unemployed 
not entitled to unemployment insurance and to benefit recipients who have 
used up their unemployment insurance entitlement. According to the author, 
this positive impact arises from employment been more attractive relatively 
to unemployment precisely because it gives entitlement to unemployment 
insurance. This hypothesis might for instance apply, in the presence of a 
dual labour market, to workers in the secondary sector of the market, typi­
cally characterized by less work protection, who are looking for a job in the 
primary sector of the market.
It has also been argued that higher levels of unemployment benefit may 
influence the unemployed’s intensity of search and with it the probability 
of getting to know about a desirable job offer, “a ” . There is, however, no 
agreement on the sign of this impact. Following Barron and Mellow (1979), 
search effort, 5 , can be expressed as a function of time, t , and money, c, spent 
searching and of individual characteristics, x , 5  =  S(t,c , x). Barron and Mel­
low (1979) show that higher benefits will augment the money spent searching 
but reduce the time of search. Ben-Horim and Zuckerman (1987) show that 
the positive effect of the benefit level on search intensity might offset the 
reservation wage effect and result in an overall positive effect of the benefit 
level on the probability of leaving unemployment. Wadsworth (1991), who 
analysed a sample of the unemployed extracted from the UK 1984 Labour
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Force Survey, concluded that recipients of unemployment benefit search more 
intensively than the unemployed that do not receive any unemployment ben­
efit. On the other hand, Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993) find for a sample 
of Dutch unemployed in the area of Leiden that the level of unemployment 
benefit has a significantly negative impact on search activity.
An important feature of search intensity is that it might vary during the 
course of the unemployment spell. For example, Lindeboom and Theeuwes 
(1993) find that the effect of search intensity on the probability of leaving 
unemployment is significantly positive and varies over time. The authors find 
that search intensity is most effective in the first weeks of the unemployment 
spell. Yoon (1981), looking at variable search intensity finds that unemploy­
ment duration is in large part explained by the time the unemployed spends 
searching for jobs rather than by the rejection of received offers, at least for 
the US PSID sample considered. This would support the argument that the 
probabilities of coming across a desirable job offer, a , and of being offered the 
job, rj may, after all, play a more important role in explaining unemployment 
duration than the offer rejection probability, 7 .
The sign of the overall impact of increased search intensity on the prob­
ability of leaving unemployment depends on the relative importance of the 
negative effect on the acceptance probability —which works through the 
reservation wage—, and of the positive effect on the probability of coming 
across a “desirable” job offer, a . Van den Berg (1994) looking at the impact 
of an increase in the offer probability on the conditional probability of leaving 
unemployment shows that for reasonable assumptions about the form of the 
wage offer distribution the positive effect dominates the negative effect. It 
seems plausible to assume that increased search intensity will raise the con­
ditional probability of leaving unemployment. Of course, it should be taken 
into account that the intensity of job search might vary during the course of 
the spell of unemployment and therefore be endogeneous to the model.
The basic ingredient of any labour supply equation is the relation between 
the wage obtained from labour and the value attributed to leisure. In the 
job search model, the assumption of income maximization on the side of the 
job seeker is equivalent to the assumption of risk neutrality. Assuming risk 
neutrality, allows one to dispense with the possible effects of risk aversion 
and non-labour income on the individual re-employment probability. This 
also implies that the impact of different valuations of leisure (L) relative to 
labour is not taken into account. However, it seems plausible that job seekers 
will differ in the value they attribute to the time spent not working. One 
way to allow for the impact of leisure valuation on the probability of leaving 
unemployment is to assume that the job seeker maximize their utility (rather 
than income) defined as a function of leisure and income. One would expect 
the reservation wage to increase with higher values of leisure relative to work, 
since the opportunity cost of working will be higher for higher valuations of 
leisure. The impact of a higher leisure valuation on the probability of leav­
ing unemployment is therefore negative. Some evidence for the UK on the
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impact of individual valuation of leisure on the reservation wage is gathered 
by Jones (1989), who has access to information on individual feelings and 
psychological attitudes during unemployment. The author finds that psy­
chological variables affect significantly and negatively (as expected) the level 
of the reservation wage.
Once, the risk neutrality assumption is relaxed, also the financial re­
sources of the unemployed might affect the probability of leaving unem­
ployment. For a given degree of risk aversion, higher levels of savings are 
expected to raise the unemployed’s reservation wage, as discussed, for in­
stance, in Jones et al. (1993). Intuitively, one would expect that wealthier 
persons have ceteris paribus higher reservation wages and longer unemploy­
ment durations. On the other hand, increasing risk aversion is likely to result 
in a lower reservation wage (Kohn and Shavell, 1974, and Pissarides, 1974), 
all things equal.
1.3 The duration of entitlem ent to unem ­
ploym ent benefit
The impact of the potential duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit 
on the individual probability of leaving unemployment has recently received 
considerable attention. This issue is exteremely relevant for the purpose of 
economic policy planning. Is it the case that reducing the duration of the en­
titlement period to unemployment benefit, will lead to lower unemployment 
duration on average?
Interest in this question is heightened by the announcement of the UK 
November 1993 Budget that the duration of the national insurance unem­
ployment benefit will be reduced to six months in 1995. Entitlement to this 
benefit lasts currently for a year.
It has been argued, for example by Mortensen (1977) and van den Berg 
(1990), that the unemployed will tend to lower their reservation wage and to 
increase their search intensity as the time of the expected reduction in the 
level (or of the exhaustion) of the benefit approaches. This would result in 
an increase in the individual chances of leaving unemployment near the time 
of the expected reduction in the level (or of the exhaustion) of the benefit. 
The majority of previous applied studies have found evidence in favour of 
this hypothesis. In particular, Katz (1986), Ham and Rea (1987), Katz and 
Meyer (1988, 1990), Meyer (1990), looked at this issue for North America. 
Similar findings were obtained for the Netherlands by Van den Berg (1990) 
and Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993).
There are no previous studies that look at this issue using microdata 
for the UK, at least to my knowledge. However, some cross-countries time 
series studies have found evidence in favour of a positive relationship between 
the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit and the duration of 
individual unemployment spells in the UK, among other countries (Burda,
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1988, and Jackman et al. , 1989).
In order to analyse the relationship between the duration of entitlement 
to unemployment benefit and the individual probability of leaving unempoy- 
ment for the case of the UK, the workings of the UK unemployment benefit 
schemes must be taken into account. Two types of unemployment benefits 
are available in the UK. The first is the National Insurance benefit, Unem­
ployment Benefit (UB), which is paid conditional on having paid sufficient 
work contributions and (currently) has a maximum duration of 52 weeks. 
The second is the social assistance benefit, Supplementary Benefit (SB), now 
called Income Support, which is is means-tested and unlimited in time. SB 
is means-tested on the resources and the needs of the unemployed (and their 
partner if any) and subject to other conditions such as demonstrating avail­
ability to work.
Both benefits are flat rate3 with additions for dependent spouse and chil­
dren. The two benefits can be received simultaneously —at any time, even 
at the commencement of the unemployment spell— if the unemployed’s re­
sources including UB fall below their needs. The benefit received by the 
unemployed can vary over time both in type and amount. For instance, the 
unemployed that initially receive only UB might gain entitlement to SB upon 
UB exhaustion; the amount of benefit received might be reduced because the 
partner has taken up a full-time job; or augmented due to the birth of a 
child; etc. etc. .
In Chapter 6 , I estimate the impact of the expected exhaustion of un­
employment insurance on the duration of unemployment. Estimating the 
relationship between the potential duration of entitlement to unemployment 
benefit and the probability of leaving unemployment is, however, a controver­
sial issue. The problems with detecting the entitlement effect are discussed 
in Chapter 6 .
1.4 A reduced form approach: the hazard 
rate
The traditional models of job search are not easily reduced to an estimating 
equation. They are neither of much help in guiding the choice of a specific 
functional form for the probability of leaving unemployment. A reduced form 
approach to modelling the probability of leaving unemployment is adopted 
throughout this work.
Structural models derive their estimating equations directly from the the­
oretical models of job search. In the reduced form models, instead, the prob­
ability of leaving unemployment is modelled as a conditional probability by 
means of the hazard raie, —drawing on the biomedical and statistical liter-
3The Earnings Related Supplement which used to link the amount of UB received to 
the level of previous earnings was abolished in January 1982.
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ature on the duration of life— and job search theory is used to guide the 
choice of the explanatory variables and the interpretation of the results.
Reduced form models present the advantage over structural models of 
a simpler specification. Moreover, reduced form models do not impose any 
restrictive functional form on the data and their results are easy to inter­
pret. For these reasons, reduced form models of the probability of leaving 
unemployment have become popular. However, a major disadvantage of such 
models is normally that the parameters of the underlying structural model 
cannot be recovered from the estimated reduced form parameters.
The hazard rate is a conditional probability. It allows one to specify 
the individual probability of leaving unemployment at a given point in time 
conditional on the individual being still unemployed up to that time. Some 
useful statistics textbooks are Kalbfleish and Prentice (1980) and Cox and 
Oakes (1984). One good econometric textbook is Lancaster (1990).
Let us define the duration of the unemployment spell, T, as a random 
variable. The probability of leaving unemployment in a certain time interval, 
(t, t -}- dt), given equation 1.1 above, can be written:
9(t)dt =  (a(<) * rj(t) * (1 — 7 {t))dt, (1.2)
where 0(t) is the hazard function. This equation gives the probability that 
unemployment will be exited between t and t +  dt, conditional on the unem­
ployment spell having lasted longer than i; i. e. formally:
d(t)dt =  P{t < T  < t +  dt\T > t), (1.3)
where P  stands for probability. The instantaneous conditional probability 
of leaving unemployment is obtained from 1.3, dividing by dt —which gives 
the average conditional probability for each instant of time in the interval 
( t,t  +  d t)— and taking the limit:
v '  d t - o dt y !
The expression above describes the probability of leaving unemployment in 
any instant of time, i, conditional on being still unemployed an infinitesimal 
amount of time to the left of t.
The hazard rate is normally allowed to depend on time, t, and on a 
vector x(t) of socio-economic variables which are individual characteristics 
and labour market conditions. Spells of unemployment end at the time of 
exit out of unemployment (completed spells), if this is observed. Often some 
unemployment spells are still in progress at the ending time of the observation 
period —right-censored spells4. The dependency on time of the hazard rate 
is captured by what is normally called the baseline hazard. The importance of
4Right-censoring is a common feature of data on unemployment duration and is easily 
dealt with in the applied econometric analysis.
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allowing for time dependency is discussed in the next section. The functional 
form adopted for the baseline hazard is presented in Chapter 3.
Multiple destinations out of unemployment are modelled by means of a 
com peting risks model. Competing risks specifications model unemployment 
duration together with the states exited into upon leaving unemployment. 
Examples of such states are employment, retirement, education, sickness. In­
stead, single risk  models, focus only on the duration of unemployment spells 
without distinguishing the destination states entered upon leaving unemploy­
ment. In a single risk framework exit from unemployment is defined as exit 
to any destination state.
In a competing risks context, the probability of leaving unemployment 
at a certain point in time, t , and of exiting to a specific destination state k, 
given the set D  of possible exit states, can written as:
_  ljm  (1 .5) 
dt—►o dt
which is the so-called cause-specific hazard. The destinations k —also called 
failure types or simply exits/exit states- are assumed to be mutually exclu­
sive, as plausible. It follows that the overall hazard rate, modelling exit to 
any state, can be thought of as the sum of the hazard rates of exiting into 
the states:
0k(<»*i(O)* (L6)
kiD
where D is the set of destination states considered. More details on the 
econometric background are given in Chapter 3. The estimating econometric 
model is also presented in Chapter 3.
It is plausible to assume that the impact of socio-economic factors on the 
individual probability of leaving unemployment will vary with the states ex­
ited to upon leaving unemployment. Previous studies such as, for instance, 
Katz and Meyer (1988, 1990) and Meyer (1990) have confirmed this view. 
Previous applied UK studies on individual unemployment duration were con­
ducted in a single risk framework, except for Narendranathan and Stewart 
(1993), who used a competing risks model to distinguish the probability of 
exiting from unemployment into employment from the probability of exiting 
from unemployment into other states. The authors compared the results of 
estimation of their preferred competing risks model with those of the corre­
sponding single risk model and concluded that the estimated effects of most 
of the explanatory variables were similar in the two models although some 
effects were larger for the competing risks exit into employment.
The importance of using competing risks models of the probability of 
leaving unemployment is assessed in Chapter 4, by means of intuitive argu­
ments and formal tests. I anticipate that the results obtained lead to different 
conclusions than Narendranathan and Stewart (1993).
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1.5 Some insights into the problem  of tim e  
dependency
The probability of leaving unemployment may vary purely as a function 
of the time spent in the state of unemployment. This issue has attracted 
considerable attention in the previous studies of individual unemployment 
duration given its implications for the purpose of economic policy.
It is possible that longer unemployment durations render the unemployed 
less “choosy” about accepting job offers, lowering their reservation wage. 
Consequently, the probability of leaving unemployment increases as a func­
tion of time, ceteris paribus —positive time dependency. It is, however, also 
possible that longer unemployment durations attach some kind of “stigma” 
to the unemployed which makes them less attractive as employees. The po­
tential employers might, for instance, fear that the long term unemployed 
are less active or less motivated to work or have lost their previous work 
experience. This would lead ceteris paribus to decreasing chances of leaving 
unemployment with increasing unemployment duration —negative time de­
pendency. Decreasing search intensity due to unemployed’s discouragement 
might also result in negative duration dependency.
It is important for economic policy purposes to investigate whether and 
how the probability of leaving unemployment varies over time purely as a 
function of the elapsing of the time spent in the state of unemployment. Neg­
ative time dependency implies that unemployment may be a “vicious circle” 
for the long-term unemployed: the longer the unemployed stays unemployed, 
the smaller are their chances to exit from unemployment.
Time dependency has often been modelled as a monotonic function, us­
ing a Weibull functional form for the baseline hazard rate (see Chapter 3). 
However, this choice is not supported by theoretical arguments. The sign of 
the dependency on time of the probability of leaving unemployment (if any) 
may vary over the unemployment spell. Only recently flexible specifications 
of the baseline hazard rate have been employed, where the sign of time de­
pendency is allowed to vary during the course of the unemployment spell. 
An interesting specification was for instance put forward by Meyer (1986). 
It represents a development of the model proposed by Prentice and Gloeckler 
(1978).
The only previous work on individual unemployment duration in Great 
Britain that modelled the baseline hazard rate using a flexible specification 
is due to Narendranathan and Stewart (1993). The authors adopted the 
same specification as Meyer (1986). The implications of using a flexible or 
a (more restrictive) monotonic specification of the baseline hazard rate are 
investigated in Chapter 4.
The issue of time dependency is closely related to that of unobserved 
heterogeneity, as pointed out by Lancaster (1979). The author argued that 
the unemployed with the “best” unobservable characteristics will be more
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likely to leave unemployment first, so that negative time dependency might 
spuriously result. Findings of negative time dependency might simply reflect 
the fact that unobserved heterogeneity has not properly been controlled for. 
The issue becomes more complicated in the case of competing risks models. It 
is possible that unobserved individual heterogeneity might result in positive 
time dependency. For instance, if one looks at the probability of leaving 
unemployment to exit out of the labour force, the individuad with the “best” 
unobserved characteristics with respect to the re-employment probability, 
will now be among the last to withdraw from the labour force. For instance, 
Katz and Meyer (1990, pp. 56) argue:
Although uncontrolled heterogeneity biases estimates o f dura­
tion dependence in the total hazard towards spurious findings of 
negative duration dependence, a bias in the opposite direction is 
possible for an individual escape route hazard in a competing risks 
model. I f  uncontrolled factors that raise the recall rate also reduce 
the new job finding rate, then one can, at least in theory, gener­
ate spurious positive duration dependence in the new job finding 
hazard.
Katz and Meyer,(1988,1990) allow for two destinations out of unemployment: 
the recall into the previous job and the finding of a new job. They claim that 
unobserved heterogeneity might lead to spurious positive time dependency 
even in the case of exit into employment.
1.6 The structure o f the thesis
The structure of this thesis is the following.
In Chapter 2 , the LSUS survey is described and some preliminary de­
scriptive analysis of the data is carried out. This is a useful exercize since 
these data have not been employed before in applied econometrics studies. 
The main features of the survey are first illustrated. The advantages and 
disadvantages of the LSUS data with respect to the analysis of unemploy­
ment duration are discussed and the LSUS data are compared to other UK 
and US datasets. The selection of the sample for the econometric analysis 
and the construction of some variables is reviewed next. I carry out some 
descriptive analysis of variables that deserve particular attention, such as the 
economic states occupied before or after experiencing unemployment and the 
amounts and types of unemployment benefit received during the course of 
the unemployment spell.
In Chapter 3, the econometric framework of analysis is laid out and the 
preferred econometric model is presented. This is a competing risks model 
where the baseline hazard is specified as a piecewise linear exponential and 
allowed to vary weekly. Two exit states out of unemployment are distin­
guished: full-time work and other states.
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In Chapter 4, the results of estimation of single and competing risks 
models are compared. The models are first estimated by the non-parametric 
Kaplan-Meier method. The appropriateness of the competing risks specifica­
tion is tested formally following the approach suggested by Narendranathan 
and Stewart (1991). The specification of a flexible baseline hazard rate is 
compared with a monotonie specification.
In Chapter 5, the impact of socio-economic factors on the conditional 
probability of leaving unemployment to take up a full-time job is investigated. 
The individual characteristics considered are for instance search activity, 
leisure valuation, spouse work activity, financial hardship and replacement- 
ratio variables. The impact of the unemployment benefit on the conditional 
probability of leaving unemployment is modelled not only in terms of the 
amount paid but also distinguishing the different types of benefit. The unem­
ployed that receive UB at the time of commencement of their unemployment 
spell are expected to leave unemployment first relative to the recipients of SB. 
The rationale of this assumption is the different duration of entitlement to to 
UB and to SB. The estimating model is a competing risks model where exit 
into a full-time job is distinguished from exit into other states. Sensitivity of 
the results to the specification of a competing risks model where part-time 
work is considered together with full-time work is tested. The robustness of 
the estimated coefficient on the level of unemployment benefit with respect 
to the choice of regressors is also tested. The predicted mean duration is 
computed under different sets of assumptions on the observed characteristics 
of the unemployed.
In Chapter 6 , the relationship between the potential duration of enti­
tlement to unemployment benefit and the conditional probability of leaving 
unemployment is investigated. The problems that might hinder the estima­
tion of this relationship are reviewed. The duration model is first estimated 
for the full sample of benefit recipients. The impact of benefit exhaustion 
is modelled with some timevarying dichotomous variables that take value 
one in given time intervals for the recipients of UB. The robustness of the 
estimated coefficients on these dummies is tested for. Next, the duration 
model is estimated separately for the the unemployed that receive UB and 
the unemployed that receive SB (either by itself or together with UB). The 
two estimated hazard rates are compared.
The object of Chapter 7 is estimating the impact of the level of financial 
resources of the unemployed on the re-employment probability. First, the 
theoretical background is laid out. Next, some descriptive analysis of the 
financial resources of the unemployed is presented. A competing risks model 
of the re-employment probability is estimated. The robustness of the results 
is tested for. The last Section concludes.
Conclusions to the thesis are drawn in Chapter 8 .
23

Chapter 2
D escription of the data and 
preliminary analysis
2.1 Introduction
The data employed are taken from the survey of the Living Standards during 
Unemployment (LSUS). This survey was caxried out by the Office of Popula­
tion Censuses and Surveys on behalf of the Department of Health and Social 
Security (DHSS) 1 in 1983/1984.
The LSUS data are largely unexploited. Only the survey planners have 
analysed them, at least to my knowledge, and mostly from a descriptive point 
of view (Heady and Smith, 1989). Therefore, I spend some time describing 
those features that are of most interest for the analysis of unemployment 
duration.
In particular, I focus on the economic states that the “LSUS” unem­
ployed reported to occupy before and after entering unemployment. Too 
often labour economists implicitly assume that the only alternative to unem­
ployment is employment. The importance of explicitly allowing for the many 
economic states that exist in the real world in models of unemployment dura­
tion has been stressed for instance by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991). It 
is shown here that even within each broad state of employment, unemploy­
ment and out of the labour force many other states can be distinguished. 
For example, unemployment covers both “registered” and “non-registered” 
unemployment. Registered unemployment relates to the unemployed that 
are registered with the Unemployment Benefit Offices (UBO) to receive un­
employment benefit. Non-registered unemployment refers to the unemployed 
that do not receive unemployment benefit.
The other set of variables that I analyse are unemployment benefit re­
ceipts. In spite of the attention paid in the literature to the disincentive 
effects of the unemployment benefit level on the probability of exiting from 
unemployment, the actual workings of the benefit have not been paid much
’Now called simply DSS.
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attention. As Atkinson and Micklewright (1991, pp. 1680) argue
we are concerned with the fact that — with some notable exceptions— 
labour market economists have paid little attention to how unem­
ployment benefits actually work.
The LSUS survey contains detailed information on the savings and debt of 
the unemployed and their spouses at different points in time. Access to such 
information is not common in previous studies. However, it might be the case 
that the financial resources of the unemployed influence their unemployment 
duration. The reader is referred to Chapter 7 for a descriptive analysis of 
the financial resources of the unemployed.
The structure of this Chapter is the following. In the next Section 2.2, 
the main features of the LSUS data are presented. Advantages and disad­
vantages of this survey are reviewed in relation to other datasets that have 
been used for the analysis of unemployment duration, in Section 2.3. In Sec­
tion 2.4, I describe how I use the LSUS data. First, I discuss the selection of 
the sample for analysis. I describe the economic states occupied in the week 
before the commencement of the observed spells of registered unemployment. 
The construction of some of the variables that are used in the econometric 
analysis, such as the duration of the unemployment spells and the expected 
earnings of the unemployed, is illustrated next. Some descriptive analysis 
of the economic states occupied before and after the commencement of the 
registered unemployment spell follows. The types and amounts of unemploy­
ment benefit received at the two interviews are analysed in Section 2.5. Given 
the limited information on the possible variation in the types and amounts of 
unemployment benefit received during the course of the unemployment spell,
I have imputed some of these changes, which are then described. Conclusions 
follow.
2.2 A description of the LSUS data
The LSUS survey was planned with the aim of gathering information on the 
change in the standards of living of the unemployed. The survey sample 
is drawn from the population of the unemployed that started to register 
at mainland Great Britain Unemployment Benefit Offices (UBOs) in the 
Summer of 1983, between 2 1 st June and 20th August 19832. The unemployed 
sampled were interviewed twice. The data can therefore be classified as a 
longitudinal sample of the inflow into registered unemployment.
The sample was selected adopting a two stage procedure. The first stage 
sample units were Great Britain Unemployment Benefit Offices, the second 
stage units were the unemployed that began their spells of registered unem­
2 Both unemployment benefits UB and SB described in the introduction are paid at 
UBOs.
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ployment in the Summer of 19833. It has to be pointed out that the survey 
relates to Great Britain and not the UK given that Northern Ireland UBOs 
are not sampled4.
The sample units
The unemployed with the following characteristics were sampled:
1. they started to register at unemployment benefit offices in the summer 
of 1983, between 21st June and 20th August 1983;
2. they were either married men or single people of either gender living 
on their own or with their children;
3. they were aged between 20 and 58;
4- they had been signing on5 continuously for three months following the 
commencement of their registered unemployment spell, in the summer 
of 1983.
The first characteristic defines the unemployment covered by the survey 
as registered unemployment. Unemployment is defined on the basis of ad­
ministrative records rather than according to individual’s self-perception or 
intensity of search. An inflow sample of the unemployed is drawn: those 
unemployed that started their unemployment spell within a given interval of 
time (the summer of 1983) are sampled. The opposite concept is that of a 
stock sample, which is a sample of the population of the unemployed at a 
given point in time. In a stock sample, the unemployed will have began their 
unemployment spells at very different points in times.
The second criterion defines “household heads” . As a consequence of 
this criterion, those living as single people in shared accomodation or living 
at home with their parents were excluded from the sample. Also married 
women were not sampled6. For the survey purposes, individuals are defined 
as married if they are either actually married or cohabiting.
3The reader is referred to Heady and Smith (1989) for more details of the sampling 
procedure.
4The sam e applies to the DHSS Cohort Study of the unemployed analysed by Naren- 
dranathan and Stewart (1993, 1993a). The United Kingdom includes Northern Ireland, 
Wales, Scotland, England; Great Britain includes England, Wales and Scotland, but it 
excludes Northern Ireland.
5 “Signing on” means in the British jargon going to social security offices to confirm 
that one is unemployed in order to get state benefits.
6This criterion for sample selection might have followed from the rules governing mar­
ried women’s entitlement to UB and SB in 1983/84. Until 1984 married women were not 
entitled to claim SB and they also had the possibility of opting out of the UB scheme by 
choosing to pay reduced rate contributions.
The third criterion excludes young people aged less than 20 and people 
close to their retirement age. Male unemployed aged less 20 represented 
about 15% of the population of the unemployed at July 19837.
The fourth criterion was such that the unemployed for less than three 
months were not interviewed. Following the actual sampling of the inflow 
into unemployment, interviews were conducted only with those persons that 
had unemployment spells longer than three months. The rationale for this 
sample selection criterion was that the survey planners aimed at gathering 
information on changes in the unemployed’s standards of living due to the 
experience of unemployment and therefore they were not interested in short­
term unemployment. The first interview took actually place three months 
after the inflow sample was drawn. The second interview was conducted a 
year after the first interview.
The informational content and the structure of the survey
The householders sampled and their spouses were interviewed twice. The 
participants in the first interview were 2929 unemployed persons of whom 
212 (7.2%) were single women (there were 396, 13.5%, single men among the 
participants to the first interview). The respondents to the second interview 
were 2299, of whom 168 (7.3%) were single women and 279 (12.1%) were 
single men, where marital status is defined with respect to the first interview.
The first interview took place about three months after the commence­
ment of the unemployment spells. Detailed information was collected on the 
demographic, sociological, economic and financial characteristics of the sam­
ple informants and their spouses at the first interview and one month before 
the commencement of the observed spells of registered unemployment. At 
the time of the first interview retrospective questions were also asked on the 
economic activity week-by-week in the year before the commencement of the 
observed spell of registered unemployment.
The second interview was carried out about a year after the first inter­
view, i. e. about 15 months after the commencement of the unemployment 
spells. Detailed information on the socio-economic characteristics of the un­
employed and their spouses was collected. At the time of the second inter­
view, questions were asked retrospectively on the economic activity week-by 
week during the year falling between the two interviews. This information al­
lows one to compute the duration of the unemployment spells and to observe 
the economic state entered upon leaving unemployment, if any.
The structure of the information collected by the survey is illustrated best 
by Table 2.18. The longitudinal structure of the data enables one to gather 
some limited information on the change if any in the types and amounts of 
unemployment benefits received. This information is exploited in the later 
Sections.
7Source: Employment Gazette, September 1983.
8This table is extracted from Heady and Smith, 1989, Vol. I, pag. 2.
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________________Table 2.1: The structure of the dataset
Longitudinal structure 
Content of first interview 
History:
Situation one month before 
signing on:
Situation three months after 
signing on:
Content of second interview
Events between S and 15 week by week data on economic status of sam-
months after signing on: pled person and of spouse.
Situation 15 months after cross-sectional dataset
signing on:
Contents of cross-sectional datasets
Economic status of sampled person and spouse; income, savings and debt; fi­
nancial commitments; material living standards; informants’ opinions; mea­
sures of psychological welfare; domestic, social and leisure activities; sources 
of help.
All the information collected by the survey is based on self-reports by 
the unemployed to the interviewers and not on administrative records. The 
drawback of self-reported information is the possible presence of recall error 
or misreporting, as will be discussed later on.
The response rate and the problem of attrition
Attrition is defined as the loss of sample participants across different waves 
of a panel survey. Attrition is a problem when non-participation in succes­
sive interviews is related to the object of the analysis. In the analysis of 
unemployment duration this would be the case if non-response to successive 
interviews were associated with the sample informants having gone back to 
work. This would imply for the LSUS data that the estimates of the con­
ditional probability of leaving unemployment obtained considering only the 
subsample of second interview participants underestimate the rate of exit 
from unemployment. Some analysis of attrition will be carried out below.
Heady and Smith (1989, Vol. 1 p. 4) report that the overall response 
rate to the first interview was between 67.9% and 71.4% , taking into ac­
count non-response to the sift questionnaires and to the main questionnaire9. 
The response rate to the second interview was 79%. among first interview
9A range is given because computing non-response to the sift questionnaires is not 
straightforward.
description of the sampled person’s last per­
manent job; week by week data on economic 
status in the year before signing on. 
detailed cross-sectional dataset with limitation 
imposed by the practicability of collecting in­
formation retrospectively, 
cross-sectional dataset.
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respondents10.
Heady and Smith (1989) observe that the response rate to the second 
interview was about 79% for all age classes and family types of first inter­
view respondents but that a much lower proportion (67%) of younger single 
people participated. Non-respondents at second interview can be classified 
as follows, using information gathered by the interviewers:
• respondents (8) died between the two interviews;
• respondents (25) had already said at the time of the first interview that 
they were not willing to participate in the successive interview;
• respondents (297) refused to participate in the second interview, when 
they were actually contacted in order to be interviewed;
• respondents (293) could not be contacted.
For 56% of the last two categories (590 people), some information on 
the economic activity at the second interview was also collected by the 
interviewers11. It turned out that, at the time of the second interview, 53.6% 
were in full-time work, 37.5% were in registered unemployment, 9% had left 
unemployment and were in states other than full-time work12. The same 
figures for the male subsample to be defined in Section 2.4.1 are 46%, 41% 
and 13%. It appears that the proportion of persons that have gone back to 
work is slightly higher among non-respondents than among respondents to 
the second interview. However, these estimates relate to only 56% (590) of 
the non-respondents to the second interview. It is not possible to exclude 
that the proportion of persons that took full-time employment was larger 
for those unemployed for whom no information of any sort on their later 
economic activity could be recovered.
To gain more insights into the extent of possible problems arising from 
attrition I have estimated a binary probability model of the non-response to 
the second interview13. The results of estimation of a probit model of the
I0For comparison purposes, 1 give here the corresponding figures for another UK longi­
tudinal survey of the unemployed. The response rate for the DSS Cohort Study of 1987/88 
was 70% to the first interview and 71% to the second interview, as reported in Garman et 
al. (1992).
11 Some information concerning the last category of people namely those that could not 
be contacted was gathered by asking their relatives or neighbours.
lzThis information will not be used for duration analysis, since not much is known about 
the economic activity of these persons during the time in between the two interviews. This 
information does not tell us when the spell of unemployment, started in the summer of 
1983, was actually terminated nor the state to which the person had exited to, if any. For 
instance, somebody might have concluded their “first” observed unemployment spell to 
take up a full-time job and then gone back into unemployment by the time of the second 
interview. However, one could make the assumption that the unemployment spell ended 
some time between the first and the second interview for the non-respondents that were 
back to work at the time of the second interview.
13See for instance Maddala (1988) for an introduction to binary probability models.
probability of participating in the second survey interview are presented in 
Table 2.2. The dependent variable is the probability of participating in the 
second survey interview. The explanatory variables considered are those of 
the preferred duration model of Chapter 5, to which the reader is referred for 
their description. The analysis is carried out only for the male unemployed.
Table 2.2: The probability of participating in the second survey interview: a 
probit model
Variable Coeff SE
F /t work most of time in the 0.2634* 0.0954
year before
Unemployed most of the 0.1332 0.1018
time in year before
Sick out of work most of the 0.1177 0.1653
time in year before
Profess. /Interm. Occupa­ -0.0891 0.0769
tion class
Unskilled Occupaiton -0.0235 0.1177
Age 25-34 -0.1508 0.0969
Age S5-44 -0.1924 0.1038
Age 45-54 -0.1419 0.1128
Age 55-58 -0.0891 0.1316
Any child aged < 5 0.1226 0.0756
Married 0.2578* 0.0862
Spouse worktng month be­ -0.1029 0.0761
fore
Searches less than before 0.1587* 0.0787
Values Leisure more 0.0089 0.0822
Experiences money shortage -0.0977 0.0680
House owner 0.0630 0.0648
County unemployment rate 2.9410* 0.8718
Receives only UB at t l -0.0123 0.0665
Benefit amount (£ )  logs. -0.0548 0.0352
Expected earnings (£ )  logs. 0.0530 0.0485
Expected earnings not avail­ 0.2284 0.3288
able
Max. lik. : -1883.78. A * indicates statistical significance
at the two sided 5% level. Descriptive statistics of the ex­
planatory variables are given in the Chapter 5. The model
is estimated only for male unemployed.
From Table 2.2, it emerges that most explanatory variables considered 
do not affect significantly the probability of participating in the second sur­
vey interview. These variables are instead found to affect significantly the 
probability of leaving unemployment, as shown in Table 5.2 of Chapter 5. 
This result is quite encouraging. The probability of participating in the sec­
ond survey interview is significantly higher for persons with the following 
characteristics: married people; that were in full-time work most time in 
the year before becoming unemployed; residing in an area with (relatively) 
higher unemployment rates; demonstrating little search activity. These last 
two variables affect the probability of staying in the sample in an opposite 
direction than the re-employment probability. The first two variables listed 
above affect instead both probabilities in the same direction. To sum up 
there is no strong indication that non-response might be associated with the 
non-respondent having gone back to work. Only two of the variables consid­
ered are found to affect significantly and in the same direction the probability 
of participating in the second survey interview and the re-employment prob­
ability. However, it is not possible to exclude that unobserved individual 
characteristics might affect the two probabilities in the same direction. I 
have considered only a very simple model of non participation. More sofisti- 
cated models would involve estimating the two probabilities simultaneously 
and testing for any correlation across the errors in the model. A good refer­
ence in this respect for the analysis of attrition is van de Berg et al. (1991 )14. 
Given the large number of explanatory variables here considered, some of 
which capture individual characteristics that are normally unobserved, it 
seems unlikely that attrition might constitute a serious problem.
2.3 An assessm ent o f the LSUS data and a 
com parison w ith other datasets
The advantages and the disadvantages of the LSUS survey with respect to 
the analysis of unemployment duration are discussed below. At the same 
time, the LSUS data are compared with other data that have been used for 
the analysis of unemployment duration in the UK and in the USA. These 
two countries are selected for comparison since the majority of the literature 
I refer to relates to them.
The other surveys considered for the UK are: the DSS Cohort Study 
of the unemployed of 1978/79, analysed by Narendranathan et al. (1985) 
and by Narendranathan and Stewart (1993, 1993a); the DSS Cohort Study 
of the unemployed 1987/88; the national survey for Political and Economic 
Planning (PEP) of 1974 employed, for instance, by Lancaster (1979), the 
General Household Survey (GHS) 1972 analysed by Nickell (1979) and the
14The authors estimated simultaneously the duration of participation in the sample and
the duration of unemployment18, for a sample of Dutch unemployed. Their results point 
to independency of survey participation duration and unemployment duration.
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Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 1972-1977 used by Atkinson et al. (1984). 
The surveys considered for the USA are: the Continuous Wage and Benefit 
History (CWBH) data employed, among others, by Moffit (1985), Katz and 
Meyer (1988) and Meyer (1990); Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
analysed, for instance, by Katz (1986) and Katz and Meyer (1990).
Ideally in order to conduct some microeconometric analysis of the deter­
minants of the duration of unemployment one would need information about 
the local labour market conditions, the duration of the unemployment spells, 
the destination states out of unemployment, the amounts of unemployment 
benefit and other sources of income received while unemployed, the expected 
income from work and other individual characteristics, such as age, gender, 
family composition, previous work history, search activity. Some of these 
variables such as, for instance, the local labour market conditions and the 
amount of unemployment benefit received, may vary over the course of the 
unemployment spell. Information on any changes in the values of these vari­
ables intervened during the course of the unemployment spell should also be 
available. There is no need to say that all information should be as detailed 
and accurate as possible.
A first advantage of the LSUS data stems from its longitudinal structure 
which allows one to observe the ending time of the unemployment spells and 
the economic states occupied upon leaving unemployment, at least for those 
unemployment spells that are completed by the time of the second interview. 
Normally cross-section surveys such as the GHS and the FES do not contain 
such information. As a result, the likelihood functions for the data in any 
analysis of unemployment duration with such cross-section samples are very 
complicated and require an assumption about the inflow rate. Moreover, such 
cross-section samples do not usually contain any information on the economic 
states entered upon leaving unemployment by the sample informants.
A second advantage is that the period of time covered by the survey is one 
of high and rising unemployment rates, while the majority of previous applied 
UK studies relate to the seventies when the rate of unemployment was much 
lower. Indeed, the re-employment probability is likely to be influenced by 
the overall level of unemployment.
A third advantage of the survey is that it collects detailed information on 
the socio-economic characteristics of the unemployed. There is for instance 
information on the states occupied before unemployment, on the individual 
valuation of leisure, search activity, financial constraints and on the partici­
pation of the spouse in the labour force. Moreover, most of these variables are 
observed a short time (one month) before the commencement of the observed 
unemployment spells. This allows one to avoid potential endogeneity prob­
lems. For instance, search intensity may vary as a function of the duration 
of the unemployment spell. Furthermore, the LSUS survey contains detailed 
information on the savings and debt of the unemployed. This information is 
unique in the sense that there are, to my knowledge, no other datasets that 
contain such information.
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A fourth advantage is that the survey covers the situation of the unem­
ployed for longer than a year. This is particularly important given that in 
Britain unemployment is concentrated in durations longer than a year, as 
shown in Figure 2.1. Moreover a year coincides with the maximum enti­
tlement to UB16. Therefore, it is possible to observe the behaviour of the 
unemployed beyond UB exhaustion. The two DSS Cohort studies do not 
follow the unemployed for longer than a year. Similarly, the US CWBH 
does not follow the unemployed beyond unemployment benefit exhaustion. 
The CWBH data used by Katz and Meyer (1988) were instead supplemented 
by telephone interviews which collected also information on the unemployed 
behaviour after entitlement to unemployment benefit had expired.
The main disadvantage of the LSUS data is that they contain little infor­
mation on any change in the amount or the type of unemployment benefit 
received during the course of the unemployment spell. This problem is dis­
cussed in more detail in the later sections, where also some imputations of 
the changes in benefit receipts are made. A similar problem affects the FES, 
PEP and GHS but not the DHSS Cohort Studies nor the CWBH. This prob­
lem can hinder the estimation of the unemployment benefit effect. However, 
using imputed benefit receipts rather than the actual values might introduce 
additional problems into the regression.
Another disadvantage of the LSUS survey stems from the administrative 
definition of unemployment adopted. Also the DSS Cohort studies and the 
CWBH adopt an administrative definition of unemployment. As Atkinson 
and Micklewright (1991) point out different definitions of unemployment may 
have different implications for the analysis of the duration of unemployment. 
On the basis of the administrative definition adopted here any person receiv­
ing unemployment benefit (UB or SB) is considered as unemployed regardless 
of their actual search activity. Instead, there might be persons not entitled 
to unemployment benefit that are actively searching for jobs in the labour 
market. These individuals will not be considered as unemployed, if an ad­
ministrative definition of unemployment is adopted. Another drawback of 
defining unemployment on the basis of administrative records is that admin­
istrative law may be used to control artificially the figures on unemployment, 
for instance by tightening the conditions for entitlement to unemployment 
benefit.
A further disadvantage of the data is due to the self-reported nature of 
all information contained in the LSUS survey. However, most surveys are 
based on individual self-reported information. Exceptions are for instance 
the DHSS Cohort Studies and the CWBH which contain administrative in­
formation on the duration of the unemployment spells and on the amounts of 
unemployment benefits paid. Self-reported information might be biased by 
recall error or misreporting. For instance, the retrospective information on
l6The reader is referred to Section 1.3 of Chapter 1 for a brief description of the UK 
system of unemployment benefits.
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Figure 2.1: The distribution of unemployment durations
the economic activity week-by-week in the year between the two interviews, 
which is used to construct the duration of the unemployment spells and to 
define the exit state out of unemployment (if any), might be biased by recall 
error or misreporting. However, this does not seem a major problem in the 
case of the LSUS data. Some analysis of the accuracy of the information on 
the amounts and types of benefit reported is provided in the next sections.
Another drawback of the LSUS data is the non-coverage of unemployment 
spells that lasted for less than three months. However, this problem is not 
very serious since one can condition each unemployment spell contribution 
to the likelihood for the LSUS data on the probability that the spell lasted 
for longer than three months. One could also argue that the real problem for 
the economy is not short-term unemployment but long-term unemployment. 
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of unemployment spell by their durations 
for the population of the unemployed at July 1983 (not for the LSUS sample). 
The Figure relates to the male unemployed aged between 20 and 5917 at 
July 14th 1983. I have considered only males since it was not possible to 
distinguish between married or single women in the published figures. The 
bulk of unemployment is concentrated in durations longer than three months. 
At July 1983, the male unemployed for longer than 12 weeks were 78% of 
the population of male unemployed aged more than 20 or less than 59.
17The limit 59 rather than 58 was chosen because of the structure of all information in 
the Employment Gazette which groups together age 58 and 59.
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To conclude other problems of the LSUS survey are that no information 
on race nor on the educational attainments of the unemployed is collected.
None of the above drawbacks is however so serious that one should re­
strain from using the LSUS data to investigate the determinants of individual 
unemployment duration. It seems instead worth the effort to carry out some 
analysis of unemployment duration using the LSUS data given the attractive 
features of the data described above.
2.4 U sing the LSUS data
The preparation of the LSUS data for econometric analysis is reviewed below. 
The criteria that lead to the selection of a subsample of the unemployed are 
reported first. The construction of the duration of the unemployment spells, 
of the exit states and of the expected earnings from work is presented next. 
Some descriptive analysis of the states occupied before and after entering un­
employment; of the type and the amount of unemployment benefit received; 
and of how it may vary over course of the unemployment spell follows. A 
section on social security benefits other than “UB” and “SB” concludes.
2.4.1 T he subsam ple for the econom etric analysis
Information on the week-by-week economic activity of the sample informants 
in the year before the commencement of the the unemployment spell and in 
the year falling between the two sample interviews is collected retrospectively. 
The LSUS survey allows one to distinguish the following economic states:
• full-time work;
• registered unemployed and entitled to benefit;
•  registered unemployed and not entitled to benefit;
• full-time education;
• government scheme;
• part-time work o f over 10 hours per week;
• part-time work o f 10 hours or less per week;
• sick and out of work;
• in prison;
• looking after family;
• other.
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The survey allows for four possible states within the labour force: full­
time work; part-time work of more than 10 hours per week; part-time work 
of 10 hours or less per week; registered unemployment.
“Work” is defined, for the survey purposes, as (ESRC, 1990(a), pag. 3 .): 
“regular work regardless of hours and excluding odd jobs, mail order agent, 
baby sitting, but including people away sick with work to return to”. Full­
time work is defined as (ESRC,1990,a,pag. 3.): regular work of “more than 
30 hours per week, except teachers and lecturers, and including people work­
ing short-time if  job is normally f u l l - t i m e Registered unemployment is 
defined as registration with Unemployment Benefit Offices, on the basis of 
administrative records. Some unemployed , although registered at UBO, are 
“not entitled to benefit” because they are for instance awaiting to receive 
benefit or temporarily suspended from benefit receipt.
Five “out of the labour force” states are distinguished within the OPCS 
survey: full-time education; government training scheme; care of family; sick­
ness; prison.
The category “sick and out of work” is defined as “being out of work and 
having medical or doctor’s certificate exempting one from signing on” (ESRC, 
1990a, pag. 12).
The state “other” includes any other state not previously considered. It 
includes for instance “on strike at the end of an employment spell” (ESRC, 
1990a, pag. 12). It includes also “answers which imply rather than a state 
that the person was not entitled to benefit. For instance: ‘paid up till here 
‘finished work, waiting to sign on’; ‘pay in lieu o f notice”18. Unfortunately it 
is not possible to distinguish these cases from the others. I have then recoded 
the state “registered unemployment but not entitled to benefit” under “other 
states” . Retirement is not considered because of the age range (20-58) cov­
ered by the survey. However, there is no mention of whether early retirement 
schemes might be coded under the category “other states” .
There is a question of whether or not the state “in care of family” should 
be considered as a “marginal job” and, therefore, a state within the labour 
market, as suggested by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991). The same ques­
tion applies to the state “government training scheme” . However, trainees 
that are receiving a proper wage rather than a small allowance are already 
coded by the interviewers as in full-time or part-time work, as appropriate.
The economic state occupied in the week before entering unemployment 
are summarized in Table 2.3 for the subsample of second interview respondents19. 
The proportion of first interview participants in the different entry states is 
actually very similar and can be looked up in the published reports (Heady
18The unemployed are not entitled to unemployment benefit while receiving pay in lieu 
of notice.
19As will be explained below, unemployment duration analysis will be carried out only 
for this subsample of the unemployed. Second interview participants are 2299. However, 
for two of them the information on the economic activity undertaken in the week before 
the commencement of their registered unemployment spell is not available; i. e. missing.
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oand Smith, 1989, Vol. 1 , p. 5).
As shown in Table 2.3, almost 55% of the unemployed were in full-time 
work in the week before registering as unemployed at UBO. This confirms 
that it is not enough to describe the possible economic states as either em­
ployment or unemployment. However, it is also true that the majority of the 
sampled unemployed were in full-time work before becoming unemployed. A 
considerable number (7.8%) were sick and out of work in the week before 
registering at UBOs. A large fraction (2 0 .2 %) were classified in the state 
“other” . Of those people whose entry state is classified as “other” , 28% 
reported to have received some pay in lieu of notice.
Some unemployed —129, as shown in the Table 2.3— turned out to be 
already in the state of registered unemployment in the week before the time 
when, according to the survey, they began their registered unemployment 
spell. Heady and Smith (1989, pag. 5) comment upon this by observing 
that: “The fact that 6% of the sample were actually signing on for most of 
the previous week is perhaps particularly surprising, but can happen because of 
technical interruptions in the process of signing on and claiming, which may 
lead to being counted as starting a new spell”. Another possible explanation 
is that some unemployed had just moved to different geographical areas and 
they were erroneously counted as starting a new spell of unemployment.
Table 2.3: The entry states into unemployment
Economic states 2nd interview Subsample
in the week before participants used for analysis
No. % No. %
f/ t  work 1236 53.8 1252 57.0
signing on 129 5.6 0 0
f / t  education 53 2.3 54 2.6
govt scheme 62 2.7 63 2.9
p /t work over 10 hrs 49 2.1 49 2.2
p /t work 10 hrs or less 11 .5 11 .5
sick and out of work 196 8.5 201 9.1
in prison 43 1.9 44 2.0
looking after family 41 1.8 41 1.9
other 465 20.2 469 21.3
not entitled to benefit 12 .5 12 .5
Total Sum 2297 100.0 2196 100.0
The majority of those people whose entry state turned out to be regis­
tered unemployment were deleted from the sample for econometric analysis. 
For few of them (28) it turned out that they were in states other than regis­
tered unemployment two weeks before the recorded commencement of their
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registered unemployment spell. These persons were kept in the sample for 
analysis20. Most of them were in full-time work at that time, as shown in 
Table 2.3 by the difference between the numbers in the second and fourth 
column of the first row.
The unemployed that were “not entitled to benefit” in the week before 
starting their registered unemployment spell were in the same position as the 
people in the category “other”, which were receiving pay in lieu of notice. 
Therefore, these people were kept in the sample for analysis.
The subsample for analysis is restricted to male unemployed only. This 
makes the results of the analysis comparable with those obtained in previous 
UK studies of unemployment duration, which relate to men only. Including 
the subsample of single women unemployed may, indeed, throw considerable 
unobserved heterogeneity into the sample. Recent literature, as, for instance, 
Jenkins (1992) and Blundell et al. (1992) has focused on the peculiar situation 
of “lone mothers” with respect to the decision to work, given the special social 
security treatment they enjoy21. Comparing the duration of unemployment 
of the female unemployed with that of the male unemployed is the subject 
of a separate piece of work (Stancanelli, 1994).
2.4.2 The duration o f the unem ploym ent spells
The duration of the unemployment spells was constructed (by myself) as 
described below.
To start with, three types of unemployment spells can be distinguished, 
as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Let us define “tO” as the starting time of the 
unemployment spell, “t l ” the time of the first interview (about three months 
later) and “t2” the time of the second interview (after a further 12 months). 
The times tO, t l  and t2 differ for each individual, although each of them 
falls in a given interval of time. For instance, tO lies somewhere between 
20th June and 21 August 1983, t l  falls in the Autumn of 1983 and t2 in the 
Autumn of 1984.
Unemployment spells of type “a” last less than three months and are 
not observed given the sample design. In the econometric analysis of un­
employment duration, I allow for the fact that only spells that last longer 
than three months are observed; i. e. for left truncation of the sample at the 
three months point. Spells of type “b” are completed spells, they last longer 
than three months and end before the time of the second interview, t2. For 
these spells, exit from unemployment is observed to take place between t l
20Their registered spell of unemployment was amended and set one week longer than it 
would have otherwise been. Similarly their entry state was corrected and set equal to the 
state actually occupied two weeks before.
21 It is interesting to know that while the social security legislation the authors refer 
to in their work applies to lone parents of either gender, they are considering only lone 
mothers as having a disincentive to work, the reason being that 90% of lone parents are 
women.
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Figure 2.2: Types o f unemployment spells
and t2 . Spells of type “c” are right-censored since they are still in progress at 
the second interview, t 2 . Right-censoring is a typical feature of duration or 
transition data. Often some proportion of the sample units have not exited 
to a new state by the end of the observation period. This is easily allowed 
for in the econometric model.
The duration of the unemployment spells was constructed for spells of 
type “b” and “c” using the information on the week-by-week economic activ­
ity in the year falling between the two interviews. The unit of time considered 
throughout the analysis is the week and time is assumed to be continuous.
Unemployment duration can be computed only for the participants to 
the second interview, since the information on the economic activity week- 
by-week after the commencement of the unemployment spell was collected 
at the second interview22. This is one of the reasons for restricting attention 
to this subsample of the unemployed.
The duration of the unemployment spells was computed as follows.
1 . The survey weekly calendar time was transformed in “homogenous” 
non-calendar units of time, setting the first week of registered unem­
ployment equal to one for each individual— rather than for instance to 
the second week of July or the third week of August— and counting
22Non-participants to the second interview could be treated as right-censored at the first 
interview. However, given of the sample design they should also be treated as left-truncated 
at the first interview, which implies that their contribution to the sample likelihood would 
be irrelevant.
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2. The individual left truncation period was set equal to the lapse of time 
(in weeks) between the date of registration at benefit offices and the 
date of the first interview. The resulting variable varies between 11 and 
17 weeks, since the first interview took place in the Autumn of 1983 
and the unemployed began their spells in the Summer of 1983.
3. The time the individuals had been unemployed between the two in­
terviews was computed on the basis of the replies to the retrospective 
questions on the economic activity in each week in the year falling be­
tween the first and the second interview. The exit state variable was 
constructed using the same information, for completed spells. Spells 
still in progress at the second interview are right-censored.
4. The duration of the first spell of unemployment was set equal to the 
sum of the two durations constructed at points 2 and 3.
Table 2.4 illustrates the variation in the individual left truncation points. 
Most spells, about 38%, present a left truncation point of 13 weeks. The left 
truncation point falls between 12 and 14 weeks for 85.5% of the sample.
Table 2.4: Left truncation points
truncation No. of spells Percentage
11 23 1.1
12 363 17.8
IS 770 37.8
U 609 29.9
15 195 9.6
16 62 3.0
17 13 .6
Sum 2035 100.0
The truncation intervals are measured in
weeks. The table refers to the male sub-
sample.
Table 2.5 shows the frequency of the duration of the unemployment spells. 
All right-censoring takes place from week 63 onwards. The completed spells 
in Table 2.5 relate to exit from unemployment into any economic state. There 
is no indication that the reported durations might be biased by “rounding 
recall error” ; i. e. there is no evidence of durations been bunched at regular 
intervals of time. This is instead often the case when retrospective questions 
are asked on the duration of the unemployment spell (Torelli and Trivellato,
23It should be remembered that unemployment spells that started in the summer of 1983 
were sampled. The time of commencement of the unemployment spells differs therefore 
across the sampled unemployed.
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1993a and 1993b). However, in the case of the LSUS data a separate question 
is asked about the respondent’s economic activity in each given calendar 
week. One might conclude that this type of question probably avoids the 
occurrence of rounding recall errors.
I do not use the information on any subsequent spells of unemployment 
recorded in the data. Multiple spells of unemployment are therefore ignored. 
For instance, a person exiting from unemployment at week 21 to enter full­
time work and then going back into unemployment or perhaps sickness in 
week 30, is recorded as having unemployment duration of 20 weeks and exit 
state full-time work.
Table 2.5: Unemployment spells
unemployment censored complete unemployment complete censored
duration spells no. spells no. duration spells no. spells no.
12 4 43 18
IS 25 44 28
U 44 45 21
15 4S 46 18
16 43 4 7 22
17 39 48 15
18 SS 49 23
19 31 50 24
20 26 51 10
21 27 52 19
22 18 53 25.
23 21 54 19
24 27 55 15
25 27 56 15
26 31 57 11
27 27 58 16
28 31 59 15
29 25 60 U
SO 26 61 IS
31 36 62 12
32 22 63 9 11
S3 38 64 135 10
34 29 65 300 7
35 21 66 236 2
36 12 67 103
37 27 68 34
38 24 69 7
39 23 71 1
40 18 Column 825 1210
41 18 Total 40.5 59.5
42 12
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2.4.3 T he ex it states out o f unem ploym ent
The exit states that can be distinguished using the information contained in 
the LSUS survey are the same economic states which were described in Sec­
tion 2.4.1: full-time work; part-time work of more than ten hours per week; 
part-time work of less than ten hours per week; full-time education; govern­
ment scheme; sickness; looking after family; prison; other states. Information 
on the exit states is used in the specification of the competing risks models 
in the later chapters, although at a much less disaggregated level given the 
small number of exits to most of these states.
Table 2.6 compares the exit states with the entry states for the male un­
employed selected as described in Section 2.4.1. This table gives a “snapshot” 
of individual history with respect to the economic states occupied through­
out one’s life. The cell frequencies rather than the percentages are shown in
Table 2.6: The entry and exit states of the male subsample
entry state exit states out of unemployment
censored JA td. gov. p / t > P A < sick pris. fam. oth. total
j / t  work 453 612 4 17 29 5 47 1 1 25 1194
f / t  education 9 22 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 40
gov. scheme 24 26 1 6 3 1 61
p /t work > lOh 13 16 4 3 1 1 38
p /i work < lOh 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
sick no work 100 48 1 6 3 16 5 179
prison 30 7 1 3 3 44
care of family 11 2 1 1 2 17
other 183 198 2 7 16 3 23 1 3 18 442
total St4 931 9 44 57 11 97 5 4 50 1033
The table relates to the suhsample of males participating tn the second interview, constructed as in the
paragraphs above. There are two “missing cases'", for whom such information is not available.
order to retain full information, given the very small numbers found in some 
of the matrix cells. The state of “not being entitled to benefit” has been 
merged with “other states”. The number of persons whose entry state was 
“not entitled to benefit” were 1 2 ; those whose exit state was not “entitled to 
unemployment benefit” were 7.
Two points emerge. First, a quick glance at this table should persuade 
the reader that reducing the economic world to the two standard states of 
employment and unemployment is too strong a simplification of reality. How­
ever, it is true that about 59% of the unemployed were in full-time work 
before becoming unemployed. Furthermore, almost 46% of the unemployed 
exited to full-time work. About 77% of the unemployed that exited from un­
employment exited to full-time work. Second, the table reveals how people 
move across states. Having been in a certain state before becoming unem­
ployed does not necessarily imply going back to the same state upon leaving 
unemployment. People from all different “backgrounds” of economic entry
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states into unemployment are observed to leave unemployment to take up a 
“regular” full-time job. For instance, almost 30% of those that were sick be­
fore entering unemployment find a full-time job before the time of the second 
interview. The same percentage for those that were in full-time work before 
unemployment is about 6 6 %. The corresponding figure for the individuals 
entering unemployment from “other” states is about 45%. Instead, about 4% 
of those that were in full-time work before becoming unemployed end their 
unemployment spell in sickness.
For the purpose of the later econometric analysis the unemployed exiting 
into prison (11  observations) or into “not entitled to unemployment benefit” 
(7 observations) will be treated as if right-censored at the time of exit. The 
rationale for this choice is that the number of people exiting into prison is too 
small to allow one to consider this state separately. Furthermore, it seemed 
preferable not to consider “prison” together with the “other states” given the 
already considerable heterogeneity of the “other states” exit. Similarly, the 
few cases that reported to be not “entitled to unemployment benefit” were 
treated as if right-censored since it was not possible to know whether they 
were only temporarily suspended from benefit receipt or they had actually 
exited the state of registered unemployment.
2.4.4 T he expected  earnings from work
The expected earnings from work contribute to determine the level of the 
unemployed’s reservation wage and search intensity. However, individual 
expected earnings are not normally observed. One would actually like to 
observe the mean of the distribution of expected earnings. Earnings in the 
last job are often used as a measure of expected earnings from work, in 
the analysis of unemployment duration. One rationale for this choice is its 
computational convenience, given that earnings in the last job are most of 
the time observed. It is also plausible that the unemployed form expectations 
of their future earnings looking at their past earnings.
Past earnings may however be “endogenous” to the model since “the indi­
viduals who are more selective about accepting jobs may well have had higher 
than average earnings” (Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993a, p. 4). Past 
earnings might also proxy unobserved individual characteristics which might 
affect the offer probability. Narendranathan et al. (1985) argue that expected 
earnings should be measured by the average earnings of the individuals with 
similar qualifications rather than by the level of past earnings. The authors 
suggest that one could for instance use a “smoothed” earnings variable con­
structed using the fitted earnings from an earnings regression where past 
earnings are the dependent variable.
In addition to these reasons, there is an important practical reason for not 
using past earnings. In the LSUS survey past earnings are available only for 
about 52% of the subsample considered and for about 53% of the participants 
in the first interview. Using the procedure described below I have imputed
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expected earnings if past earnings were not reported.
However, the drawbacks of using imputed earnings instead of actual earn­
ings might be severe. It is well known that instrumenting variables might 
introduce unobserved heterogeneity in non-linear models. There is however 
no reasons to believe that imputed earnings might be less close to the true 
expected earnings distribution than earnings in the last job. The sensitivity 
of the estimates of the preferred model of Chapter 4 to the use of either 
earnings variables will be tested for (in Chapter 4).
I have computed a “smoothed” earnings variable for the LSUS sample as 
follows.
1 . I have estimated an earnings regression for the unemployed that re­
ported net earnings in the last job (one month before unemployment, 
see Table 2 .1 ) and whose last job was full-time, excluding the self- 
employed in professional occupations. The units of analysis were 52% 
(1407 out of 2717) of the male respondents to the first survey interview.
2 . The dependent variable is usual net earnings in the last job (in £ )  
and it is entered in logarithms. The explanatory variables considered 
are industry, occupational group, the type of position occupied (l. e. 
manager or foreman or employee), marital status and a quadratic in 
age.
3. The estimated earnings from this regression are used as a measure 
of expected earnings. The expected earnings of the unemployed that 
had reported past earnings are set equal to the fitted values from this 
regression.
4. Using the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables from this 
regression, expected earnings are imputed for the unemployed that pro­
vided information on the values taken by (at least some of) the explana­
tory variables but did not report the level of their last earnings. When 
information on some of the explanatory variables was not available, the 
person was treated as if being in the base group for these variables.
Results of estimation are given below. Descriptive statistics of the ex­
planatory variables are given in the Appendix. Unfortunately, no informa­
tion is available on the educational levels of the sample participants nor on 
their race.
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Table 2.7: Results o f estimation of the earnings equation.
Variable description Coefficient SE
Constant 8.51 .13
age/100 3.55 .71
(•8*/100)2 •4.05 .90
married .05 .03
manager .16 .03
foreman .14 .03
Ind2 Minerals & Chemicals -.10 .04
Ind3 Engineering -.13 .03
lnd4 Other Manufacturing -.12 .03
lnd6 Hotels i¿ Catering -33 .03
Ind8 Finance -.13 .05
lnd9 Other Services -.19 .04
Noind Information not available -.25 .09
Gl Employers/managers large firm .31 .06
G2 Employers/managers small firm .25 .07
G3 Professional/self-employed .62 .18
G4 Professional/employees .15 .06
G6 Junior non-manual -.25 .06
G9 Skilled manual workers -.25 .04
G10 Semi-skilled manual -.26 .08
G il Unskilled manual -.10 .04
G13 Farmers employers/managers -.14 .05
Gl4 Farmers own account -.22 .03
G15 Agricultural workers -.18 .03
G16 Members of armed forces -.12 .06
M ultiple R =.515 nquare=.265 ; adjusted r»qu*rc= .251; Number of obaerva- 
tions 1407. The dependent variable is log. weekly earnings (measured in pence). 
The average reported earnings were «£96.50 (SD -C51.90) per week. Descriptive 
statistics of the explanatory variables are given in Table 8.1 in the Appendix. 
The base for the dummies “manager” and “foreman” is “employee” . The base 
for the occupational groups is “group 12”; i. e. own account workers ingaged in 
any occupation other than one requiring a University degree. The occupational 
groups are defined in the Appendix. The base for the industry dummies is the 
construction industry.
The results relate to the restricted model. I shall not stop to comment 
in detail these results since the purpose of this exercise is to construct a 
smoothed earnings variable and not to explain individual earnings. A dis­
cussion of the earnings of the unemployed that participated in the survey is 
provided by the survey planners (Heady and Smith (1989), Vol. 1 pp. 16-18, 
Vol. 2 pp. 18-20).
The results of estimation indicate that earnings are maximum at about 
age forty-four. According to the estimates managers and foreman turn out 
to have average earnings above employees, as reasonable. Employers or man­
agers in large firms have slightly higher earnings (on average) that employers 
or managers in small firms. It emerges that average earnings of workers in 
the construction industry (the base for the industry dummies) are higher 
than average earnings in other industries. The average reported earnings 
were £98.50 (SD .£51.90) per week. The average estimated earnings are £83 
(SD £20.65) per week. Restricting attention to the subsample selected for 
the later econometric analysis, 1082 unemployed out of 2035 reported usual 
earnings in the last job while expected earnings were estimated for 2 0 1 2  of 
them. The mean reported earnings was £97.29 (SD £51.90) and the mean 
expected earnings was £92.02 (SD £20.49).
2.5 An analysis o f unemployment benefit re­
ceipts
I present below some descriptive analysis of unemployment benefit receipts. 
The type of unemployment benefit received is discussed first. Next, I look 
at the amounts reported. Then, I explain how I imputed part of the changes 
in the pattern of benefit receipts over the course of the unemployment spell. 
A discussion of other types of benefits that might be received by the unem­
ployed, such as, for instance, housing benefit, concludes this Section.
2.5.1 T he typ e o f unem ploym ent benefit
Four categories of the unemployed can be distinguished with respect to un­
employment benefit receipt:
• recipients of only Unemployment Benefit (UB);
• recipients of only Supplementary Benefit (SB);
• recipients of both UB and SB;
• recipients of no unemployment benefit at all. (The data contain infor­
mation only on registered unemployed that are not entitled to unem­
ployment benefit).
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The reader is referred to Section 1.3 of Chapter 1 for a description of the 
workings of the unemployment benefit scheme in the UK. UB is paid to the 
unemployed that show a satisfactory contribution record while SB is awarded 
on the basis of means-testing. Both UB and SB are flat rate with additions 
for dependent spouse and children. UB lasts for maximum a year while SB is 
unlimited in time. SB can be received in addition to UB if the unemployed’s 
resources including UB fall below their needs, at any time.
Table 2.8: The type of unemployment benefit
Benefit Receipt 
at 1st interview
Number of 
recipients
Percent
Unemployment Benefit 786 36.2
Joint UB and SB i n 35.2
Supplementary Benefit 488 24.0
No UB nor SB 94 4 6
Total 2035 100.0
The table relates to the subsample of male unemployed.
Frequencies of the type of benefit reported at the first interview — about 
three months after the commencement of the unemployment spell— are given 
in Table 2.8.
Overall, 71.4% of the unemployed report to receive UB, either by itself or 
together with SB. There are also some 4.6% of the unemployed that report 
no unemployment benefit receipts. This might appear unreasonable, at least 
at first sight, given that the sample is extracted from the registers of unem­
ployment benefit offices (UBO). However, these unemployed persons might 
be temporarily suspended from benefit receipt or they might have already 
exhausted their entitlement to UB24.
To gain more insights, I compare the LSUS unemployed with the stock 
of male unemployed. Of the population of male unemployed at November 
198325, respectively about 29% were UB recipients, either by itself or to­
gether with SB, and about 10% were non-recipients of benefit (DSS, Social 
Security Statistics 1989). The percentage of UB recipients in the LSUS in­
flow sample (71%) is much higher than in the stock of the unemployed. The 
main reason for this difference is the limited duration of entitlement to UB. 
It is likely that the unemployed in the stock experience on average longer 
unemployment durations than the unemployed in the LSUS flows sample. 
Shorter spells of unemployment are probably under-represented in the stock
24Entitlement to UB lasts 52 weeks. Those unemployed that leave unemployment before 
fully exhausting their UB entitlement, will be able to use up their residual entitlement in 
future spells of unemployment. Instead, those unemployed that fully exhaust their UB 
entitlement must work for at least 13 weeks in order to gain new entitlement to UB.
25 November 1983 is chosen as a reference period because it is close to an average date 
of the first LSUS interview, which took place in the Autumn of 1983.
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of the unemployed. Another reason might be that the LSUS unemployed 
are all household heads. Household heads are probably more likely to have 
hold a full-time job, on average. Those sharing accomodation with others 
are excluded from the LSUS survey. They are instead included in the stock 
of the unemployed.
The type of benefit received may vary over time. For instance, the unem­
ployed may exhaust their entitlement to UB or they may be disqualified from 
benefit receipt or they may become poorer. In Table 2.9, I compare the type 
of benefit reported at the two survey interviews. The Table covers only those 
unemployed with right-censored spells26. One should keep this in mind when 
interpreting this table since it is one of the claims of this thesis that the type 
of unemployment benefit affects the probability of leaving unemployment.
Table 2.9: The type of benefit reported at the two interviews
Benefit receipt Benefit receipt Total
at 1st interview at 2nd interview
UB joint UB/SB SB no UB nor SB Unemployed
Unemployment Benefit 
(UB)
IS 4 149 108 274
percentage 4-7% 1.5% 54-4% 39.4% 100%
Joint UB and SB 1 21 264 8 294
percentage 0.3% 7.1% 89.8% 2.7% 100%
Supplementary Benefit 
(SB)
3 11 212 6 232
percentage 1.3% 5.2% 91.4% 2.6% 100%
No UB nor SB 2 0 9 14 25
percentage 8% 0 36% 56% 100%
Total 19 36 630 140 825
percentage 2.3% 4-3% 76.4% 17% 100%
The table relates to the subsample of male unemployed that were right-censored at the time 
of the second interview, so that the benefits received at the second interview were recorded.
It emerges that the type of benefit varies considerably over the course 
of the unemployment spell. About 76% of the (right-censored) unemployed 
reported to receive only SB payments at the second interview. The corre­
sponding figure at the the first interview was about 28% (232 out of 825, in 
the last column). About 17% reported no UB nor SB at the second inter­
view. The corresponding figure at the first interview was about 3% (25 out 
of 825, in the last column). A few of the unemployed reported payments of 
UB by itself (about 2%) or UB together with SB (about 4%) at the second
26The unemployed that exited from unemployment before the second interview but were 
again unemployed by the time of the second interview are excluded from this table. Their 
inclusion would be misleading since for instance they might have gained new entitlement 
to UB.
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interview. However, entitlement to UB lasts for 52 weeks while the second 
survey interview took place about 65 weeks after the commencement of the 
unemployment spell. One possible explanation for this apparent inconsis­
tency are temporary suspensions from UB or perhaps misreporting of the 
type of benefit.
Of those (right-censored) unemployed receiving only UB at the first in­
terview, almost 55% reported to receive only SB at the second interview. 
Almost 40% of them reported no benefit receipts at the second interview. 
The corresponding figure for the full sample —this table covers only right- 
censored spells— is likely to be higher since the receipt of unemployment 
benefit may actually influence the duration of the unemployment spell.
Of those (right-censored) unemployed that reported UB together with SB 
at the first interview, almost 90% reported only SB payments at the second 
interview. This supports the view that upon exhaustion of entitlement to 
UB the foregone UB payment is replaced by some SB payment, for those 
unemployed receiving some SB on top of UB at the commencement of their 
unemployment, spell. Almost 3% of them reported no unemployment benefit 
at the second interview. However, about 7% of them reported joint payments 
of UB and SB at the second interview.
About 91% of those (right-censored) unemployed receiving only SB at 
the first interview, reported only SB at the second interview. This finding 
suggests that the unemployed receiving only SB at the commencement of 
their unemployment spell are likely to continue to receive SB throughout 
their unemployment spell.
To conclude, let us remark that most (right-censored) unemployed report­
ing no benefit payments at the second interview (108 out of 140, in the 5th 
column), reported receipts of UB by itself at the first interview. Instead, 96% 
of the (right-censored) unemployed receiving SB, either by itself or together 
with UB, at the first interview (264 plus 212 out of 294 plus 232 persons) 
reported only SB at the second interview. The rationale for this finding is 
that the unemployed that pass the means-test at the commencement of their 
unemployment spell continue to pass it thereafter, unless there is a significant 
change in their circumstances. Instead, the type of benefit varies considerably 
over time for the unemployed receiving UB by itself at the commencement of 
their unemployment spell. The evidence on the changes in benefit receipts is 
important in order to justify the assumptions I make in Chapter 6 concerning 
the relation between the potential duration of entitlement to unemployment 
benefit and the duration of unemployment.
However, one has to acknowledge that the type of benefit may be misre- 
ported by the unemployed. For the DSS survey of 1978/79, it was found by 
Moylan et al. (1984, pp. 19-20) —who had access to both administrative and 
self-reported information— that as many as two-fifths of the unemployed had 
misreported the type of benefit. Indeed, it is possible that some unemployed 
may be unaware of the type of benefit they receive. It is typically found that 
the unemployed tend to misreport the type of benefit received more than the
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actual amounts. I test for misreporting of the type of benefit in one of the 
next sections.
2.5.2 T he p oten tia l duration  o f U B
I have computed the potential duration of entitlement to UB for the recipi­
ents of UB by itself at the commencement of their unemployment spell. The 
maximum duration of UB is of 52 weeks. However, UB entitlement might 
sometimes last for less than 52 weeks because of the so called “linked spell” 
rule, which says that unemployment spells separated by less than eight weeks 
of employment will be counted together as a single spell for the purposes of 
benefit entitlement. I have made an attempt to allow for linked unemploy­
ment spells by using the information on the economic activity week-by-week 
in the year before the commencement of the observed spell of registered un­
employment. Given that this information was collected retrospectively at the 
time of the first interview (see Table 2.1) the estimated potential duration of 
entitlement to UB may not be precise.
The estimated potential durations of entitlement to UB are reported in 
Table 2.10 for the recipients of UB by itself. Upon UB exhaustion the type of 
benefit received will definitely change for recipients of UB by itself, at least 
if they have not yet exited from unemployment. This is why I am interested 
in computing the maximum potential duration of benefit for this group of 
people.
Table 2.10: The potential duration of entitlement to UB
maximum entitlement maximum entitlement maximum entitlement
weeks freq. weeks freq. weeks freq.
1 1 21 3 39 2
2 2 22 1 40 1
7 1 23 4 41 1
8 1 25 1 42 3
9 1 27 1 43 3
10 1 29 2 44 3
11 2 30 2 45 1
12 2 31 1 46 1
14 3 33 3 47 2
15 3 33 3 48 1
17 1 34 3 50 3
18 1 37 1 52 672
20 1 38 1 TOTAL 736
The table relates to the recipients of UB by itself within the sub-
sample of male unemployed.
About 91% of these unemployed enjoy full maximum duration of UB 
of 52 weeks. The remaining 8.7% of them shows a potential duration of 
UB entitlement that differs considerably, ranging from only one week to 50
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weeks. This information will be used to impute benefits over the course of 
the unemployment spell.
2.5 .3  B enefit am ount and changes
Summary descriptive statistics of the amount of unemployment benefit re­
ported at the first interview are presented in Table 2.11. These amounts 
correspond to the November 1982 rates —unemployment benefits are regu­
larly updated in November of each year; the amounts asked for at the first 
survey interview, which took place in the Autumn of 1983, were therefore 
the 1982 rates.
The 1982 UB flat rate was £25 per week with 30 pence addition for each 
dependent child and £15.45 addition for dependent spouse. The dependent 
spouse addition is payable if the spouse’s earnings are less than the level of 
the addition. Two reduced rates were also payable: the 2/3 rate was £20.23, 
£30.34 with reduced rate spouse addition; the 1/2 rate was £12.50, £18.75 
with spouse addition. Reduced rates were mainly paid to people whose con­
tribution record would not give entitlement to the full rate or that were par­
tially disqualified from benefit receipt. In practise few unemployed received 
reduced rates as shown in Atkinson and Micklewright (1989). (Reduced rate 
unemployment benefit payments have since been abolished.)
The SB flat rates were £26.80 for single persons and £43.50 for married 
persons with dependent spouse. The SB additions for children varied from 
£9.15 to £13.70 depending on the age of the children. The amounts of 
SB payable are computed on the basis of the difference between the nuclear 
family resources and the flat rate amounts which should measure family 
needs. Therefore, there is no particular reason to find exactly the flat rate 
amounts recorded in the data, in contrast to the UB amounts which should 
in principle be observed.
Table 2.11: Descriptive statistics of benefit amounts
Benefit Mean Sid Dev Minimum Maximum Recipients
received Number
UB 31.2 10.2 6.8 130.2 274
UB and SB 51.8 15.4 3.2 150.0 294
SB 48.8 16.8 0.95 124-0 232
The amounts are in pounds. The table relates to the male subsample and to the
benefits received at the 1st interview.
From Table 2.11, it emerges that the mean benefit amount is the lowest 
for UB recipients while it is the highest for recipients of both UB and SB. 
This finding is probably due to the the means-tested nature of SB, which
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implies that those unemployed receiving SB on top of UB are quite poor and 
therefore receive a substantial amount of unemployment benefit.
The minimum and maximum amounts of UB received by itself might 
perhaps represent evidence of misreporting since the flat rate UB may vary 
from a minimum of £12.5 (1/2 reduced rate) to a maximum of about £42 
(the standard rate plus dependent spouse and children additions). Another 
possibility is that the local Unemployment Benefit Office made an error in 
computing the amount of benefit to be paid to the unemployed. This seems 
however unlikely given the flat rate nature of UB.
Unemployment benefit receipts were self-reported by the unemployed. 
As already stressed, they might therefore be affected by recall error or mis- 
reporting. Moylan et al. (1984) who had access to both self-reported and 
administrative information for the DSS Cohort Study of the unemployed 
of 1978/79 found that three-quarters of the reported amounts fell within 5 
pound sterling of the recorded amounts with the UBOs. Their analysis re­
lates to the unemployed whose spells lasted for longer than 13 weeks. They 
concluded (Moylan et al. 1984, pp. 19-20) that “despite the fact that the 
recorded measures referred to an average while the interview data referred to 
a single week, there was a fairly high degree of agreement between the records 
and the reports as to the amount of benefit received”. These findings are in 
agreement with those of Katz and Meyer (1988) who also had access to both 
individual self-reports and administrative records on unemployment benefits 
for the US CWBH. They found that 67.5% of the unemployed reported ex­
actly the same benefit amount as that registered by administrative sources 
and that 85% reported amounts within $ 10 of the true (administrative) 
amount.
I have looked at the accuracy of the unemployment benefit reported by 
the recipients of UB by itself at the first interview (736 of the subsample for 
analysis), by comparing the UB amounts reported with the 1982 flat rates. 
The results are summarized below. I have not carried out similar analysis 
for the recipients of SB, either by itself or together with UB. In principle one 
could compute SB amounts and compare them with the reported amounts. 
However, given the complexity of the means-test calculations, the scope for 
errors would be rather too large to allow one to test the accuracy of the re­
ported amounts. The following points emerge with respect to the unemployed 
that reported to be in receipt of UB by itself at the first interview27:
• 41.4% reported precisely the flat rate amount (£25), 6.7% the flat rate 
plus one child addition (£25.30), 3.7% the flat rate plus two children 
additions (£25.60), 0.8% plus three children (£25.90);
• 9.6% reported the flat rate plus addition for dependant spouse (£40.45), 
3.5% the flat rate plus dependent spouse and one child addition (£40.75),
27The amounts of UB by itself reported at the first interview are shown in the Table 8.2 
in the Appendix.
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2.3% plus dependent spouse and two children additions (£41) and 1.1% 
with three children addition (£41.35),
•  0.4% report precisely the 2/3 reduced rate (£18.75) and 0.7% the 1/2 
reduced rate (£12), another 1% the reduced 1/2 rate with additions 
for spouse and children.
It appears that overall 71.2% of the subsample considered reported UB 
amounts which are exactly equal to the official rates. Moreover there are:
• 8.4% that reported amounts between £25 and £26, and that were not 
considered above;
• 8.7% that reported amounts which fell between £40 and £42 and that 
were not counted above.
If these 17.1% tire treated as true UB amounts, lying within one pound 
from the precise amount, it is possible to conclude that 88.3% of the un­
employed that reported UB by itself at the first interview provided correct 
information on the payment received.
The amounts of benefit payable may vary over the unemployment spell 
for different reasons, such as, for instance, the exhaustion of entitlement to 
UB or the birth of a new child or the spouse’s earnings rising above the 
benefit addition. Some descriptive statistics of the change in the amounts 
of benefit reported at the two interviews are given in Table 2.12, for the 
right-censored individuals. I have distinguished two groups of unemployed: 
recipients of UB by itself and recipients of SB, either by itself or together 
with UB. Some “only UB” unemployed are excluded from Table 2.12 since 
the benefit amounts they report at the first interview might be evidence of 
misreporting of the type of benefit received, as discussed above.
As already mentioned, unemployment benefits are regularly increased in 
November of each year to allow for the rising cost of living. The benefit 
amounts reported at the first interview relate to the November 1982 rate. The 
amounts reported at the second interview relate normally to the November
1983 rate. However, in a few cases the amounts reported are probably the
1984 rates, since the second interview took place in November 1984, for a few 
persons. To give an idea of the order of magnitude of the benefit increases, 
the average of the increases in the 1983 rates was about 5%.
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Table 2.12: The percentage change in benefit receipts
Benefit loss or gain Percentage that loses or gains
at the 2nd interview Type of benefit received at 1st interview
in percentage SB by itself or with UB only UB
loses 100% 2.7 43.7
loses 50% or more (but less than 4.0 4.8
100%)
loses 10% or more (but less than 11.9 7.0
50%)
loses more than zero (but less than 13 3.5
10%)
loses nothing, gain nothing 0.0 0.0
gains more than zero (but less than 40.6 8.7
10%)
gains 10% or more (but less than 21.3 18.8
50%)
gains m on than 50% (but less than 4.2 8.7
100%)
gains 100% or more 0.3 4.8
total percentage 100.0 100.0
mean benefit amount at t l  (£) 49.7 (SD 17.6) 31.7 (SD 7.8)
mean benefit amount at t2 (£ ) 49.6 (SD 19.7) 21.9 (SD 23.1)
total number of unemployed 526 229
The table relates to the right-censored unemployed. They report benefit
amounts also at the 2nd interview. The unemployed that reported at the first
interview amounts of UB by itself less than £12.50 or greater than £43  are
excluded from this table (these are about 7% of the “only UB” unemployed at
the first interview). The November benefit update was not allowed for.
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The proportion of the unemployed that lose completely their benefit en­
titlement is much higher among recipients of only UB at the commencement 
of their unemployment spell. This feature of the data had already emerged 
from Table 2.9. In Table 2.12 the percentage of recipients of only UB (at 
the time of the first interview) that lose their benefit entitlement is slightly 
higher than in Table 2.9. This happens because some “only UB” unemployed 
are excluded from Table 2.12, as discussed above.
On the other side, the “only UB” persons are found on average to both 
lose more and gain more than the unemployed receiving SB (with or without 
UB) near the commencement of their unemployment spell. It is quite sur­
prising that the proportion of the “only UB” persons that gain more than 
10% (32.3 %) is higher than that of the “SB” recipients (25.2%). It is instead 
not surprising that the percentage of “only UB” unemployed that lose more 
than 50% of their benefit entitlement by the time of the second interview is 
higher than the corresponding percentage for ‘SB” unemployed.
Most of the gains in benefit receipts of less than 10% are probably due 
to the regular November update of benefit payments. About 42% of the 
recipients of SB (with or without UB) at the first interview that are still 
unemployed by the time of the second interview report benefit amounts that 
are no more than 10% higher than before. The corresponding figure for the 
“only UB” unemployed is about 9%.
However, the evidence presented in Tables 2.12 and 2.9 relates to the 
right-censored unemployed. Since the behaviour of the unemployed with 
respect to exit from unemployment is likely to be influenced by their benefit 
receipts, one has to be careful in interpreting the above evidence. One would 
expect that the “only UB” unemployed that lose more in terms of benefit 
receipts will have a stronger incentive to leave unemployment possibly before 
the time of the second interview (or right-censoring time), which corresponds 
to about one and half year after the commencement of their unemployment 
spell. In particular, about 77% of the unemployed receiving only UB near 
the commencement of their unemployment spell are observed to exit from 
unemployment before the time of the second interview. The corresponding 
figure for the unemployed receiving SB (with or without UB) at the time of 
the first interview is about 56%.
2.5 .4  Im puting  som e changes in benefit receip ts
The type and amount of unemployment benefit may vary over the course of 
the unemployment spell, as illustrated in the preceding sections. Therefore, i 
is necessary to allow for this variation in the econometric analysis. However, 
as we have seen, the LSUS data contain very limited information on any 
change in the pattern of benefit receipts. Some of these changes are known 
only for the unemployed with right-censored spells. Moreover, the time at 
which any change took place is not normally known.
I have constructed a time-varying variable for the receipt of unemploy­
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ment benefit as follows. The main criterion adopted is to avoid imputing any 
change except for the recipients of only UB at the commencement of their 
unemployment spell. This choice is supported by the evidence gathered in 
the preceding sections. The type and the amount of the unemployment ben­
efit is likely to vary at the time of UB exhaustion for those unemployed that 
received only UB at the commencement of their unemployment spell, unless 
their spell lasted less than the maximum duration of UB. Very little is in­
stead known about the timing or the reasons for any change in the pattern of 
benefit receipts of the other unemployed. Actual changes are observed only 
for the unemployed with right-censored spells. If the level of benefit were 
allowed to vary only for the unemployed with right-censored spells, the level 
of benefit would vary with the dependent variable. This would clearly result 
in enormous bias.
1. For recipients of SB (either by itself or with UB) at the first interview, I 
have imputed no change in the type nor the amount of benefit received, 
independently of whether the benefits received at the second interview 
were observed —right-censored spells. The idea is that even when the 
change in the amount or the type of benefit received is observed, the 
time of and the reasons for this change were not observed. It seems 
therefore more reasonable to assume no change for any of the SB (or 
SB and UB) recipients, given that no sensible imputation is possible.
2. For the right-censored unemployed that reported to receive UB (by 
itself) at the first interview, the type and amount of benefit received 
at the second interview are known. I have therefore imputed the first 
interview amount up to the time of UB exhaustion and the second 
interview amount (reduced by 5% to remove the effect of uprating) 
thereafter.
3. For those unemployed receiving only UB at the first interview who 
completed their unemployment spell by the second interview, I have 
first of all compared their unemployment duration with their poten­
tial UB duration. If their unemployment spell were shorter than their 
potential UB duration, I have assumed the same amount of benefit 
receipt throughout the spell. If, instead, their spell were longer than 
the potential UB duration, I have looked at their savings. If the total 
savings reported at the first interview (including the spouse savings) 
were larger than £3500 ,1 have assumed zero amount of benefit receipt 
at the second interview28. If instead the unemployed savings fell below 
£3500 the amounts of UB reported at the first interview were imputed
28The unemployed with savings of over about i*3000 were not entitled to the means- 
tested benefits in 1983. I have used as a reference the savings at the first interview since 
the savings at the second interview may vary depending on whether the unemployed were 
entitled to any benefit after UB exhaustion or not.
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throughout the spell. It seems plausible to assume that if the UB re­
cipients were entitled to larger amounts, they would have received SB 
together with UB at the first interview. It is instead possible that these 
persons might have received lower amounts than the UB amounts re­
ported at the time of the first interview. However, the amounts were 
set equal to the first interview levels to remain in line with the assump­
tions made concerning the pattern of benefit receipts by the recipients 
of SB (with or without UB). The rationale for this choice is that I pre­
ferred to impute no change in the benefit amounts received whenever 
not enough precise information on the changes was available.
One more justification for the procedure adopted is that about 95% of 
the SB recipients (at the first interview) reported SB payments also at the 
second interview (if they had not yet exited from unemployment) and about 
42% reported small variations in benefit receipts (if they had not yet exited 
from unemployment).
Of course, the assumptions made are very much open to criticism. More­
over, using imputed benefit values instead of actual values might introduce 
errors into the econometric model. The sensitivity of the estimated coef­
ficient of the model to a different specification of the benefit level variable 
is tested in Chapter5. There, it is shown that employing this timevarying 
benefit level rather than the benefit level at the first interview does not ac­
tually affect the estimated coefficient on the benefit variable. This confirms 
perhaps that with the above assumptions no major error was introduced. It 
might however also imply that not enough variation in the pattern of benefit 
receipts was allowed for.
2.5.5 H ousing benefit and other socia l security  ben­
efits
In addition to unemployment benefit (UB or SB), the unemployed have also 
access to other subsidies, such as children benefit, sickness benefit29, Family 
Income Supplement (FIS) and housing benefit. These benefits are taken 
into account in the computation of total unemployment income, a variable 
that is used in the econometric analysis of Chapter 5. However, I shall 
refer throughout this thesis to unemployment benefit as UB and SB unless 
otherwise specified, since normally not only the unemployed but also the low 
wage earners can apply for other benefits such as FIS, sickness benefit and 
housing benefit.
29Sickness benefit is payable to people that have satisfied the same work contribution 
conditions as for the contributory unemployment benefit. Since April 1983 workers sick 
for less than eight weeks are not entitled to sickness benefit but only to statutory sick 
pay to be paid by their employer. Statutory sick pay is flat rate without additions for 
dependants.
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The “housing benefit” scheme deserves particular attention. A new hous­
ing benefit scheme was introduced in April 1983. Two schemes of financial 
help with domestic rents and rates were available before April 1983: rent and 
rates subsidies were either paid (and administered) together with the Sup­
plementary Benefit (SB) or they were paid (and administered) separately by 
the local authorities. After the reform, the benefit is administered only by 
the local authorities.
This change in the system of rent and rates subsidies took place right in 
between the first and the second wave of the LSUS survey. In spite of the 
fact that the survey planners did their best to get round this problem by 
designing particular questions aimed at capturing the amount of rent and 
rates subsidies before and after the change in rules, I am sceptical about the 
completeness of the information collected. The new housing benefit scheme 
was introduced in April 1983 and the first survey interview took place in the 
Autumn of 1983. However, many unemployed appear to me as unaware of 
the workings of the new scheme.
Only 12% (240 out of 2035) of the subsample of males considered reported 
to receive some rent or rates subsidies at the first interview. The amount 
of monthly subsidy reported varied from 79 pence to £103.8. The mean re­
ported subsidy was £15.34 (SD £9.36). About 28% (67 out of 240) of those 
reporting some housing benefit at the first interview, report help with their 
rent and rates also one month before the commencement of their unemploy­
ment spell. For 45% of these unemployed the same amount is reported at 
both dates.
The number of the unemployed that reported rent and rates subsidies is 
quite low. It is quite possible that most unemployed were confused about the 
new housing benefit scheme and perhaps reported these subsidies together 
with the SB payments. They might not have been able to spell out the hous­
ing subsidy from the SB payment. Since in the case of SB recipients it is 
not always clear whether the amounts of rent and rates subsidies reported 
had already been reported as part of SB payments, I resolved not to add 
the amounts of housing benefit (or rent and rates subsidies) reported sep­
arately to the benefit payments in order to avoid possible double counting. 
Of course, this might also introduce errors since some SB payments might 
include housing benefit30. Sensitivity of the model estimates to this choice is 
tested when considering the reported amounts of housing benefit in the total 
unemployment income variable31.
30The mean value of UB and SB receipts at the first interview is «£41.59 (SD 18.99). 
If the reported amounts of housing benefit are summed to the UB and SB amounts, the 
mean benefit amount becomes £43.40 (SD 21.14).
31This is done in Section 5.4. I anticipate that none of the total unemployment income 
variable or the “other unemployment income” variable (which is equal to the total unem­
ployment income minus UB and SB payments) turn out to have a significant impact on 
the hazard rate. However, also the coefficient on benefit level variable is found statistically 
insignificant.
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It is worth mentioning that while the self-employed are not entitled to 
contributory benefit scheme, UB, they are instead entitled on condition of 
having paid enough contributions to sickness benefit. The self-employed are, 
though, entitled to means-tested unemployment benefit.
Children benefit is paid to anybody, not only to the poor or the needy, 
and it is of fixed amount. It is payable to the mother and it is tax free. 
The person entitled, must, however, make a claim in order to receive it. The 
average amount of child benefit reported at the first interview was about £12 
(SD about £6).
FIS can only be claimed by families with children when household head 
is in full-time work. Eligibility is conditional on gross income being below 
a certain prescribed level and the benefit paid is equal to half the difference 
between gross income and the prescribed level. However, this benefit is paid 
for fifty-two weeks irrespective of changes in the claimant situation, which 
implies that sometimes an unemployed person may be in receipt of FIS. The 
FIS benefit has been object of much debate. It was introduced as a temporary 
measure to reduce poverty among working people but it is still in force. It is 
now called “Family Credit” since the 1988 reform.
Total benefit receipts were computed for the unemployed, his spouse and 
the nuclear family by adding to the reported amounts of UB and SB any 
other social security payment reported; i. e. child benefit, sickness benefit, 
housing benefit, Family Income Supplement and any other benefit. The mean 
value of total benefit receipts for the unemployed is £42.18 (SD 19.14), for 
the spouse is £8.03 (SD 9.37) and for the nuclear family altogether (husband 
plus spouse) is £50.21 (SD 23.67).
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, I have presented the main features of the LSUS data; I have 
described how some variables were constructed; and I have carried out some 
descriptive analyis.
It seems to me that the LSUS data are well worth using for the analysis 
of unemployment duration. The main drawback of these data is the limited 
information on any variation in the pattern of unemployment benefit receipts 
over time. This has made necessary some crude imputation of the changes in 
benefit receipts over the course of the unemployment spell. This problem may 
hinder the estimation of the benefit impact on the re-employment probability.
It was found that about 6% of the respondents to the second interview 
reported to be already in registered unemployment in the week before they 
were actually sampled as starting their spell of registered unemployment. 
These persons were dropped from the sample for analysis except for a few of 
them for whom this inconsistency could be amended.
Non-respondents to the second interview were not included in the final 
sample for analysis. Information on the duration of the unemployment spells
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was available only for second interview participants. Some discussion of 
attrition and non-response has been provided. Also female unemployed were 
excluded from the final sample for the following reasons: only single women 
entered the definition of household heads; few women were sampled; most 
previous UK studies have looked at male unemployed only; the behaviour of 
British single women is generally believed to differ from that of married or 
single men.
From the analysis of the economic states occupied by the unemployed 
before and after the observed unemployment spell, it emerged that about 
30% of them were in full-time work in the week before entering registered 
unemployment. Almost 46% of them found a full-time job by the time of the 
second survey interview. About 77% of those that exited from unemployment 
exited into full-time work.
The type and the amount of unemployment benefit has been shown to 
vary across the unemployed and throughout the observed unemployment 
spell. At the first interview, about 35% of the unemployed reported only 
UB; about 25% of them reported only SB; and about 35% reported both UB 
and SB. About 5% of the unemployed reported no benefit receipts.
It was possible to conclude that probably more than 70% of the un­
employed reporting only UB at the first survey interview reported accurate 
amounts of benefit (to the pence) and almost 90% of them probably reported 
correct amounts (to the pound). Almost 95% of those unemployed receiving 
SB (either by itself or together with UB) at the first interview, reported SB 
also at the second interview. Instead, about 55% of those unemployed re­
ceiving (only) UB at the first interview, reported SB at the second interview. 
These last two figures relate to the unemployed with right-censored spell, for 
whom the information on benefit receipts at the second interview is available.
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Chapter 3 
The econom etric framework
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to to provide the reader with some economet­
ric background and to introduce the preferred econometric model. I adopt 
a reduced form approach to modelling the individual probability of leaving 
unemployment, as anticipated in Section 1.4. The probability of leaving un­
employment is modelled as a conditional probability by means of the hazard 
rate and job search theory is used to guide the choice of explanatory variables 
and the interpretation of the results of estimation.
In Section 3.2, the statistical underpinnings of the model are laid out. 
Some of the basic statistical concepts were already introduced in Chapter 1. 
The preferred specification for the baseline hazard rate, a piecewise linear 
functional form, is presented together with alternative specifications that 
have been often used in the literature in Section 3.3. The advantages of 
such a flexible specification of the dependency on time of hazard rate are 
discussed. Modelling the impact of the explanatory variables on the hazard 
rate is the subject of Section 3.4. The competing risks model is presented in 
Section 3.5. A brief description of the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier method 
of estimation is provided in Section 3.7. Finally, in Section 3.8 the likelihood 
function for the LSUS data is specified for the single and the competing risks 
models. A brief summary concludes the Chapter.
Good references for a more detailed treatment of the material presented in 
this chapter are for instance Kalbfleish and Prentice (1980), Cox and Oakes 
(1984) and Lancaster (1990).
3.2 The hazard rate and the survivor func­
tion
The probability of leaving unemployment is expressed with the hazard rate. 
The hazard rate defines a conditional probability as follows:
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m =  l i mf ^ r < ‘ + * | r s i >. ,3.i)
V '  dt—O dt
This expression describes the probability of leaving unemployment in any 
instant of time, t, conditional on being still unemployed an infinitesimal
amount of time to the left of t. By the law of conditional probability:
P(t <  T <  t + dt\T >  t) =  P{t ~  T^ *  + T ~ t) (3.2)
P{t < T  < t +  dt)
P (T  > t)
Defining time since the commencement of the unemployment spell as a con­
tinuous random variable T  —where T  does not need to be calendar time— 
with cumulative distribution function F(t) =  P (T  < t) and density function 
f{ t)  =  d F /d t, Equation 3.1 can be rewritten as follows:
g n \ - L  F ( t+ d t)  ~ m  1 mm  -  l>™«-0 dt J _  F(i) -  J _  F{ty  (3-3)
where 1 — F(t) is a recurring function in statistical duration analysis, the 
so called *survivor f u n c t i o n From now onwards, I shall define the survivor 
function as G{t) =  1 — F(t). Equation 3.3 defines the hazard rate in terms 
of the probability density function, f ( t ) ,  and of the survivor function, G(t). 
The hazard rate is also called “transition rate”, to emphasize the fact that 
it can be employed to describe the transition from a given economic state to 
a new economic state.
It is easy to notice that 6{t) =  —dlogG(t)/dt, from which assuming
G(0) =  1, it is possible to express the survivor function in terms of the
hazard rate, as below:
G(t) = exp{— f  0{u)du), (3.4)
Jo
and, consequently, the density function in terms of the hazard rate:
f ( t )  =  $(t)exp{— f  6{u)du). (3.5)
Jo
The integral above is the so-called “integrated h a z a r d These relations will 
be used to specify the likelihood function for the data.
Since the hazard rate expresses a probability it is constrained to take on 
positive values. Assuming that exit out of unemployment will definitely take 
place at some point in time, than lim ^,»  G(t) =  0, and it follows that:
Km J 8(u)du =  oo, (3.6)
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which means that the integral must diverge, otherwise lim^oo G(i) >  0 and 
the distribution will be “defective” .
Two related concepts are the “expected total duration” of the unemploy­
ment spell at a certain time s from commencement of the spell, condi­
tional upon being still unemployed at that time, e($), and the “expected 
remaining duration”, r(s), which gives the expected duration at time s; i. e. 
r(s) =  e(s) — s. It can be shown (Lancaster, 1990, pp. 13) that the expected 
remaining duration at the commencement of the unemployment spell is equai 
to the integral of the survivor function, as below:
e(0) =  r(0) =  E(T) =  f °  G{t)dt. (3.7)
Jo
This concept can be used in the empirical analysis to compare the actual 
mean expected duration with the estimated mean expected duration under 
different assumptions.
3.3 The specification of the baseline hazard 
rate
The hazard rate is normally specified as a function of time. The dependency 
on time of the (conditional) probability of leaving unemployment is captured 
by the baseline hazard rate, , tpi(t). The reader is referred to Section 1.5 for 
a more intuitive discussion.
The simplest functional form for the baseline hazard rate is the exponen­
tial:
G(t) =  e-ot; f ( t )  =  9{t) =  a, (3.8)
where a > 0 is the parameter that defines the exponential function. The 
hazard rate, as a pure a function of time, is constant over time and equal to
a. This is a particularly unattractive feature for the purpose of modelling 
unemployment duration. It is not possible to exclude on economic grounds 
that the sign of the dependency on time of the probability of leaving unem­
ployment may vary over time.
The most commonly used functional form for the baseline hazard rate 
—at least until quite recently— is the Weibull:
G(t) =  exp[(—<rf)e]; B(t) =  ac(i)c_l; (3.9)
f ( t )  =  ac(<)c-1exp[(—ai)°]; (3.10)
where c > 0 is the Weibull parameter, which describes the sign of the de­
pendency on time of the hazard rate. When c =  1, the Weibull reduces 
to an exponential distribution and time dependency is constant; if c > 1, 
the probability of leaving unemployment augments with the length of the
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unemployment spell —positive time dependency—; if, instead, c < 1, the 
probability of leaving unemployment decreases with time —negative time 
dependency. The Weibull model has been adopted extensively in the litera­
ture because not only it has a very simple formulation (only one parameter), 
but it also allows the hazard rate to vaxy as a function of time.
However, the Weibull model only allows for monotonic time dependency, 
while the sign of time dependency may in fact vary during the course of the 
unemployment spell. Using a Weibull specification for the baseline hazard 
constrains the data to indicate either positive or negative or no time depen­
dency. This restriction has no economic rationale. It is for instance plausible 
to assume that the hazard rate may first rise and then decline, as a function 
of time. The literature has approached this issue only recently.
Flexible formulations of the baseline hazard rate can be generalized to 
the piecewise-constant hazard:
' 61, 0 < t < mi
62, mi < t < m2
(3.11)
Oq, m q < t < 00
where the hazard rate remains constant in each of the q — 1 time intervals 
defined in 3.11 but varies across intervals. Flexibility is only ensured if enough 
“pieces” or time intervals are specified. A functional form must be assumed 
for 9. One possibility is to specify an exponential functional form. The 
resulting baseline hazard is a piecewise linear exponential.
exp{a\ ), 0 <  t < m\
exp(a2), mj < t < m 2
(3.12)
exp(aq), m q < t < 00 
which can be rewritten as:
m  =
m  =
9(t) =  exp(a\), , t  C I\ (3.13)
h  = {*|n < t  < tj+1}, / = l , 2 , - - - , m.
The advantage of this formulation is that it does not impose severe re­
strictions on the behaviour of the hazard rate over time, especially if several 
time intervals are specified. Moreover, the sign of the dependency on time 
of the hazard rate is allowed to vary over time (if enough time intervals are 
specified). This is a particularly desirable property since economic theory is 
inconclusive as far as the pattern over time of the probability of leaving un­
employment goes. Another advantage of the piecewise linear exponential is
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that it is easy to estimate given its simple functional form. This is the spec­
ification that I shall adopt in the later Chapters. I also estimate a Weibull 
baseline in Chapter 4, for comparison purposes.
Another flexible specification of the hazard rate which is a piecewise- 
constant but relies on a non-parametric1 approach, is due to Meyer (1986, 
1990), and it is an extension of Prentice and Gloecker (1978):
f t + 1
P (T  > t + 1|T > /) =  exp[— j  9{u)du), (3.14)
where P{.) is the probability that the spell lasts until t +  1 given that it has 
lasted until t. This corresponds to the ratio G(t +1 )/G (t), where G(t) is the 
discrete time survivor function. This specification was adopted for instance 
by Narendranathan and Stewart (1993, 1993a). In practise, this approach 
does not differ from the one that I adopt, i. e. a piecewise linear with a weekly 
baseline.
3.4 Allowing for the impact of observed ex­
planatory variables
The next step is to introduce dependency of the hazard rate on a vector of 
(observed) explanatory variables, defined as x, which take different values for 
each unemployed *. The hazard rate can now be written as:
0(xu t). (3.15)
It is convenient to assume what has been called a proportional hazard 
specification, which distinguishes the influence of the elapsing of time from 
the influence of other observable on the hazard rate as follows:
0(ti,Xi) =  ^i(<i)02(si)* (3.16)
where and ip2 do not vary across individuals, but the explanatory variables 
and the duration of the spell do. In the case of the proportional hazard, 
the explanatory variables have a proportional multiplicative impact on the 
hazard rate over time. For instance, the hazard rates for two individuals with 
regressors vectors, Xi,Z2> are in the same ratio ipi{x\)/4)2(x2) for all t. The 
proportional hazard specification has been widely adopted in the literature.
The impact of the covariates on the hazard rate is conventionally modelled 
exponentially:
6(t ¡, ii)  =  ^i{ti)exp{/3x ¡), (3.17)
1 Where non-parametric methods are generally characterized by not imposing a specific 
functional form on the data. So that the observed data, rather than a given functional 
form, shape the estimates of the hazard rate. For instance, the hazard rate is also estimated 
non-parametrically in the Cox partial likelihood (Cox 1972).
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where /? is the vector of coefficients associated with the vector of explanatory 
variables (x).
Adopting a piecewise exponential functional form for the baseline hazard 
rate, the overall hazard rate can be written as follows:
0(t) =  exp(ai)exp(/9xj), t C /i, (3.18)
h  =  {<h <  t < -n+i}, I = 1,2, • • • ,m .
One further step is to allow covariates to vary over time:
0(t) = exp(ai)exp(0xi(t)), , t  C /i, (3.19)
h  =  {<h <  t < n+i}, I = 1,2,• • • ,m .
Examples of explanatory variables that may vary over time are the local 
unemployment rate and the unemployment benefit level. As Lancaster (1990) 
points out, when the explanatory variables are allowed to vary over time the 
proportionality property may not hold any longer. Equation 3.19 constitutes 
the basis for the model that is laid out in the next sections.
3.5 A com peting risks m odel o f the proba­
bility o f leaving unem ploym ent
The attractiveness of using a competing risks model of the probability of 
leaving unemployment has been stressed in Chapter 1. Competing risks 
specifications allow one to model the duration of unemployment together 
with the economic states entered upon leaving unemployment. The opposite 
concept is that of single risk models which do not distinguish the economic 
states to which the unemployed exit.
Assuming that the exit states are mutually exclusive, the conditional 
probability of leaving unemployment at a certain point in time, t, and of 
exiting to a specific destination state k , given the set D of possible exit 
states, can be written as:
fl m  y P ( t < T < t  + d t,D  = k , \T > t )= h m -------------------- ---------------------- , (3.20)
which is the so-called cause-specific hazard.
Given the assumption that the destinations k —also called failure types 
or simply exits/exit states- are mutually exclusive, the overall hazard rate 
can be expressed as the sum of the cause-specific hazards of exiting into the 
states considered:
«(<i,ii(i)) =  E iii.(‘i-*i(<)). (3.21)
k t D
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where D is the set of destination states.
Given the relation between the hazard rate and the survivor function, 
illustrated by the expression 3.4 above, the survivor function can be written 
in the competing risks case as:
G(t) = exp{— f  ^ (u jdu} ,
k t D  - '°
where G is, as before, the survivor function and D is the set of destination 
states.
Adopting a piecewise exponential functional form for the baseline hazard 
and an exponential function for the impact of covariates on the hazard rate, 
the competing risks hazard rate is the following:
9(th x ,(t)) =  exp{a\ +  Pkxï(t)}  telu
k t D
h  =  {¿h < t < 71+i}, / =  1,2,* --,171,
where I allow for two destination states k2:
{
full-time work, k =  1 
other economic states, k = 2.
3.6 Tim e dependency and unobserved het­
erogeneity
The concept of the dependency on time of the probability of leaving unem­
ployment was introduced in Section 1.5. The effect of the elapsed unem­
ployment duration on the conditional probability of leaving unemployment 
is captured by the baseline hazard rate. I adopt a functional form adopted, 
a piecewise Unear exponential, whi is a flexible specification and does not 
impose severe constraints on the form of time dependency.
However, the estimates of the time dependency of the hazard rate might 
be affected by unobserved individual heterogeneity (see Section 1.5). W hat­
ever the sign of the bias, it seems therefore important to allow for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. However, this is not straightforward because of two 
sets of problems. The first is that in order to allow for unobserved hetero­
geneity, assumptions on the form it takes must be made, which might not 
be the most appropriate. The second has to do with the specification of 
competing risks models since unobserved heterogeneity may be correlated 
across the cause-specific hazards. Assumptions must be made on the degree 
of correlation of unobserved heterogeneity across the cause-specific hazards, 
which will impose additional constraints on the data.
2The reason for this choice of destination states is given in Section 2.4.3 and in the 
later Chapters.
(3.23)
(3.22)
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The literature has conventionally allowed for unobserved heterogeneity 
by introducing a multiplicative random error term in the specification of the 
hazard rate:
9{th X), v) =  vV'i(<i)cxp(^xi), (3.24)
where %l>\ is the baseline hazard, as defined above and v is the random error 
term. The error term v has typically been modelled, by means of a Gamma 
distribution (Lancaster, 1979) or using mass point techniques that approxi­
mate the continuous error distribution by a discrete distribution (Heckman 
and Singer, 1984). In the case of competing risks models the additional 
assumptions of cross-hazards correlation of the error terms of 1 (Katz and 
Meyer, 1988) or 0 (Flinn and Heckman, 1982) have been made.
Narendranathan and Stewart (1993, p. 71) argue that *severe distortions 
are likely to be imposed by the use of such techniques to allow for omitted 
heterogeneity and there is no reason to expect these distortions to be less 
seriotis than those resulting from ignoring omitted heterogeneity in the first 
place”. They therefore resolve not to allow for unobserved heterogeneity.
The main finding of previous studies that have allowed for unobserved het­
erogeneity (by means of a Gamma distribution) in a competing risks frame­
work and that have specified a flexible baseline hazard rate is that allowing 
for unobserved heterogeneity tends to raise the-absolute value of the coeffi­
cients (Katz and Meyer, 1988). However, in a single risk framework (allowing 
for a flexible baseline hazard rate) Katz and Meyer (1990) find that when un­
observed heterogeneity is allowed for the sign and the statistical significance 
of the main coefficients does not change much except for the benefit coeffi­
cients (benefit level and duration) which rose by 25%. Meyer (1990) (using a 
flexible specification of the baseline hazard) finds in a single risk framework 
that the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity tends to raise the absolute 
value of the coefficients. It would seem to be the case that unobserved het­
erogeneity is more of a problem when the functional form adopted for the 
baseline hazard is rather restrictive, such as, for instance, the monotonie 
Weibull, than if a flexible baseline is allowed for. Following these arguments,
I do not allow in waht follow for unobserved heterogeneity. However, the 
wide number of the covariates considered, some of which relate to normally 
unobserved characteristics, such as for instance, a measure of the individual 
valuation of leisure, together with the extremely flexible specification of the 
hazard rate adopted, may reduce the extent of unobserved heterogeneity in 
the model. Some sensitivity analysis will be carried out in the later chapters 
to test for the robustness of the parameters of the estimated models3. A good 
reference for the consequences of misspecifying unobserved heterogeneity is 
Ridder (1987).
3It would also have been possible to test explicitely for the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity, as suggested by Chesher, 1984.
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3.7 The non parametric Kaplan-M eier m ethod
The survivor function and the hazard rate for any sample are often estimated 
by non-parametric methods before carrying out any estimation by paramet­
ric methods. The main advantage of non-parametric methods is that they 
do not impose any specific or restrictive functional form on the data. Given 
that economic theory is inconclusive as to the functional form of the con­
ditional probability of leaving unemployment, non-parametric methods are 
very attractive, at least as a preliminary tool of analysis. Non-parametric 
estimation of the hazard rate (or of the survivor function) may be useful 
to gain insights into the behaviour over time of the probability of leaving 
unemployment.
Non-parametric methods are also useful to approach specific issues such as 
the detection of spikes in the hazard rate near the time of benefit exhaustion 
(when the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit is the same for 
most people in the sample), which might be preliminary to more sofisticated 
analysis. Also, some interesting information on the (conditional) probability 
of leaving unemployment of some exclusive categories of the unemployed 
may be be gathered by comparing non-parametric estimates their survivor 
functions. For instance, one could compare the estimated survivor functions 
for the male and the female unemployed (see Stancanelli, 1994).
The drawback of non-parametric models of unemployment duration is 
that they do not allow for individual heterogeneity. In practise, homogeneity 
of the sample with respect to observed and unobserved individual heterogene­
ity is assumed (Kalbfleish and Prentice, 1980, Meyer, 1990). Non-parametric 
analysis is normally only useful for preliminary inspection of the data. In 
order to draw some conclusions, individual heterogeneity must be allowed 
for.
Non-parametric estimates of the survivor function can be obtained by 
means of the Kaplan-Meier or Product Limit method4, which will be briefly 
described below.
The probability of leaving unemployment, at a given point in time, is set 
equal to the ratio of the number of completed unemployment spells over the 
“risk set”; i. e. the number of the observations that are “at risk” of exiting 
from unemployment. The risk set at a given point in time is equal to the 
number of the observations that have not yet exited from unemployment plus 
those observations that are right-censored at the same point in time.
Formally, let us define Em as the number of observations with completed 
spells of unemployment at rm, Zm as the number of observations that are 
right-censored in the time interval (Tm_ i,rm) and Rm as the number of ob­
servations in the risk set at rm. The risk set R ^  is defined as follows:
Rm ~  (•£'m "I" ) -(- (£ m-)-p ■+■ Ztn+p) ~¥ +  (£ q +  Zq), (3.25)
4Other non-parametric methods are reviewed for instance in Kalbfleish and Pientice 
(1980). They will not be used here.
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where rm are the discrete points in time at which at least one spell is com­
pleted and m varies from 1 to q. The Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor 
function is defined, at any point in time t, as follows:
<?«) =  I I  O - f 1 )- (3-26)
m|rm<t ^
This estimate of the survivor function is based on the observed frequency of 
exits from unemployment over the risk set at any point in time. The standard 
error for the Kaplan-Meier survivor function is conventionally defined as 
follows:
SE(G (t)) =  G(t)
»1 rm < t  ^m )
(3.27)
The expression for the integrated hazard, defined in the Section 3.2 above, 
is straightforward and equal to:
H{t) =  -log(G {t)). (3.28)
It is possible to derive estimates of the so-called “empirical hazard rate” from 
the above expression by means of numerical differentiation. The following 
linear approximation will be used: 6 =  A H /  A t.
The generalization to the competing risk case is straightforward, given the 
definitions of section 3.5. Let us define D as the set of the k mutually exclusive 
exits or destination states out of unemployment and r*>TO as any point in time 
at which at least one unemployment spell is completed, with m — 1, • • • ,qk. 
Accordingly, £*,m is now defined as the number of observations that exit 
to destination k at time r^im and Rm as the risk set at the same point in 
time. The risk set at any time does not depend on the destination states, 
but it is equal to the risk set for the single risk case; i. e. to the number 
of observations with starting time less than m and ending time greater 
than r*,m. The Kaplan-Meier estimates of the destination specific “pseudo­
survivor” functions are given by:
à{T)=  n  (1 -  % =)• (3-29)
"*l T*,m«
There is no direct interpretation of the destination specific or pseudo-survivor 
functions in terms of survivor functions, since they do not properly sum up 
to one. The overall single risk survivor function is equal to the product of the 
destination specific pseudo-survivor functions, as illustrated in the preceding 
section 3.5. In practise, the pseudo-survivor function relative to a given 
destination is computed treating observations that exit to destinations other 
than the one under consideration as if they were right-censored.
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3.8 The likelihood function for the m odel
It is conventional to use maximum likelihood techniques to estimate hazard 
rate models. One of the main reasons is that maximum likelihood techniques 
allow one to deal easily with right-censoring of the unemployment spells.
The contribution to the likelihood of completed spells of unemployment 
is the density function, evaluated at the exit time, while the contribution 
of right-censored spells is the survivor function, evaluated at the time of 
censoring. The single risk likelihood for a random sample of the inflow can 
be written as follows:
l = n  /!(*.•(<). u) n  *,), (3 .3 0 )
icA icB
where i indicates an unemployed individual, A  is the set of completed 
spells and B  is the set of right-censored spells. The time t■, is the observed end 
of individual “i” spell of unemployment, ending with exit from unemployment 
or right-censoring.
Given the relation between the density function and the hazard rate and 
between the hazard rate and the survivor function (provided in 3.4 and 3.5), 
the likelihood function for the data can be rewritten as:
L = Y l9 i(x i( t) ,u )Y [e x p { -  f  6i(xi(u),u)du}> (3.31)
itA i Jo
where the second product is now over all spells.
In the case of the LSUS data, it is necessary to allow for the the left 
truncation of the sample at about three months from the commencement of 
the unemployment spell. As explained in Section 2.4.2, the left truncation 
period is set equal to the lapse of time between the commencement of the 
unemployment spell and the time of the first interview, which varies for 
each unemployed between 11 and 17 weeks. Allowing for left truncation, the 
likelihood function for the LSUS sample can be written as:
L = Y[0i(x i(t ) , ti )Y [ exP{~ f  9i(xi(u),u)du}, (3.32)
kA i J t‘
where ia is the individual left truncation time, which varies between 11 and 17 
weeks. For estimation purposes, it is convenient to define the corresponding 
log-likelihood function:
LogL =  £fo$0i(a:.-(<)»<i) +  £ { -  P  $(*«(“ )» u)d“ }» (3-33)
kA i J u
and adopting a piecewise exponential specification of the hazard rate, as in 
Equation 3.19:
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LogL =  £{(ai)jftri(i)} +  J ^ { -  t*  [exp{a\)0xi{u)du], (3.34)
ieA i J u
I C /i, Ii =  {fin < t < T^+i}, / =  l ,2 ,- - - ,m ,
which is the single risk model I use in the following Chapters.
In the competing risks case, given the definition of the hazard rate pro­
vided in 3.21, the likelihood function can be written as follows:
LogL =  I I  I I  M I ^ M -  /  M * i( “ )i “ )**}, (3-35)
kcDitAk keD i Jo
where is the set of completed spells ending into destination state k. From 
Equation 3.35 it is possible to see that each cause-specific hazard of the 
competing risks model can be estimated by simply applying single risk tech­
niques and treating the observations exiting to states other than the one 
under consideration as if right-censored. Taking the logarithms, allowing for 
left truncation and specifying the hazard as a piecewise exponential5, the 
following expression for the competing risks likelihood is obtained:
LogL =  J ]  /  exp{a \+ 0kxï{u)du}(ZM )
keDieA* keD i J u
h IU h  =  { < h  < t < T|+ 1 } ,  / =  1 , 2 , ■ • • , 171,
which is the competing risks model I use in the later Chapters, allowing for 
two destination states k,
{
full-time work, k = 1 
other economic states, k = 2 .
3.9 Summary
In this Chapter, I have laid out the econometric model that I use in the next 
chapters. Some background information on the statistical concepts used has 
also been provided.
The preferred specification for the baseline hazard rate is a piecewise 
linear exponential. I have specified a competing risks model which allows for 
two destination states out of unemployment: full-time work and other states. 
The likelihood functions for the LSUS data are given by Equations 3.34 
and 3.36 respectively for the single risk and the competing risks models.
5The piecewise exponential hazard rate in the competing risks is given by Equation 3.23.
72
Chapter 4
An assessm ent of the use o f  
com peting risks models with a 
flexible baseline hazard rate.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, two methodological issues are approached using the LSUS 
data. The first concerns the use of competing risks models of unemployment 
duration. The second relates to the specification of a flexible baseline hazard. 
Both comparisons hinge on intuitive arguments more than on formal testing 
and relate on using the LSUS data.
The use of competing risks model of the duration of unemployment is 
quite recent. Katz and Meyer (1988, p. 1) distinguishing the finding of a new 
job from recall to the previous job, conclude that “the recall and new job exit 
probabilities have quite different time patterns and are affected in opposite 
ways by the explanatory variables”. Narendranathan and Stewart (1993, p. 
79) allowing for exit into full-time job and other states, find, instead, that 
“the general pattern of the estimated effects of most of the variables” in the 
competing risks hazards uis similar to the single-risk model, although some of 
the more important effects are more pronounced in the full-time job hazard”. 
The two studies might have led to different conclusions simply because of the 
different cause-specific hazards considered or of the different countries (the 
first, the US, the second, the UK) they looked at.
Often the data available to do not allow one to distinguish the states en­
tered upon leaving unemployment. For this reason and also given the large 
number of studies that have adopted a single risk framework it might be 
useful to gather further evidence on the possible implications of not distin­
guishing the destination states out of unemployment by comparing the esti­
mates of single and competing risks models for the LSUS data. Of course, 
the conclusions drawn are strictly dependent on the data used and on the 
destinations states that have been considered.
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The majority of previous applied studies on unemployment duration have 
estimated single risk models with a Weibull baseline hazard, which does allow 
the sign of time dependency to vary over time. Recent studies have pointed 
to the importance of adopting a more flexible specification of the baseline 
hazard rate. For instance, Meyer (1990), Han and Hausman (1990), Naren- 
dranathan and Stewart (1993) compared the results obtained modelling a 
Weibull baseline hazard rate with those obtained modelling a flexible base­
line hazard rate. The restrictions imposed by the Weibull model were always 
rejected. Narendranathan and Stewart (1993, p. 81) do however conclude 
that uthe estimated effects of the economic and socio-demographic factors 
considered are very similar in the two specifications when there are no time 
varying coefficients”. It seems therefore interesting to compare the estima­
tion results obtained with the LSUS data using a monotonie or a flexible 
specification of the baseline hazard.
The focus of interest of this Chapter is the assessment of the implications 
of using competing risks models with a flexible baseline, for the case of the 
LSUS data. The reader is referred to Chapter 5, for a detailed discussion 
of the explanatory variables used in the analysis and of their impact. The 
coefficients on the explanatory variables are commented upon here only in 
so far as they shed light on the differences between estimating single or 
competing risks models and flexible or monotonie baseline hazards, using 
the LSUS data.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The data used are described 
briefly in Section 4.2. Next, in Section 4.3, the single and competing risks 
models are estimated first by non-parametric Kaplan-Meier method and the 
results of estimation of the two models are compared. Then, in Section 4.4, 
the parametric models are estimated and the results of estimation compared. 
In Section 4.5, I test the independence of the single risk model and the 
competing risks cause-specific hazards, adopting the method suggested by 
Narendranathan and Stewart (1991). Two sets of assumptions are tested for: 
the equality of the coefficients on the explanatory variables and the equality of 
the baseline hazards. In Section 4 .6 ,1 compare the estimated baseline hazards 
for the single risk and the competing risks models under the assumption of a 
piecewise linear exponential or a Weibull baseline hazard rate. The estimated 
coefficients on the explanatory variables under the two specifications are also 
compared. Finally, I test for the sensitivity of the competing risks model with 
a piecewise linear baseline to different specifications of the expected earnings 
variable. Conclusions to the Chapter follow.
4.2 The data
The main features of the LSUS data were described in Chapter 2 together 
with the construction of some of the explanatory variables. A subsample of 
the male unemployed that participated in both survey interviews has been
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selected for the econometric analysis (see Section 2.4.1).
The overall number of observations is 2035, of which 933 exited into 
full-time work and 267 into other states. The remaining observations are 
right-censored (835). The duration of the unemployment spells by the exit 
states is given in Table 4.1. Two destination states out of unemployment axe 
considered: full-time work and other states1. Given the small number of the 
unemployed exiting to economic states other than full-time work, as shown 
in Section 2.4.3, it is not sensible to disaggregate further in the econometric 
analysis the other states exit. This is one of the reasons for grouping the 
unemployed exiting to states other than full-time work in the same category 
of “other states” . Another reason is that it is easier to compare my findings 
to those of Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) who allowed also for exit 
into a job or to other states. As already pointed out, the destination “other” 
states is not at all homogeneous, since it includes very different labour force 
and out of the labour force states (see Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.3).
Table 4.1 shows that exit from unemployment is equally spread over time. 
No particular increase in the frequency of exits can be detected at any time, at 
least on the basis of simple visual inspection. Perhaps, between week 48 and 
week 52 the frequency of the unemployed exiting to other states is higher than 
in other time intervals. The number of the unemployed exiting to other states 
is generally smaller in any time interval than that of the unemployed exiting 
into full-time work. Given the small number of the unemployed exiting to 
other states in certain weeks, it might not be very reasonable to estimate 
a weekly baseline hazard rate. However, I am interested in estimating as 
precisely as possible the baseline hazard rate for the conditional probability 
of exiting from unemployment into full-time work. The estimation of a weekly 
baseline for the full-time work exit should not present major problems.
Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are given in Table 4.2. 
The reader is referred to Chapter 5 for a detailed description of the variables 
considered. It emerges that the unemployed exiting into other states tend to 
be older on average than those exiting into full-time work. The unemployed 
exiting into full-time work are on average more likely to have been in full­
time work for the largest part of the year before entering unemployment, to 
be married and to have children aged less than five years.
*In previous work (Stancanelli, 1993a), I have allowed for three destinations: full-time 
work, sickness and other states.
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Table 4.1: Unemployment duration by the exit states
Unemployment duration 
in Weeks
Frequency
Full-T im e Work Exit
of Exits 
Other States Exit
12 2 2
IS 16 9
u 27 16
15 35 7
16 S3 9
17 *4 5
I S 27 6
19 27 S
20 22 4
SI 23 4
22 16 2
t s 1 * 3
u 23 4
25 21 6
26 23 8
27 22 5
28 25 5
29 21 4
SO 21 5
SI 24 12
32 20 1
S3 33 5
S4 25 3
35 17 4
36 11 1
37 21 6
38 16 8
39 17 6
40 15 3
41 13 5
42 12 3
43 15 4
44 24 5
45 16 3
46 15 5
47 17 2
4S 13 10
49 12 8
50 15 3
51 7 8
52 11 9
53 16 5
54 14 4
55 11 5
56 9 3
57 8 6
58 10 5
59 10 2
60 12 6
61 7 6
62 6 2
63 9 2
64 8
65 6
66 2
Sum 9SS 267
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of the economic variables
Full-time work exit Other states exit Full sample
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Left truncation period 13.3923 1.0545 13.4082 I .1214 13.4069 1.0571
Unemployment duration (weeks) 33.6506 14-3393 36.3258 15.7641 46.9327 19.1035
In f / t  work most of the year before U. 0.6988 O.459O 0.5768 O.495O 0.6531 0.4761
Unemployed most of the year before U. 0.2186 0.4136 0.2097 O.4079 0.2216 O.4154
Sick out of work most of the time in the 0.0161 0.1258 0.0599 0.2378 0.0364 0.1872
year before U.
Professional/Intermediate Occupation 0.2004 O.4OO5 0.2172 0.4131 0.1730 0.3783
Unskilled Occupation 0.0386 0.1927 0.04 87 0.2156 0.0580 0.2338
Occupation not available 0.0740 0.2618 0.0599 0.2378 0.0708 0.2565
Age £0-24 0.1426 0.3498 ; 0.0974 0.2970 0.1238 0.3295
Age 25-34 0.3548 0.4787 0.2846 O.452I 0.3229 0.4677
Age 35-44 0.2765 O.4475 0.2397 O.4277 0.2482 O.432O
Age 45-54 0.1768 0.3817 0.2210 0.4157 0.1975 0.3982
Age 55-56 0.0493 0.2166 0.1573 0.3648 0.1076 0.3100
Has any child old less than 5 0.3516 O.4777 0.2472 O.4322 0.3410 O.4742
Married 0.8950 0.3068 0.8240 0.3816 0.8673 O.3393
experiences some shortage of money 0.7856 0.4106 0.6891 0.4637 0.7327 0.4427
House owner outright/with mortgage 0.4234 O.4944 0.4270 0.4956 0.3808 0.4857
County unemployment rate 13.4799 3.2047 13.3816 3.1789 13.5856 3.2049
Receives only UB at tl 0.3719 0.4836 O.4195 O.4944 0.3617 O.48O6
Receives no UB nor SB O.O4I 8 0.2002 O.IO49 0.3070 0.0462 0.2100
Amount UB and SB, >n pounds, logs. 3.4952 0.8431 3.1671 1.1507 3.4778 0.8748
Predicted earnings, in £ , logs. 4.4592 0.5527 4.4261 0.5965 4.4485 0.5194
pred. earn, not available 0.0129 0.1127 0.0150 0.1217 0.0113 0.1057
Earningst tn pounds, logs. 2.5667 2.2699 2.1090 2.2639 2.3771 2.2561
Earnings not available O.433O 0.4958 0.5281 0.5001 0.4683 O.4991
The number of units exiting to full-time »j 933, to other exits 267 and the total number of units, including
the right-censored is 2035. The dichotomous variables take unitary value when the condition stated for
each of them is satisfied. The mean unemployment duration is computed over the completed «ne mployment
spellst excluding the right-censored and the observations exiting to states other the one considered in turn.
The logarithms are taken over the non-zero observations. The state occupied for the largest part of the year
before is the state occupied for the largest number of weeks as relative to the other possible states. The LSUS
survey allows for the following states: full-time work, part-time work, sickness, registered unemployment,
government training scheme, full-time education, housework, prison and other states. The state occupied
is recorded week-by-week for each week in the year before the commencement of the observed unemployment
spell. The base for the three dummies above is given by the unemployed that resulted to be in one of the
other possible states considered for the largest proportion of weeks.
4.3 Non-param etric estim ates of single and 
com peting risks models
The survivor functions and the hazard rates for the single and the competing 
risks models have been estimated by non-parametric Kaplan-Meier2 method. 
The advantage of non-parametric models is that no restrictive functional form 
is imposed on the data. However, individual heterogeneity is not allowed for. 
One must therefore be careful in interpreting the results.
2The Kaplan-Meier method is described in Section 3.7 of Chapter 3.
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Figure 4.1: Kaplan-Meier estimates o f the survivor functions
The Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function and the integrated 
hazards are given in the Tables 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5, in the Appendix, together 
with the standard errors. The two competing risks pseudo-survivor functions 
of exit into full-time work and into other destinations are plotted in Figure 4.1 
together with the single risk survivor function. The figure starts at the 11th 
week of unemployment since the behaviour of the survivor function in the 
weeks before is not observed because of the left truncation of the sample.
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Figure 4.2: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard rates
The steeper is the slope of the estimated (pseudo) survivor function, the 
higher is the hazard of leaving unemployment to enter that specific destina­
tion state. According to these estimates, the probability of leaving unem­
ployment to enter full-time work is at all times higher than the probability 
of exiting to other states. The behaviour of the single risk survivor func­
tion and of the pseudo-survivor for exit into full-time work is very similar. 
This result is probably due to the fact that most of the completed spells of 
unemployment end into full-time work.
hazard funcuona
Trrn i ri'f i ru n  htttii i rrrri i i i i n i i i mr n i  in  i r
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The empirical hazard rates for the single and the competing risks models 
are plotted in the Figure 4.2. These estimates are derived drom the Kaplan- 
Meier estimates of the integrated hazard as discussed in Section 3.7. The first 
few weeks of unemployment duration are not shown given the small number 
of observations exiting.
According to the estimated empirical hazards, the probability of leaving 
unemployment to enter states other than full-time work is, at any time, lower 
than the probability of exiting into full-time work. Some spikes are detected. 
The spikes are much larger for the hazard of exiting into full-time work than 
for the hazard of exiting into other states. The single risk hazard follows 
more or less the same path than the full-time work hazard but shows smaller 
spikes. The reason for this slight difference in behaviour is that the single 
risk hazard is equal to the sum of the competing risks hazard rates and only 
a small number of the unemployed exits into other states.
Individual (observed) heterogeneity is allowed for in the next section.
4.4 R esults o f estim ation of the parametric 
m odels
The likelihood functions for the single and the competing risks models are 
described by Equations 3.34 and 3.36. A weekly baseline hazard rate is spec­
ified. Unobserved heterogeneity is not allowed for (see Sections 1.5 and 3.6).
As already discussed in Chapter 1, unobserved heterogeneity is likely 
to bias the estimated sign of time dependency. Lancaster (1979) pointed 
out that not allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity might result 
in spurious findings of negative time dependency. Katz and Meyer (1990) 
argued that uncontrolled unobserved heterogeneity might lead to spurious 
findings of positive time dependency. However, it seems that unobserved 
heterogeneity is more of a problem when a restrictive baseline hazard rate 
rather is specified. Previous studies that adopted a flexible specification for 
the baseline hazard rate concluded that allowing for unobserved heterogeneity 
did not improve substantially upon the estimated coefficients. Introducing 
individual unobserved heterogeneity would require making assumptions on 
the form of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and on its correlation 
across the cause specific hazards of the competing risks model. This would 
impose additional restrictions on the model which will not necessarily result 
in more realistic estimates of the parameters of the model. This problem was 
also highlighted by Narendranathan and Stewart (1993). I therefore refrain 
from allowing for individual unobserved heterogeneity. I do however test for 
the robustness of the estimates to alternative specifications of the model. I 
test also for the sensitivity of the estimates to the use of actual earnings 
instead of imputed earnings as a measure of the distribution of expected 
earnings. In the next Chapter, I test the sensitivity of the estimated model 
to a different choice of covariates and to different specifications of the benefit
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variable. I also test there for the robustness of the estimated coefficient on 
the unemployment benefit level..
Results of estimation of the single risk and the competing risks models 
are shown in Table 4.3. The estimates of the weekly baseline are given in 
the Appendix. The two exits of the competing risks model are estimated 
simultaneously3.
4.4.1 T he im pact o f  th e  explanatory variables
The reader is referred to Chapter 5 —where also a wider number of covari- 
ates will be considered— for a discussion of the impact4 of the explanatory 
variables. I restrict attention here to comparing the estimates of the single 
risk model with those of the competing risks model.
A first inspection of the results indicates that the impact of the explana­
tory variables differs considerably between the single risk model and the 
competing risks model. For instance, the coefficient on “full-time work for 
most of the time in the year before entering unemployment” is not statisti­
cally significant in the single risk model; it is instead significant in the two 
competing risks exits but showing opposite signs. Having been in full-time 
work the largest part of the year before entering unemployment raises by 
50% (expO.3922 =  1.48) the chances of finding a full-time job and halves 
(exp — 0.73 =  0.48) the probability of exiting to states other than full-time 
work. The single risk model by blending these two opposite effects together 
leads to the conclusion that this variable is not significant.
Having been unemployed for most of the year before the observed un­
employment spell has a similar impact. This variable has an impact not 
statistically different from zero in the single risk model; it raises by 40% 
the hazard of exit into full-time work; but decreases by 40% the hazard of 
exit into other states. A possible explanation for this result is the so called 
“repeated unemployment”; i. e. the fact that having been in unemployment 
raises the chances of exiting into a full-time job, to go back into unemploy­
ment after a while. An alternative explanation for this result is that having 
occupied the state of unemployment in the year before the commencement of
3This does not affect the estimates of the coefficients, since no restrictions across the 
two exits were imposed, but only the value of the likelihood function, which is equal to 
the product of the two corresponding “single risk” likelihoods, which would have resulted 
if the two exits were to be estimated separately as single risk models with everybody not 
exiting to the given exit being treated as if right-censored.
4The impact of a dichotomous explanatory variable, “z”, on the hazard rate can be 
interpreted as follows. Let us think of two unemployed persons with the same values of 
the explanatory variables except for the dichotomous variable “z” and let us assume that 
“z” takes value one for one of them (person A) and equals zero for the other (person B). 
The hazard rate of A is equal to “exp(&)” times the hazard rate of B; i. e. A stands 
“exp(/?*)” higher (lower) chances of leaving unemployment than B. The coefficient on a 
continuous explanatory variable specified in logarithms gives the elasticity of the hazard 
rate with respect to that variable.
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Table 4.3: Results of estimation: single and competing risks models
Variable Single risk model Competing risks model
label Pull-time exit Other states exit
ôoetf SE Coeff SË Coeff SË
F /t  work for most of the year be­ 0.0866 0.1080 0.3922* 0.1363 -0.7290* 0.1849
fore
Unemployed for most of the time 0.0750 0.1181 0.3336* 0.1468 -0.5393* 0.2096
in year before
Sick for most of the time in year -0.2612 0.2069 -0.4539 0.2895 -0.1585 0.3025
before
Profess. /Interm. Occup. 0.2377* 0.0864 0.1933* 0.0982 0.4127* 0.1814
Unskilled Occupation -0.4219* 0.1476 -0.4828* 0.1719 -0.2194 0.2891
Age 20-24 0.1351 0.0973 0.2126* 0.1071 -0.1688 0.2345
Age 35-44 -0.1155 0.0809 -0.1559* 0.0904 0.0372 0.1823
Age 45-54 -0.5180* 0.0961 -0.6113* 0.1101 -0.2059 0.2006
Age 55-58 -1.0490* 0.1323 -1.4814* 0.1722 -0.1849 0.2286
Has any child aged < 5 -0.2783* 0.0760 -0.2887* 0.0843 -0.2775 0.1758
Married 0.2445* 0.0973 0.3777* 0.1163 -0.0891 0.1803
Experiences money shortage 0.2569* 0.0739 0.3050* 0.0861 0.0934 0.1458
House owner 0.3309* 0.0646 0.3310* 0.0731 0.3089* 0.1378
County unemployment rate -0.0196* 0.0092 -0.0168 0.01046 -0.0252 0.0192
Receives only UB at t l 0.2581* 0.0740 0.2331* 0.0839 0.3920* 0.1572
Receives no UB nor SB -0.3211 0.3036 -0.4413 0.3578 -0.2662 0.5878
Amount UB and SB -0.2119* 0.0723 -0.1735* 0.0828 -0.3606* 0.1473
Predicted earnings 0.2473 0.1764 0.5463* 0.1992 -0.7692* 0.3767
No pred. earn. 1.1666 0.8362 2.4498* 0.9463 -3.1645 1.7775
Single risk max. loglikelihood:-5907; competing risks max. loglikeli lood: -6451. Weekly baseline
estimates are shown in the appendix. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are pro­
vided in the preceding table, in the data section, where also some variables are defined. A *
indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% two-sided level. The
number of units exiting to full-time is 933, to other exits 267 and the total number of units,
including the right-censored is 2035. The logarithms are taken over the non-zero observations.
The state occupied for the largest part of the year before is the state occupied for the largest
number of weeks as relative to the other possible states. The LSUS survey allows for the following
states: full-time work, part-time work, sickness, registered unemployment, government training
scheme, full-time education, housework, prison and other states. The state occupied is recorded
week-by-week for each week in the year before the commencement of the observed unemployment
spell. The base for the three dummies above is given by the unemployed that resulted to be in
one of the other possible states considered for the largest proportion of weeks.
the observed spell of registered unemployment raises the individual chances 
of leaving unemployment more than having been in any of the other base 
states; i. e. government training scheme, full-time education, part-time work, 
other states.
Also the estimated coefficient on the individual predicted earnings is not 
significantly different from zero in the single risk model; it is statistically 
significant in the competing risks model and shows opposite signs for the two 
exits.
These findings are rather worrying given the considerable bulk of previous 
studies that used single risk models and drew policy conclusions on the basis 
of the estimates obtained. However, if one compares the results of estimation 
of the single risk model with those of the full-time exit hazard many variables 
are found to have the same sign and are not too different in absolute value. In
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particular, the estimated elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to changes 
in the level of the unemployment benefit does not vary much across the two 
models, being equal to 0.21 in the single risk model, to 0.17 for the exit into 
full-time work and to 0.36 for the other states exit. These estimates are close 
to those of Narendranathan and Stewart (1993), for the second quarter of 
the year (0.19).
4.4 .2  T he p iecew ise exponentia l baseline hazard rates
The estimated baseline hazards of the single risk model is plotted in Fig­
ure 4.3. The baseline hazard of exit into full-time work is also plotted for 
comparison purposes. The coefficients on the weekly constants (shown in 
Table 8.6 in the Appendix) are all statistically significant for both baseline 
hazards5. The baseline of exit into other exits is not plotted since almost 
none of the estimated coefficients differed significantly from zero. The esti­
mated coefficients are shown in Table 8.6 in the Appendix. These coefficients 
are larger than those in the full-time hazard and show more variation in size.
The behaviour of the baseline of “other states” is probably due to se­
vere problems of unobserved heterogeneity arising from having grouped to­
gether many destination states; such as part-time work, government training 
scheme, sickness and other non-labour force states. This might also explain 
why many of the coefficients of the explanatory variables of Table 4.3 are not 
significantly different from zero in the other states exit. It was found above 
that variables exercising influence of opposite sign on the cause-specific haz­
ards of the competing risks model, have insignificant effect in the single risk 
model. Of course, an alternative explanation is that statistical non signif­
icance arises from the small number of observations exiting to other states 
(267 or 13% of the sample considered).
From Figure 4.3, it emerges that both the single risk hazard and the 
full-time work hazard show large spikes and humps over time. The baseline 
hazard rate for the full-time job exit shows spikes at week 33, 37, 43-44, 47, 
50, 52-53 and 60, from the commencement of the registered unemployment 
spell. The significance of the differences between consecutive pairs of the 
baseline coefficients is tested using the information on their variances and 
covariances. The null hypothesis that each consecutive pair of coefficients, 
Q/, c*;+i is not different from each others is tested as follows:
Ho : at = aj+i, at -  Qt+1 = 0;
S E (a t -  ar/+i) =  yjvar(at) +  t>ar(ai+i) -  2c<w(a/,ai+1).
5An exception is the first week 11, given that there were no completed spells at that 
time, so that the graph starts at the 12th week of unemployment. No coefficients are 
estimated for the first 10 weeks because of the left truncation of the sample during the 
first about three months of unemployment.
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Figure 4.3: Piecewise linear exponential models: weekly baselines
The results are given in Table 8.7 in the Appendix. I conclude that while 
the estimated coefficients are all significantly different from zero (except for 
the coefficient on week 11) only few of the spikes plotted in Figure 4.3 are 
statistically significant. However, only successive pairs of coefficients have 
been considered. On the basis of this evidence no clear pattern of time 
dependency emerges. The baseline hazard rate appears quite flat, in the 
sense that the estimated coefficients on the weekly constants do not differ 
significantly from each other.
Next, I have tested the validity of the restriction imposed by allowing 
the baseline to vary each month instead than each week. The estimated 
monthly coefficients of the baseline hazard of exit into full-time work were all 
significantly different from zero. None of the estimated monthly coefficients 
for the other exits were statistically significant. This result is in line with 
the previous findings for the weekly baseline. The monthly baseline hazard 
rate for the exit into full-time work is plotted in Figure 4.4.
The validity of the imposed by specifying a monthly rather than a weekly 
piecewise linear baseline hazard rate is tested using a likelihood ratio-test. 
The test statistic gave the following result:
LR  =  2(—6451.0 -  (-6491.9)) =  81.8 ~
which implies that the restrictions imposed by the monthly baseline cannot 
be strongly rejected on statistical grounds. This result is probably due to
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Figure 4.4: Monthly piecewise linear exponential baseline
the non-significance of the estimated coefficients on the segments of the base­
line hazard for exit into other states (since the values of the two maximum 
likelihood considered relate to the competing risks of exit into full-time work 
and other states). It is however, I believe, reasonable to allow for a weekly 
baseline as long as there are enough degrees of freedom since all the esti­
mated coefficients on the full-time work hazard are significant. Moreover, a 
monthly baseline would impose the restriction that the baseline hazard rate 
follows the same pattern each month. This restriction cannot be justified on 
economic grounds.
The significance of the differences between consecutive coefficients of the 
monthly baseline hazard of exit into full-time work was tested as above. The 
results are shown in Table 8.8 in the Appendix. Not many of the coefficients 
are significantly different from each other. There appears to be a significant 
rise in the hazard rate from week 11 to 15 and then a fall from week 15 to 
19.
Constancy of the dependency on time of the (conditional) probability 
of leaving unemployment is next tested by estimating a simple exponential 
model of the hazard rate. The estimated parameter for the baseline hazard 
of exit into full-time work is strongly significant and equal to 0.00145 (exp(-
6.54), SE 0.93) while the estimated baseline parameter of exit into other 
states did not differ significantly from zero. The restriction imposed by as­
suming a constant baseline is rejected against a weekly varying baseline on
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the basis of a likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio test gave the following 
result:
L R  =  2(—6451.0 -  (-6521.6)) =  141.2 ~  x?oe-
I have also tested the restriction of imposing a constant baseline hazard on 
the data against a monthly baseline. This restriction is also rejected on the 
basis of a likelihood ratio test (LR  = 59.4 ~  Xk)*
According to these findings no clear pattern of time dependency emerges 
although constancy of the baseline hazard is rejected. These findings are in 
line with previous UK studies which generally did not find important time 
dependency effects. For instance, Lancaster (1979) finds (in a single risk 
model with a Weibull baseline hazard) significant negative time dependency 
which does however “disappear” if unobserved heterogeneity is allowed for 
(by means of a gamma distribution). Nickell (1979) finds negative duration 
dependency which becomes negligible once unobserved heterogeneity is al­
lowed for. Atkinson et al. (1984), who estimate a Weibull baseline hazard 
without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, find evidence of significant 
negative time dependency. It seems reasonable that the results obtained here 
using a flexible specification of the baseline hazard rate are close to those ob­
tained (in previous studies) specifying a Weibull baseline hazard rate and 
allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. In Section 4.6, a Weibull baseline is 
estimated for the LSUS data and the results compared. The reader is referred 
to that section for further conclusions.
4.5 Testing for the independence o f dura­
tion and the exit states
I follow here the approach suggested by Narendranathan and Stewart (1991) 
of conducting simple tests of independence of unemployment duration and 
the destination states, given the destination states. I test the hypotheses of 
equality of the coefficients on the explanatory variables and on the baseline 
constants across the single and competing risks models estimated for the 
LSUS data.
Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) develop some test statistics for the 
following general model of the proportional hazard rate family6:
$i(t) =  (t)cxp[a + Xi(t)'0\,
where they assume in order to identify the model that V’i(O) =  1 as initial 
condition. The alternative would have been to assume a  =  0, as they them­
selves point out. They do not assume a priori any functional form for the 
baseline hazard. Their conclusions are therefore independent of the form 
specified for the baseline hazard. The model I have used is equivalent to 
their formulation if a  =  0 is assumed instead than ^i(O) =  1.
6The proportional hazard rate was defined in the introduction and in Section 3.4.
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4.5.1 E quality o f  th e  covariates im pact
The null hypothesis of proportionality of the conditional probabilities of exit 
into a given destination for the competing risks and the single risk models, 
at a particular elapsed duration, t, is given by equality of the /? vector of 
coefficients on the explanatory variables. The assumption tested is that of 
equality of the vector of coefficients on the explanatory variables at any point 
in time. Any assumption on the specification of the baseline hazard does not 
affect the testing procedure. The null hypothesis is the following:
#  =  A. =  /?,
which can be written in terms of the hazard rate, specified as a piecewise 
linear exponential, as:
0i(t) =  exp^i(/)'/?] ^2  expaat, I =  11,12, • • •, 65,
k
where / is a function of time.
The conditional probability of exiting into state k at a certain time t, 
given that at least one spell is completed at that time is:
Pki(*) =  M 0 / W ,  ¿ =  1,2;
which is, under the null hypothesis, simply equal to:
^ ( i )  =  [expaucj/QT expay], / =  11,12, • • • ,65.
j
Under the null hypothesis:
0ki(*) =  P k iW iO i
so that the log-likelihood can be written as:
LogL = Y ^ {^ 2 c ki[logp)i{ti)ei( t i ) ] - O i { u ) d u } ,  (4.1)
i k
= Y i i ^ o g e ^ )  -  f  ‘ 6i(u)du + £  CKlogp^t)}, 
i Jo k
where the first two terms correspond to the single risk likelihood and the last 
term is an adjustment factor. The indicator “cjd” takes value one when the 
individual “i” exits to state “k”. Maximization of the last term with respect 
to pk(i) and subject to £kPk(0 =  1 gives the following adjustment factor:
5 3  5Z  E *  l n ( E k t / { J 2  E j t ) ,  
t k j
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where E  is the number of completed spells.
The maximized log-likelihood under the null hypothesis (restricted max­
imum log-likelihood) is then equal to the maximized log-likelihood of the 
single risk model plus the above adjustment factor. The unrestricted likeli­
hood is the competing risks likelihood. A likelihood ratio-test can be used 
to test the validity of the restrictions:
= 2 { in i4 „  -  +  0 )} ,
where Q stands for the adjustment factor, c denotes the competing risks 
model and s the single risk model.
The test statistics gives the following result:
LR = 2{—6451 -  [-5907 -  587.314]} =  86.6 ~  x ï9,
which leads to rejection of the null hypothesis.
4.5 .2  E quality  o f  th e  baseline hazards
Another interesting hypothesis to test is the equality of the baseline hazards 
for the given exit states. The piecewise exponential baseline hazards for 
the two competing risks exits and for the single risk model are shown in 
the Appendix. The hypothesis of equality of the baselines was rejected on 
the basis of visual inspection and intuitive arguments. A formal test of thie 
hypothesis is carried out here. Under the null hypothesis, assuming that the 
covariates do not vary over time, the baseline hazards are equal:
tl’ij (t) = ^ih(i) = (4.2)
where tj>i is the baseline hazard rate. Under the assumption of a piecewise 
exponential baseline hazard rate, the null hypothesis can be rewritten as:
expa^ =  exporllh =  expoi,, 
h  = {*h <  t < n+i}, / =  1,2,•■•,65,
where the unit of time is the week and the first 11 weeks are ignored 
because of the left truncation of the sample. Under the null, the conditional 
probability of exiting from unemployment into state k at time i, given that 
some spells are completed at that time, is the following:
Pki(i) =  exp(x [4 )/ Ç  exp(x-/?j), k =  1,2.
j
The conditional probability above is independent of time. The restricted 
log-likelihood is the following:
LogL =  53 cilogxl)i(t)+cii(x'ifl1)+c2i(x,i02)—(zxp(x,if3i)+exp(x[02))(4.3)
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/  V>i(u)du}.
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The restricted maximum likelihood can then be calculated, following 
Narendranathan and Stewart (1991), by duplication of the sample and es­
timation of a single risk model where the conditional probability of leaving 
unemployment, 6\, is expressed as below:
Oi = xl>i(t)exp[x[P + ZiXiS}-, (4.4)
B\ =  ex-p(a\)exp\x[(i + z\X\6], I = 11,12, ■ • •, 65,
where z =  C2 in the original sample; i. e. it takes value one for the observa­
tions exiting to the state other destinations and zero value otherwise. In the 
duplicate sample, all the observations are, instead, right-censored at the time 
of completion/right-censoring and z is defined as 1 — c2; i. e. it takes value 
one for the observations that either exit into full-time work or are “truly” 
right-censored.
The idea behind this procedure is to estimate the same baseline for the 
two exits but different coefficients on the explanatory variables for the two 
exits. The duplicated sample where all the observations are right-censored 
is only going to affect that part of the likelihood relating to the estimated 
survivor functions, since the contribution to the likelihood of completed spells 
is the density function and of right-censored spells is, precisely, the survivor 
function. As a result, the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables 
give the Pi coefficients and the estimated coefficients, <5, on the explanatory 
variables multiplied by the new variable z provide estimates of /?2 — A-
The model above was actually estimated adopting a monthly specification 
of the piecewise linear exponential baseline, to simplify the burden of esti­
mation given that the covariates are here more than twice as many as before. 
Results of estimation are shown in Table 8.9, in the Appendix. Equality of 
the monthly baselines seems an interesting hypothesis as much as equality of 
the weekly baselines. The likelihood for the unrestricted model was estimated 
as before but specifying monthly baseline constants. A likelihood-ratio test 
gave the following result:
LR  =  2{—6491.9 -  (-5731.9)} =  1520 -  Xu-
The null hypothesis of equality of the single and competing risks baselines is 
strongly rejected on the basis of the above evidence.
To sum up, on the basis of the formal tests carried out here the propor­
tionality of the cause-specific hazards has been rejected. The results of the 
analysis conducted here support the use of competing risks models.
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4.6 A comparison w ith the W eibull m odel
The piecewise linear exponential model is compared here with a Weibull 
model. The main difference between the piecewise linear and the Weibull 
baseline is that the Weibull baseline implies monotonic time dependency, 
while the piecewise baseline allows the sign of time dependency to vary over 
time7. The same explanatory variables as before are considered. The results 
of estimation for the Weibull model are shown in Table 4.4 below.
Table 4.4: Weibull specification: single and competing risks models
Variable Single nsk model Competing risks model
label Full-time exit Other states exit
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Constant -4.4998* 0.9565 -7.0673* 1.1715 -0.3798 1.7342
F /t  work year before 0.0991 0.1241 0.4757* 0.1713 -0.6772* 0.1949
Unemployed year before 0.0857 0.1356 0.4058* 0.1824 -0.5016* 0.2080
Sick out of work year before -0.2968 0.2381 -0.5530 0.3562 -0.1395 0.2849
Profess. /Interm. Occup. 0.2689* 0.1004 0.2331 0.1208 0.3806* 0.1767
Unskilled Occupation -0.4810* 0.1726 -0.5863* 0.2154 -0.1992 0.2731
Age 20-24 0.1491 0.1120 0.2539 0.1322 -0.1633 0.2221
Age 35-44 -0.1309 0.0932 -0.1890 0.1112 0.0393 0.1721
Age 45-54 -0.5842* 0.1165 -0.7372* 0.1465 -0.1742 0.1893
Age 55-58 -1.1875* 0.1708 -1.7915* 0.2572 -0.1514 0.2146
Has any child < 5 -0.3138* 0.0896 -0.3499* 0.1066 -0.2472 0.1677
Married 0.2789* 0.1130 0.4582* 0.1467 -0.0863 0.1708
experiences money shortage 0.2883* 0.0868 0.3680* 0.1090 0.0764 0.1373
House owner 0.3748* 0.0781 0.3989* 0.0947 0.2876* 0.1337
County unemployment rate -0.0224* 0.0106 -0.0204 0.0129 -0.0239 0.0183
Receives only UB at tl 0.2885* 0.0867 0.2774* 0.1042 0.3589* 0.1533
Receives no UB nor SB -0.3793 0.3500 -0.5377 0.4396 -0.2915 0.5568
Amount UB and SB -0.2442* 0.0848 -0.2100* 0.1027 -0.3465* 0.1460
Predicted earnings 0.2786 0.2028 0.6579* 0.2487 -0.7145 0.3666
No pred. earn. 1.3171 0.9615 2.9498* 1.1784 -2.9232 1.7142
Log Weibull constant -0.1372 0.0744 -0.1983* 0.0896 0.0601 0.1307
Single risk max. loglikelihood:-5938.5; competing risks max. loglikelihood: -6519.7. De­
scriptive statistics of explanatory variables are provided in the table 4.2. A * indicates 
statistical significance at the twosided 5% level.
The time dependency parameter is statistically significantly different from 
zero only for the exit into full-time work8. In this case, it is equal to “0.82” 
and indicates negative time dependency. In the single risk Weibull, the 
“log(c)” parameter is significantly different from zero only at the 10% two- 
sided level and it signals negative time dependency. These results are in line 
with the findings of negative time dependency of previous British authors 
that used a restrictive specification for the baseline hazard rate (when they 
did not allow for unobserved heterogeneity), as discussed at the bottom of
7See Section 3.3.
“The Weibull parameter “c”, which gives the sign of the dependency on time of the 
hazard rate (see Section 3.3), is equal to the exponential of the coefficient shown in Ta­
ble 4.4.
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Figure 4.5: Weibull and piecewise linear exponential baselines 
Section 4.4.2.
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Figure 4.6: Is there negative time dependency in the long run?
The other exits “log(c)” parameter is not significantly different from zero 
. The statistical non-significance of the other exits ulog(c)” parameter is 
probably due to the considerable heterogeneity of the states grouped under 
the category “other states” . One could also explain by the same argument 
the fact that the single risk time dependency parameter is not statistically 
significant. The estimated coefficients on the baseline constants of the exit 
into other states were neither significantly different from zero.
The Weibull baseline for exit into full-time work is plotted in Figure 4.5 
together with the piecewise linear exponential baseline (which is allowed to 
vary each week).
For the purpose of comparison, I have simply drawn a line through the 
steps of the piecewise exponential baseline. This line is plotted in Figure 4.6 
together with the Weibull baseline hazard rate. Both lines are decreasing 
over time. Negative time dependency would seem to emerge in both cases. 
However, in Section 4.4.2 no significant pattern of time dependency was 
detected. It is likely that the significant Weibull estimate of negative time 
dependency would disappear if unobserved heterogeneity were allowed for. 
This is what I would expect following previous UK findings, which were 
summarized at the bottom of Section 4.4.2. It seems therefore preferable to 
estimate a flexible baseline hazard rate.
The coefficients on the explanatory variables turn out to be quite similar 
in sign, absolute value and statistical significance to the piecewise linear co-
W eibull
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efficients. This result is in line with the previous findings of Narendranathan 
and Stewart (1993) who concluded that the impact of the explanatory vari­
ables was very similar if a Weibull model or a model with a more flexible 
baseline were estimated (at least in the absence of time varying covariates).
4.7 Sensitivity to the specification of the earn­
ings variable
The earnings variable should capture the expected earnings of the unem­
ployed. A “smoothed” earnings variable —computed as described in Sec­
tion 2.4.4— was used instead of the reported earnings for the reasons given 
in Section 2.4.4. However, the use of imputed earnings instead of observed 
earnings may introduce addtional problems into the model; such as in partic­
ular unobserved heterogeneity, at least if the variance of the additional error 
is large. I present below the estimates of the model were reported earnings 
in the last job are entered among the regressors.
The results of estimation are presented in Table 4.5. I find that the 
estimated coefficients are very close to those of the model estimated with 
the smoothed earnings variable. The value of the maximised log-likelihood 
is also quite close to that of the other model.
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Table 4.5: Results o f estimation: using reported usual earnings
Variable
label
1
Full-time exit
Competing risks model
Other states exit
Coeff SE Coeff SET
F /t work for most of the year be­
fore
0.3093* 0.1418 -0.7118* 0.1987
Unemployed for most of the time 
in year before
0.2717 0.1472 -0.5186* 0.2107
Sick for most of the time in year 
before
-0.4686 0.2897 -0.1742 0.3035
Profess. /Interm. Occup. 0.2570* 0.0893 0.2170 0.1638
Unskilled Occupation -0.4783* 0.1718 -0.1823 0.2891
Age 20-24 0.1762 0.1051 -0.0774 0.2312
Age 35-44 -0.1212 0.0885 -0.0529 0.1782
Age 45-54 -0.5887* 0.1088 -0.2806 0.1979
Age 55-58 -1.4872* 0.1719 -0.2273 0.2287
Has any child aged < 5 -0.2955* 0.0842 -0.2754 0.1757
Married 0.4105* 0.1154 -0.1443 0.1779
Experiences money shortage 0.3198* 0.0860 0.0984 0.1463
House owner 0.3163* 0.0732 0.2695 * 0.1380
County unemployment rate -0.0158 0.0104 -0.0259 0.0192
Receives only UB at tl 0.2094* 0.0844 0.3881 * 0.1592
Receives no UB nor SB -0.4839 0.3536 -0.2430 0.5813
Amount UB and SB, £ % log. -0.1991* 0.0819 -0.3596 * 0.1457
Reported earnings, £ , log. 0.4371* 0.1033 0.1381 0.1968
No reported earnings, / ,  log. 1.8801* 0.4711 0.6467 0.8799
Competing risks max. loglikelihood: -6447.331. Weekly baseline estimates are shown in the ap­
pendix. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are provided in the preceding table,
in the data section, where also some variables are defined. A * indicates that the coefficient is
significantly different from zero at the 5% two-sided level . The number of units exiting to full-time
is 933, to other exits 267 and the total number of units, including the right-censored is 2035. The
logarithms are taken over the non-zero observations. The state occupied for the largest part of the
year before is the state occupied for the largest number of weeks as relative to the other possible
states. The LSUS survey allows for the following states: full-time work, part-time work, sickness,
registered unemployment, government training scheme, full-time education, housework, prison and
other states. The state occupied is recorded week-by-week for each week in the year before the
commencement of the observed unemployment spell. The base for the three dummies above is
given by the unemployed that resulted to be in one of the other possible states considered for the 
largest proportion of weeks.
4.8 Summary of the results and conclusions
The focus of interest of this chapter has been on the importance of allowing 
for the destination states entered upon leaving unemployment and on the 
specification of the baseline hazard rate.
I have investigated the difference between the estimation results of the 
single and competing risks models, using the LSUS data and distinguishing 
exit into full-time work from exit into other states. My conclusion is that, on 
the basis of both intuitive arguments and formal statistical testing, the use 
of competing risks models is to be strongly recommended. The estimation 
results indicate that the coefficients on some of the explanatory variables 
differ substantially in sign, statistical significance and absolute value across 
the single risk model and the two cause-specific hazards of the competing risks 
model. Also the coefficients of the baseline hazards differ considerably across 
the single risk model and the two cause-specific hazards of the competing 
risks model. Likelihood ratio tests of the null hypotheses of the equality of 
the coefficients on the explanatory variables and the baseline hazard rates 
across the single and the competing risks models reject these hypotheses 
strongly.
Therefore, my conclusion is that one should be careful in interpreting the 
results of estimation of single risk models.
I have compared the estimates obtained allowing the baseline hazard to 
vary weekly with those of a Weibull model, which impose monotonie time 
dependency. I have found that the estimated coefficients on the explana­
tory variables do not differ substantially if a Weibull or a piecewise linear 
exponential model are specified. This result is in line with the previous find­
ings of Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) for the UK. It suggests that the 
specification of the baseline hazard rate does not affect the impact of the 
explanatory variables, at least not to a large extent. In the case of the LSUS 
data, the Weibull estimates indicate negative time dependency in the full­
time job cause-specific hazard. The piecewise linear exponential estimates of 
the baseline hazard for the exit into full-time job do not instead show a sig­
nificant time dependency pattern. I conclude that it is preferable to estimate 
a flexible baseline hazard rate.
Alternative specification of a piecewise exponential baseline hazard rate 
were tried out: weekly segments, monthly segments and constant exponen­
tial. The estimated coefficients on the segments of the baseline hazard of the 
“other exit states” did not turn out statistically significant. No clear pattern 
of time dependency could be detected for the cause-specific hazard of exit 
into full-time work. This result is in line with previous UK studies, such 
as Lancaster (1979) and Nickell (1979). Interestingly, these authors using 
quite restrictive specifications of the baseline hazard rate found evidence of 
negative time dependency which did however become not significant upon 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
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Chapter 5
A com peting risks m odel o f  
the re-employment probability
5.1 Introduction
Previous UK studies on unemployment duration have focused on the impact 
of the level of unemployment benefit on the hazard rate, given the obvious im­
portance of this issue for economic policy. However, there was no agreement 
on the significance of the benefit impact (see Section 1.2) until the study of 
Narendranathan et al. (1985) who found robust evidence in favour of a sig­
nificantly negative benefit impact. The authors found that the benefit effect 
declined during the first six months of unemployment and they estimated 
a benefit elasticity that varied (with unemployment duration) between 0.08 
and 0.65. I anticipate that using the LSUS data I conclude that the level of 
unemployment benefit does not affect significantly the re-employment prob­
ability or at least that the data do not one allow to detect a significant 
impact.
In this chapter, I estimate the impact of many socio-economic and in­
stitutional factors on the re-employment probability. The individual re­
employment probability is modelled as a conditional probability in a compet­
ing risks framework. The only previous study that estimated a competing 
risks model of unemployment duration distinguishing exit into a job from 
other exits for the UK is due to Narendranathan and Stewart (1993). The 
authors choice of covariates is more limited than in the model of this chapter.
The structure of the chapter is the following. In the next Section 5.2, the 
explanatory variables of the model are defined. These are individual demo­
graphic characteristics, family composition variables, unemployment benefit 
variables, expected income from work, some proxies deemed to capture finan­
cial hardship, search activity, leisure valuation and demand side conditions. 
In Section 5.3, the results of estimation of the econometric model are dis­
cussed. A competing risks hazard with a piecewise baseline is specified and 
the baseline is allowed to vary each week. Two destination states are mod­
elled: full-time work and other states. Part-time work is considered first
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with the “other destinations” and then together with full-time work, for sen­
sitivity analysis purposes. The limited number of the unemployed that end 
their unemployment spell into part-time work does not allow me to consider 
part-time work by itself. The robustness of the coefficient on the level of 
unemployment benefit to the choice of covariates is tested in Section 5.4. 
Then, in Section 5.5 I compute the predicted mean unemployment duration 
under alternative sets of assumptions. Conclusions follow.
5.2 A description of the data
Descriptive statistics of the variables employed are presented in Table 5.1 for 
the full sample selected for the econometric analysis (see Section 2.4.1) and 
for the subset of the unemployed that exited into full-time work or into any 
job; i. e. full-time or part-time work. The explanatory variables are defined 
below.
5.2.1 D em ographic and fam ily com p osition  variables
The only demographic variable considered here is the age of the unemployed 
person. Older age is expected to affect negatively the individual (conditional) 
probability of leaving unemployment to enter full-time work. The survey did 
not collect any information on the race of the unemployed. Narendranathan 
and Stewart (1993) using the DSS Cohort Study 1978/79 allowed race to 
affect unemployment duration. Its impact was found to be statistically in­
significant. Gender is not considered because I have restricted attention to 
the male unemployed. The impact of gender on unemployment duration is 
treated in a separate piece of work (Stancanelli, 1994).
I model the impact of age with a series of dummies that take value one 
in given age intervals. The base for these dummies are the unemployed aged 
between twenty-five and thirty-four years. About 10% of the unemployed are 
aged between fifty-five and fifty-eight. The same figure for the unemployed 
that found a job by the time of the second survey interview is about 5%. 
The proportion of younger unemployed aged between twenty and forty-four 
is slightly larger for the subset that exited into employment than for the full 
sample.
97
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of the economic variables
F-t work exit F-t/p-t work exit Full sample
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Left truncation period 13.3923 1.0545 13.4056 1.0655 13.4069 1.0571
Unemployment duration (weeks) 33,6506 14.3393 33.8392 14.5053 46.9327 19.1035
F /t work for most of the year before U. 0.6988 0.4590 0.6933 0.4614 0.6531 0.4761
Unemployed for most of the year before 
rr
0.£186 0.4136 0.2138 0.4102 0.2216 0.4154
u.
Sick, no work for most of the year be­ 0.0161 0.1258 0.0150 0.1216 0.0364 0.1872
fore U.
Professional/Intermediate Occupation 0.£004 0.4005 0.2068 0.4052 0.1730 0.3783
Unskilled Occupation 0.0386 0.1927 0.0390 0.1936 0.0580 0.2338
Occupation not available 0.0740 0.2618 0.0719 0.£585 0.0708 0.2565
Age 20-24 0.1426 0.3498 0.1439 0.3511 0.1238 0.3295
Age £5-34 (base group) 0.3548 0.4787 0.3506 0.4774 0.3229 0.4677
Age 35-44 0.2765 04475 0.2707 0.4446 0.2482 0.4320
Age 45-54 0.1768 0.3817 0.1828 0.3867 0.1975 0.3982
Age 55-58 0.0493 0.2166 0.0519 0.2220 0.1076 0.3100
Has any child old less than 5 0.3516 0.4777 0.34 67 0.4761 0.3410 0.4742
Married 0.8950 0.3068 0.8911 0.3117 0.8673 0.3393
Spouse working 1 month before U. 0.3301 0.4705 0.3357 0.4725 0.2688 O.4434
Searches less than before 0.0407 0.1978 0.0400 0.1960 0.0958 0.2944
Values Leisure more than Labour 0.0965 0.2954 0.1019 0.3027 0.1371 0.3440
experiences some shortage of money 0.7856 0.4106 0.7802 0.4143 0.7327 0.4427
House owner outright/with mortgage 0.4 £34 0.4944 0.4266 0.4948 0.3808 0.4857
County unemployment rate 13.4799 3.2047 13.4416 3.2161 13.5856 3.2049
Receives only UB at tl 0.3719 0.4836 0.3746 0.4843 0.3617 0.4806
Receives no UB nor SB 0.0418 0.2002 0.0490 0.2159 0.0462 0.2100
logs. benefit (£ ) 3.4952 0.8431 3.4534 0.8903 3.4 778 0.8748
logs, benefit time varying (£ ) 3.2779 1.1543 3.3900 1.0067 2.9885 1.3465
Predicted earnings, in £ t logs. 4.4592 0.5527 4*4560 0.5561 4 4485 0.5194
predicted earnings not available 0.0129 0.1127 0.0130 0.1133 0.0113 0.1057
other unemployment income, £ , logs 2.4021 1.5203 2.4102 1.5217 2.4817 1.6513
other employment income, £ t logs 2.1877 1.5687 2.6347 1.4672 2.3036 1.6978
reported earnings, £ , logs 2.5667 2.2699 2.5452 2.2675 2.3771 2.2561
no reported earnings, £ f logs 0.4330 0.4958 0.4366 0.4962 0.4683 0.4998
the  number of units exiting to full-time is 933, to full-time and part-time is 1001 and the total
number of units, including the right-censored is £035. The dichotomous variables take value one
when the condition stated for each of them is satisfied. The mean duration for exit into full-
time work or full-time and part-time work is computed excluding the right-censored observations
and the observations exiting to states other than the one under consideration. The logarithms
are taken over the non-zero observations. The mean unemployment duration is shorter for the
unemployed that exited into any job than for the full sample because the full sample includes also
individuals with right-censored spells.
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The family composition variables considered are marital status and the 
presence of any child aged less than five years in the nuclear family. It it 
is quite common in applied analyses of unemployment duration to include 
marital status among the explanatory variables. The for this choice is that 
greater family “needs” should drive people faster back to work. Instead, the 
presence of young children in the household might increase the opportunity 
cost of labour and therefore raise the reservation wage.
5.2 .2  P rev iou s work h istory  variables
The individual past work history is expected to influence the job offer prob­
ability. Two groups of variables have been considered here. The first relates 
to the activity undertaken for most of the year before the commencement of 
the unemployment spell. The second concerns the professional qualifications 
of the unemployed.
The activity undertaken for most of the year before the commencement 
of the unemployment spell is defined as follows. The survey collects retro­
spective information on the economic activity of the sample participants in 
each week during the year before the commencement of the unemployment 
spell. Using this information, I could compute the activity undertaken for 
the largest number of weeks in the year before the commencement of the 
unemployment spell. If the activity undertaken for the largest number of 
weeks was “full-time work”, then the dummy “in full-time work for most of 
the year before U. ” takes value one. The other two dummies for “unem­
ployed” or “sick and out of work” have been computed similarly. The base 
for these dummies are the unemployed that spent most of the year before 
the commencement of the unemployment spell in other states; i. e. full-time 
education, government training schemes, part-time work, in care of family 
and any other state.
About 65% of the unemployed were in full-time work for most of the year 
before becoming unemployed. The corresponding figure for the unemployed 
that took up a job before the end of the observation period is five percentage 
points larger. About 22% of the sample were unemployed most of the year 
before the commencement of the unemployment spell. Almost 4% were sick 
and out of work for the largest part of the year before the commencement of 
the new unemployment spell. The corresponding figure for the unemployed 
that left unemployment to take up employment is less than two percentage 
points.
The LSUS survey collects information about the so called “socio-economic” 
class which generally reflects individual educational attainments and last job 
position (occupation) held. I have computed two that take value one if the 
unemployed person was classified respectively as a professional or interme­
diate worker and as an unskilled worker. About 17% of the unemployed 
had professional or intermediate qualifications and almost 6% had no work 
skills. The base for the dummy is formed by the unemployed that had skilled
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and semi-skilled (manual or non-manual) qualifications. The proportion of 
professional or intermediate workers is higher among the unemployed that 
went back into employment before the end of the observation period. The 
proportion of unskilled workers is instead lower.
I also use a dummy to allow for cases when the “social class” nformation 
was not available. These were less than 1% of the unemployed, as shown in 
Table 5.1.
5.2 .3  Incom e variables
The income variables relate to the income while unemployed; the expected 
income from work; and financial constraints.
Unemployment income variables
The unemployment benefit variables considered first axe the amoun and the 
type of unemployment benefit received. As discussed in Section 1.3 to which 
the reader is referred, in the UK there are two types of unemployment benefit: 
the national insurance benefit (UB) and the social assistance benefit (SB).
I allow for the type of benefit with a dummy that takes value one if the 
unemployed reported only UB at the first interview. Recipients of (only) 
UB are likely to behave differently from recipients of SB (with or without 
UB) because they fear that their benefit entitlement will expire1. I have also 
constructed a dummy taking value one for the unemployed that report not 
benefit receipts at the first interview. They are probably awaiting to receive 
unemployment benefit or they are temporarily disqualified from benefit re­
ceipts (since they are registered at benefit offices). However, it is not known 
when and if they will start to receive any unemployment benefit. The dummy 
should hopefully control for the unknown facts. In Table 5.1, it is shown that 
about 4% of the unemployed in the sample are in this situation.
The benefit level is a time-varying variable. It is constructed as described 
in Section 2.5.4, to which the reader is referred. Also the benefit reported 
at the first interview is considered for sensitivity analysis purposes. The 
mean and the standard deviation of the level of unemployment benefit (in 
logarithms), allowing and not allowing for time variation, are reported in Ta­
ble 5.1. When the benefit level is allowed to vary over time, its mean appears 
to decrease slightly. This result is quite reasonable and it is explained by the 
fact that some proportion of the unemployed receiving (only) UB at the first 
interview cease to receive any benefit upon UB entitlement exhaustion.
The amount of benefit is entered in logarithms. The corresponding coeffi­
cient provides then an estimate of the elasticity of unemployment duration to 
changes in the level of unemployment benefit. This is equivalent to assuming
Hn Chapter 6, the impact of benefit entitlement duration will be explored more in 
depth.
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a constant elasticity and is quite common in most previous studies. Other au­
thors enter the benefit amount in levels; for instance Katz and Meyer (1988, 
1990), Atkinson et al. (1984), (in Table 3). One could also enter the benefit 
amount as the numerator of the “replacement ratio” variable, with expected 
income from work in the denominator. However, it is preferable to the two 
variables separately and to test for the “replacement ratio” restriction; i. e. 
for the equality of the absolute values of their coefficients2.
Some authors consider the total unemployment income as an explana­
tory variable and take into account all income sources that accrue to the 
unemployed person; for instance, Narendranathan and Stewart (1993). For 
comparison purposes I employ the “other unemployment incomes” variable, 
which is added to the unemployment benefit. This variable includes any 
other social security benefit (Section 2.5.5) that accrue to either partners 
and the earnings of the spouse if any (at the first interview). These variables 
axe measured at the first interview. I assume that they do not vary over 
the course of the unemployment spell since there is not enough information 
on any changes in the survey. Moreover, any changes in the spouse’s earn­
ings during the partner’s unemployment spells should be treated carefully (if 
available) given their potential endogeneity3.
Financial situation proxies
The expected effect of financial constraints is to raise the (conditional) prob­
ability of leaving unemployment as discussed in Section 1.2 of Chapter one4. 
I model here the tightness of the unemployment income budget or the finan­
cial resources of the unemployed using replies to the following question have 
been used for this purpose:
“are you experiencing any shortage of money?”.
This question was asked to both partners at the first interview. I have com­
puted a dummy called “money bad” which takes value one if the unemployed 
person or his spouse replied positively to the question. Of course, this variable 
indicates only subjective views of income shortage. About 70% of the unem­
ployed (or their spouses) replied positively to this question (see Table 5.1). 
This seems plausible because unemployment benefit receipts are much lower 
on average than expected earnings from work (see Table 5.1). The propor­
tion of the unemployed that consider that they suffer from some shortage of 
money is higher among those that exit into full-time (and part-time) work 
than it is for the full sample.
2In what follows this restriction is however not tested given the insignificance of the 
benefit coefficient.
3The literature has pointed out that the unemployment benefit addition for dependent 
spouse might have a disincentive impact on the spouse participation in the labour force. 
See, for instance, Garcia (1989) or Micklewright and Giannelli (1990).
4The relationship between the financial situation of the unemployed and the duration 
of unemployment is investigated in Chapter 7
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Another variable which might capture, at least to a certain extent, the 
financial conditions of the unemployed is “house ownership”. The unem­
ployed that own a house might have easier access to institutional credit. 
They might also be wealthier than the other unemployed. Moreover, house 
ownership might proxy unobserved individual characteristics such as the ca­
pacity of planning ahead or a good sense of organization or reliability or 
stability or simply “social status”. In any case the expected impact of house 
ownership on the (conditional) probability of leaving unemployment is pos­
itive given that this variable proxies either access to credit and financial 
wealth or “good” (with respect to one’s chances of leaving unemployment) 
unobserved individual characteristics.
I have constructed a dummy that takes value one if the unemployed own 
the house where they live (either outright or with a mortgage)5. The base for 
the dummy are the unemployed that live in any other type of accommodation;
i. e. they live in council flats/houses or rent accommodation privately or 
live in caravans/boats (this last category is very small as plausible). The 
proportion of house owners is slightly higher (by about 4% percentage points) 
among the unemployed that exit into a job than in the (full) reference sample 
(Table 5.1).
Expected income from work
The expected income variable has been computed as shown in Section 2.4.4. 
The motivation for constructing an expected income variable is also given in 
Section 2.4.4, to which the reader is referred.
Average reported earnings appear considerably lower (see Table 5.1) than 
average predicted earnings simply because a large number of the unemployed 
(47%) do not report earnings —and this is one of the reason for estimating 
expected earnings for the unemployed. Most of the unemployed do however 
provide information on their last occupation so that it was possible to impute 
expected earnings for all but 1% of the sample (see Section 2.4.4). I have 
constructed a dichotomous variable taking value one for the unemployed for 
whom predicted earnings could not be computed.
The “other expected income from work” variable is summed up to the 
expected income in order to obtain estimates of the total expected income 
from work. “Other expected income form work” includes spouse’s earnings 
and other income such as social security receipts by either partners. These 
variables relate to the amounts reported at one month before the commence­
ment of the unemployment spell. These sources of income may not vary over 
time and in any case their variation may not depend on whether the indi­
vidual is experiencing unemployment or it may be difficult to forecast. In 
Table 5.1 it is indeed shown that the variables other unemployment income
5The impact of outright ownership might differ from that of ownership with a mortgage. 
This possibility was tested and rejected.
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and other employment income do not differ much at the individual level in 
mean or standard deviation.
5.2 .4  T h e ind ividual in ten sity  o f  search
The expected impact of higher search intensity on the (conditional) proba­
bility of leaving unemployment is positive. I have constructed a proxy for 
search intensity using the respondents replies to the following question:
“Here is a list of things people do. We would like to know 
whether you do each thing more or less than you did four or 
five months ago, before you started/restarted signing on at an 
unemployment benefit office • • • Visiting an unemployment benefit 
office or a job centre”.
This question was part of a self-completion booklet and was to be replied 
for a long list of activities such as watching television, gardening, visiting 
friends, going out for a drink, taking part in a sport, and many others, for each 
of which the unemployed had to tick either of four boxes: “no change, more 
than before, less than before ”. It is unlikely that the unemployed regarded the 
question as a control question on their search activity because the question 
was posed in a casual and indirect way.
The question was asked at the time of the first interview. It compares 
the frequency with which some activities were undertaken at the time of the 
first interview and one month before the commencement of the observed un­
employment spell. This question captures only search activity that involves 
visiting a job centre or an unemployment benefit office, while job search 
might be undertaken also bv reading job advertisements in the papers, asking 
friends and relatives or contacting directly the potential employers. However, 
Lavard et al. (1991. Chapter V, pp. 238) report that one of the most widely 
used method of job search by the unemployed in the UK is search through job 
centres. About 80% of the unemployed used this method of search accord­
ing to figures extracted from the Employment Gazete (Layard et al. 1991, 
Table 7, Chapter 5). In the DSS Cohort Study of the Unemployed 1987/88 
several questions on the unemployed search activity were asked. It turned 
out that 90% of the male unemployed in the sample reported to search for 
job vacancies through employment agencies6. In this respect, the measure 
of search available is likely to cover to a reasonable extent the actual search 
activity by the unemployed. A drawback is that it covers also “going to 
an unemployment benefit office” which is just associated with the receipt of 
unemployment benefit and does not say anything about search activity.
I have constructed a dummy that takes value one if the unemployed 
replied that they were visiting job centres (and unemployment benefit of­
fices) less than before. The dummy takes value zero if the answer to the
6The information on search activity by the unemployed contained in this survey is 
currently been analysed by Narendranathan and Stewart.
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question was “no change” or “more them before”. This dummy captures the 
change in the intensity of search activity —narrowly defined as visiting a 
job centre, if one disregards “visiting the benefit offices”— sometime before 
the commencement of the sampled spell of unemployment, rather than the 
current intensity of search. It does therefore cover also the search activity 
that the unemployed might have undertaken before actually becoming un­
employed. The fact that somebody reports to be “visiting benefit offices 
less than before” might imply that they are not receiving anjr unemployment 
benefit. This effect should be captured by the dummy for the receipt of 
no benefit which was described above and should not affect the estimated 
coefficient on the search intensity dummy.
About 10% of the sample reports a decreasing search activity. The same 
figure is even smaller (about 4%) if the unemployed that exit into a job are 
considered, as shown in Table 5.1. This implicitely shows that the figure is 
higher for the right-censored (and perhaps for those unemployed that exit 
into states other than employment).
5.2 .5  T he individual valuation  o f  leisure
The expected impact of higher individual leisure valuation on the (condi­
tional) probability of exiting from unemployment is negative. This prediction 
was justified in Section 1.2. One has to be careful that the unemployed’s val­
uation of leisure might change during the course of the unemployment spell 
as a consequence of the prolonged experience of unemployment. This would 
imply that leisure valuation is endogneous to the model. Therefore, I use in­
formation that relates to the observed commencement of the unemployment 
spell.
I proxy the valuation of leisure as relative to labour, using replies to the 
following question:
“/ /  you were to get enough money to live as comfortably as 
you would like for the rest of your life, would you want to have a 
job or would you prefer not to work?".
Here leisure is defined as the alternative use of time. There is of course 
no perfect or best way to find out how much the individuals value leisure, 
but I feel that questions of the type “how much do you value leisure when 
unemployed as opposed to leisure when working” would have performed much 
worse.
The variable “leisure” has been constructed, taking value one if the un­
employed replied they would not work to the above question, zero otherwise. 
There might be different degrees of valuing leisure as relative to labour which 
are not allowed for by this measure. A small number of the unemployed, 
about 14% (see Table 5.1), replied positively to the question above. The pro­
portion of the unemployed that “value leisure more than labourr is slightly 
lower, about 10%, among the unemployed that exited from unemployment
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into a job. This proportion is therefore higher for the right-censored (and 
perhaps for the unemployed that exit into states other than employment).
5.2 .6  T he labour force p articipation  o f  th e  spou se
The impact of the labour force participation of the spouse of the unemployed 
on the probability of leaving unemployment has been mostly overlooked, in 
both the theoretical and the applied literature on unemployment duration. 
One reason is the potential endogeneity of this variable. Another explanation 
is that “causality” has typically been assumed to run from husband to wife, 
and not viceversa.
According to the “additional worker effect”, the impact of the wife’s 
labour force participation on the husband’s (conditional) probability of leav­
ing unemployment should be negative. If the wife works, then some minimum 
subsistence level of income should be granted and there would be less pres­
sure on the husband find himself a job. Previous studies for the US (Murphy 
and Topel, 1989) have found no evidence in favour of this hypothesis. For the 
UK, Wadsworth (1991) finds that the working decisions of the two partners 
are complementary rather than substitute.
The spouses’ labour force participation might raise the husband’s chances 
of leaving unemployment by means of creating more contacts with the labour 
market and generating additional information about job opportunities. In a 
traditional society, it is also possible that unemployed husbands of working 
wives might regard themselves as udiminished” in their patriarchal role and 
have a higher incentive to find a job than unemployed husbands of non­
working wives. Another explanation is that the two partners are likely to 
have a similar background. Husbands of “working women” are more likely 
to be working as well or else to have shorter unemployment spells.
One problem with this variable is its potential endogeneity to the model 
since the two partners’ work participation decision may not be independent 
from each other. In order to avoid this, I have considered the spouse’s par­
ticipation decision sometime before the partner’s unemployment spell began.
1 have constructed a dummy that takes value one if the spouse reported to 
be in a full-time or part-time job one month before her partner started his 
unemployment spell'.
Almost 90% of the unemployed in the sample were married (or cohab­
iting); about 40% of their spouses were found to work. The proportion of 
spouses that work is on average six percentage points higher among the un­
employed that found a new job by the end of the observation period (see 
Table 5.1).
7Since the unemployment spell of the partner (or husband) is only observed from three 
months after it started onwards, the indicator chosen of the labour force participation of 
the spouse relates actually to four months before.
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5.2 .7  D em and side conditions
The conditions on the demand side of the labour market influence the job 
offer probability.
I employ as an indicator of demand side conditions the rate of unemploy­
ment in the local area. The most disaggregated geographical unit available 
for the LSUS data was the county(some 30 counties are distinguished). This 
measure is not the ideal but it might still be useful to capture demand side 
conditions. The best option would have been to use the unemployment rate 
in the “travel to work area”, which was for instance used by Narendranathan 
et al. (1985). However, this information was not available. Other authors, 
such as for example Atkinson et al. (1984) used the regional rate if unem­
ployment as an indicator of demand side conditions.
The county unemployment rate considered relate to October 1983, which 
corresponds more or less to the time of the first survey interview8. It is not 
allowed to vary over time since the relative position of the British counties * 
did not change considerably over the course of the year falling between the 
two survey interviews.
Alternatively or in addition to this measure, one could have considered 
the job vacancy rate. However, it has been shown for instance by Layard 
et al. (1991) that there is no clear cut relationship between the duration of 
unemployment and the rate at which vacancies are formed. The authors 
find that even when the overall level of unemployment increases the rate at 
which vacancies are filled does not appear to change substantially. In my 
view, one possible explanation for this finding is that the statistics available 
on the vacancy rate are not an appropriate measure of the jobs available 
on the (local) labour market. Indeed, there is no compulsory registration of 
vacancies at state job centres in Britain while the only measured vacancies 
(at least on a national basis) are those at job centres.
5.3 The results of estim ation of the m odel
The estimated model is given by Equation 3.36 of Chapter 3. A weekly base­
line hazard rate is specified. Two destination states out of unemployment 
are considered: full-time work and other states. Alternatively the first des­
tination includes in addition to observations that exited into full-time work 
also spells that ended into part-time work (of either greater or less than ten 
hours per week). Results of estimation are given in Table 5.2 below.
Model (1) of Table 5.2 is the same as the competing risks model of Chap­
ter 4 (see Table 4.3) but it additionally includes those variables that proxy 
search activity, value of leisure and spouse participation in the labour force.
A likelihood ratio test ( \ |  = 60.2) indicates that the null hypothesis that
“The first interview took place sometime in the Autumn of 1983, as discussed in Chapter
1.
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the coefficients on the additional variables of model (1) are not significantly 
different from zero can be rejected. A perhaps surprising result is that the 
estimated coefficient on benefit receipts is now not significantly different from 
zero. The robustness of this result will be investigated in the next Section 5.4 
to which the reader is referred.
Specifications (1) and (2) differ in the definition of the unemployment 
benefit variable, which is allowed to vary over time in specification (2). The 
values of the maximised log-likelihoods for the two models, (1) and (2), are 
almost identical and r.he estimated parameters are very much similar in sta­
tistical significance, sign and absolute value. The coefficient on the time 
varying benefit variable (specification (2)) is however larger in absolute value 
and it shows a smaller standard error. Model (3) considers exit into either 
a full-time or a part-time job together. The estimated coefficients of mode! 
(3) are very close to those of model (1) and model (2). An explanation for 
this result is that not many people exited into part-time work. This is quite 
plausible since the sample covers only male unemployed. I refer in the dis­
cussion of the impact of the covariates to the results of estimation of model 
(2).
Age and family composition
The base for the age dummies are the unemployed aged between 25 and 34. 
The unemployed aged between 20 and 25 do not stand significantly differ­
ent re-employment probabilities than those aged between 25 and 34, ceteris 
paribus. Older age has, instead, a significantly negative impact on the re­
employment probability. The probability of leaving unemployment to take up 
a full-time job is, respectively, 17%, 45% and 72% lower for the unemployed 
whose age falls between 35 and 44, 45 and 54, 55 and 58. The chances of find­
ing a full-time job are considerably lower for the older unemployed, all things 
equal. These findings are in line with those of previous studies. The corre­
sponding estimated coefficients (and standard errors) in Narendranathan and 
Stewart (1993) for the age ranges 35-44, 45-54, 55-59 and for exit into full­
time work are respectively —0.17(0.15),—0.61(0.15),—0.92(0.19).
The estimated coefficient on marital status is not significantly different 
from zero9. The presence of children aged less than 5 years reduces by 18% 
the probability of re-employment in a full-time job. This result is perhaps 
surprising given that the sample includes only male unemployed. An expla­
nation is that the presence of young children raises the value of the time 
spent at home and with it the opportunity cost of labour.
9This variable was instead estimated to affect significantly the re-employment prob­
ability in the simpler model of Table 4.3. This difference in results is probably due to 
having controlled for the labour force participation of the spouse in model (2).
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Table 5.2: Results o f estimation of the re-employment probability
Covartaie Full-time exit (1) Full-time exit (2) Any job exit (3)
labeI Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff j SE
F /t work year before 0.S96S* 0.1366 0.3961* 0.1365 0.1732 O.I345
Unemployed year before 0.8448* 0.1472 0.3439* 0.1472 0.2353 0.1232
Sick out of work year before -0.3459 0.2898 -0.3459 0.2898 -0.5622 0.2839
Profess. /Interm. Occup. 0.1976* 0.0976 0.1970* 0.0976 0.2501* 0.0934
Unskilled Occupation -0.4385* 0.1720 -0.4395* 0.1720 -0.4205* 0.1653
Age 20-24 0.2101 0.1074 0.2098 0.1073 0.2159* 0.1035
Age 35-44 -0.1885* 0.0901 -0.1879* 0.0900 -0.1843* 0.0875
Age 45-54 -0.5979* 0.1095 -0.5998* 0.1096 -0.5577* 0.1052
Age 55-58 -1.2661* 0.1721 -1.2735* 0.1728 -1.2212* 0.1638
Any child aged < 5 -0.1954* 0.0872 -0.1950* 0.0869 -0.1853* 0.0843
M amed 0.1356 0.1266 0.1370 0.1231 0.1132 0.1174
Spouse working month be- 0.3759* 0.0894 0.3742* 0.0866 0.3735* 0.0834
! fore
j Searches less than before -0.7793* 0.1724 -0.7824* 0.1723 -0.8507* 0.1681
Values Leisure more -0.2747* 0.1144 -0.2769* 0.1145 -0.2311* 0.1081
j Experiences money shortage 0.1983* 0.0858 0.2006* 0.0859 0.1894* 0.0823
i House owner 0.2991* 0.0739 0.2986* 0.0730 0.3133* 0.0706
| County unemployment rate -0.0185 0.0106 -0.0184 0.0106 -0.0219* 0.0101
Receives only UB at tl 0.2046* 0.0861 0.2008* 0.0844 0.1967* 0.0815
Receives no UB nor SB 0.0469 0.3810 0.0367 0.2772 0.0389 0.2529
Benefit amount (£ )  logs. -0.0295 0.0922
' Benefit amount time varying -0.0328 0.0596 -0.0713 0.0549
(£ )  logs.
Predicted earnings (£ )  logs. 0.6075 * 0.2004 0.6049* 0.2005 0.4477* 0.1933
No predicted earnings 2.729J* 0.9524 2.7183* 0.9527 2.0170* 0.9186
i Max. lik. .-6420.9 Max. Itk. : -6420.8 Max. log-hk. :-6330.5.
| The values of the maximum -og-ltkelihoods are those of the competing risks models, esti-
mated simultaneously. The other extts estimates are not shown. The any job exit includes
full-itme and part-time work. A * indicates statistical significance at the two sided 5%
! level. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are given in the preceding data
1 section.
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Previous work experience
Having been in full-time work for most of the year before the commence­
ment of the unemployment spell raises the chances of leaving unemployment 
to enter full-time work by about 50%. This result is in line with theoreti­
cal expectations. It is perhaps surprising that having been unemployed for 
most of the year before the commencement of the new unemployment spell 
raises also the hazard rate by about 50%. An explanation is provided by 
the phenomenon of repeated or recurrent unemployment; i. e. the fact that 
some individuals tend to go in and out of unemployment (employment). This 
phenomenon is likely to interest the “marginal” or less qualified workers for 
whom it is more difficult to find a permanent job. It is unlikely that some 
unemployed are abusing the unemployment benefit system by working just 
long enough to gain new entitlement to unemployment benefit since volun­
tary job quits lead to 6 months suspension of benefit. It is instead probable 
that low qualified workers tend to find temporary jobs; therefore, experience 
unemployment repeatedly.
The estimated effect of having been sick and out of work for most of the 
previous year is not significantly different from zero. However, it shows a 
negative sign, as one would expect.
Those unemployed qualified as professional or intermediate workers have 
significantly higher chances (by 22%) than the others to be re-employed in a 
full-time job. The unskilled are instead 35% less likely to be re-employed in 
a full-time job; i. e. the duration of their unemployment spell is on average 
35% longer, ceteris paribus.
Income variables
The impact of the level of unemployment benefit is not significantly different 
from zero. However, it shows negative sign, as expected. The robustness 
of this result is tested for in the next Section 5.4. The coefficient on the 
dummy for the receipt of “only UB" at the first interview is significantly 
different from zero. It signals that the re-employment probability increases 
by 22% for recipients of “only UB" once other things have been controlled 
for. The coefficient on the dummy for receipt of no unemployment benefit 
is not statistically significant. An explanation for this result is that the 
situation of those unemployed that do not report any benefit is probably 
very heterogeneous.
The estimated elasticity of the hazard rate to changes in expected fu­
ture earnings is equal to 0.60. Average earnings per week are about £85. 
Therefore, a 10% increase in mean expected earnings would lead to a re­
duction in mean expected unemployment duration of 15.5 weeks. Given the 
insignificance of the benefit variable, I do not test for the replacement ratio 
restriction; i. e. for the equality in absolute valüe of the coefficients on benefit 
receipts and expected earnings.
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Those unemployed for whom expected earnings were not available do not 
show significantly higher chances to leave unemployment to take up full-time 
employment10.
The impact of experiencing a shortage of money is significantly different 
from zero and positive, as one might expect. Being financially constrained 
raises the re-employment probability by about 22%. It is plausible that the 
unemployed that feel financially constrained will tend to be less choosy about 
jobs offers and consider as “acceptable” or “desirable” jobs that they would 
not normally consider as such. However, one might question further who are 
the unemployed that do not feel financially constrained. More evidence on 
this issue is provided in Chapter 7.
The unemployed that own the house were they five, either outright or 
with a mortgage, appear to stand 34% higher chances than the others to 
live unemployment to take up a full-time job. The corresponding estimate in 
Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) is very close and equal to 0.20(S£0.09). 
House ownership might capture individual characteristics ranging from finan­
cial wealth and access to credit, to capacity of organization and of planning 
forward (see Section 5.2).
The intensity of search and the value of leisure
The coefficient on the proxy for diminished search activity indicates that the 
unemployed that visit job centres (and unemployment benefit offices) less 
than they used to before the commencement of their unemployment spell, 
see their chances of leaving unemployment to take up a full-time job halved, 
ceteris paribus. Valuing leisure more than labour, were lifetime budget con­
straints not binding, reduces the probebility of re-employment by some 24%.
The estimated coefficient on an additional interaction term of diminished 
search activity and the level of unemployment benefit is statistically not 
significantly different from zero and positive, but its inclusion renders the 
estimated coefficient on diminished search larger (—0.9,S£0.44). A likeli­
hood ratio test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on this 
interaction term is not significantly different from zero.
The spouse’s labour force participation
The fact that the spouse was working full-time or part-time one month before 
the commencement of the partner’s unemployment spell raises by about 50% 
the partner's chances of leaving unemployment to enter a full-time job. This
l0The base for the dummy “predicted earnings not available” are the unemployed for 
whom -predicted’' earnings were available. The level of expected earnings is zero for the 
unemployed for whom expected earnings were not available. The mean value of (log) 
expected earnings is 4.5. So these people because they have no expected earnings “lack” 
4.5 * 0.6(6) =  2.7 . which is the coefficient on “no predicted earnings” . This implies that 
instead of including a dummy for these people 1 could have given them the mean expected 
earnings. The overall message is that this group is no different from the other.
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unemployment duration (weeks)
Figure 5.1: Piecewise exponential baseline of model (2)
result confirms perhaps the view that a ‘‘working spouse” represents more 
contacts with the labour market. The reader is referred to Section 5.4 for 
further discussion of this result.
Demand side conditions
The estimated coefficient of living in a county with a higher unemployment 
rate is negative and significantly different from zero, as predicted by eco­
nomic theory. A one percentage point increase in the average county rate of 
unemployment reduces the hazard of leaving unemployment by 3%, all things 
equal. The size of this impact might be considered quite significant, at least 
relative to previous UK studies. For instance, Narendranathan and Stewart 
(1993) found a non-significant impact of the unemployment rate in the travel 
to work area (which is the geographical area they consider). However, the 
data employed by these authors relate to times (1978/79) when the unem­
ployment rate was generally much lower than in the period of time covered 
by the LSUS survey (1983/84).
The estimated baseline hazard rate
The estimated baseline hazard rate of model (2) is plotted in Figure 5.1. The 
estimated coefficients on the weekly baseline constants (for the exit into full­
time work) are all strongly significantly different from zero except for the first
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week 11 when nobody exited from unemployment. The behaviour over time 
of the baseline hazard rate is quite smooth. Some spikes are detected at week 
33, 37, 43 and 51-53, with a hump at weeks 50-54. The significance of the 
spikes found in the baseline hazard rate and the sign of the dependency on 
time were discussed in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.6, to which the reader is referred.
5.4 M ore on the impact of the unem ploy­
ment benefit
The finding of a non-significant benefit level effect contrasts with previous 
UK studies; such as Narendranathan et al. (1985) and Narendranathan and 
Stewart (1993, 1993a)11. It seems therefore interesting to test for the robust­
ness of this result.
As briefly reviewed in Section 1.2, there was a^  considerable debate on the 
statistical significance of the influence of the unemployment benefit level on 
the rate of escape from unemployment in the late seventies in Britain. Nick- 
ell (1979) and Lancaster and Nickell (1980) found a significant benefit effect. 
Atkinson et al. argued that previous findings of a significant unemployment 
benefit effect were not robust. Narendranathan et al. (1985) (using the DSS 
Cohort Study of the Unemployed of 1979/80) proved instead the robustness 
of the benefit effect. Narendranathan and Stewart (1993, 1993a) —who also 
employed the 1978/79 DSS Cohort Study— found also a significant effect of 
unemployment income on the hazard rate. The authors looked at the effect 
of unemployment income — defined as the sum of unemployment benefit, 
spouse earnings and any other income accruing to either partner— rather 
than at the impact of the unemployment benefit level by itself. The unem­
ployment income elasticity was found to be —0.68 in the first three months 
of unemployment and —0.19 in the successive three months, in a single risk 
framework. The corresponding competing risks estimates, for exit into full­
time work were respectively —0.78 and —0.23. However, the benefit effect 
was found to became not significant after about six months of unemployment 
(Narendranathan et al. ,1985, Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993, 1993a).
For the US. Katz and Meyer (1988) found a significant large and positive 
impact of the benefit level on the probability of recall to the previous job 
(1.64); and a significant large and negative impact on the new job finding 
probability (-1.11). These estimates are larger if unobserved heterogeneity is 
allowed for. The impact of the benefit level in the new job finding probability 
became not significantly different from zero after benefit exhaustion. They 
did instead find a not significant (small and positive) benefit impact, in a 
single risk model. The benefit level is generally found not to have a significant 
impact in the Netherlands; for instance, Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993).
The finding of a non significant benefit impact, obtained with the LSUS
“ However, the benefit impact was found not significant also in Atkinson et al. (1984).
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data, can be explained if one considers the following points:
•  the LSUS sample consists of persons that were unemployed for longer 
than three months;
• in the time period covered by the LSUS survey the unemployment rate 
was much higher than in 1978/79;
• when the LSUS survey was carried out the Earnings Related Supple­
ment which used to link the level of the national insurance Unemploy­
ment Benefit (UB) to previous earnings had just been abolished12.
For these reasons, one would expect to find a smaller benefit effect using 
the LSUS data rather than the 1978/79 Cohort Study13.
The robustness of the estimated coefficient on the benefit level to the 
inclusion/exclusion of groups of variables is tested for in Table 5.3. Also the 
following types of sensitivity tests are carried out: the total income variables 
are specified rather than the benefit level and the predicted earnings; the 
model is estimated only for the recipients of unemployment benefit (at the 
first interview); an interaction variable for the combined effect of the level of 
benefit receipt and the type of benefit received is added to the model.
The estimated coefficient on the unemployment benefit level14 becomes 
significant only if the dummy for the spouse’s labour force participation is 
dropped from the model. It becomes slightly more significant if also the 
dummy for the presence of any child aged less than five in the nuclear family 
is dropped from the model. The estimated coefficient is now half the size of 
that estimated by Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) for the second quarter 
of the unemployment spell, which was equal to “0.23”.
>
:2This implies that the level of benefit receipts does not vary considerable across the 
unemployed and therefore it is more difficult to get a precise estimate of the benefit level 
effect.
t3However. the unemployment benefit level may not be measured with accuracy in the 
LSUS survey since it is self-reported and limited information is available on its variation 
over time. The DSS Cohort Studies do. instead, contain administrative information on 
unemployment benefit receipts and on their pattern of variation over time. No particularly 
firm conclusions about the impact of the level of unemployment benefit on the hazard rate 
should therefore be drawn on the basis of the LSUS data.
14The reader should perhaps be reminded that the level of unemployment benefit is 
measured in /an d  that the variable is entered in logarithms. The estimated coefficient 
represents an elasticity.
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Table 5.3: The robustness of the benefit coefficient in the full-time exit
Sensitivity analysis Benefit CocjJ. SE Max log-lik. hk. ratio test
Preferred model of table 5,2 
V ariables d ropped  from  th e  m odel; 
Spouse's work activity one month before hus­
bands 'unemployment
Spouse works and cny child less than 5 years 
old
Diminished Search and Leisure
Diminished Search, Leisu-re, Money shortage,
HouseOwn
All previous work history variables: Activity 
most of the year before U. and qualifications 
only UB recipients dummy
-0.0328 
-0.09180 
-0.1202*
-0.0365 
0.0112
-0.0232
-0.0730
0.0596
0.0558
0.0545
0.0926
0.0604
0.0601
0.0554
-6420.8 
-6431.8 
-6439.7
-6441-4
-6453.3 
-6447.3 
-6426.0
x i  =  22
XÎ = 37.8
x i = 41.2 
Xi = 65
X?„ =  53 
X| = 10.4
V ariables added:
Interaction of benefit level and dummy for re­
ceipt of only UB
Other Unemployment Income (-0.0386, SE 
{ 0.0835), entered in logs (£), in addition to 
| the benefit amount and the expected income 
: variables
0.0805 
-0.0286
0.1052
0.0605
-6419.2 
6420.6
Xi = 3.2
Other Unemployment Income (-0.0433, SE 
0.0903) and Other Expected Income from 
work (0.0282, SE 0.2065), entered tn logs 
(£ )  in addition to the benefit amount and 
the expected income variables
-0.0277 0.0609 6419.5
Benefit amounts and expected earnings 
; (0.0061, SE 0.0019) entered in levels (£ )
-0.0038 0.0025 -6417.6
i Total Unemployment Income (-0.0105, SE 
6.0631) and Total Expected income form 
■ Work (0.2008). entered fin logs, £ )  instead 
| of the benefit amount and the expected eam- 
' ings variables.
6421.9
Model estimated only for benefit recipients -0.0389 0.0929 -6089.0 j
t The unemployment benefit variable considered is the time varying unemployment benefit. The level of 
\ unemployment benefit u  measured tn £and it is entered tn logarithms. The estimated coefficient represents 
I an elasticity. The estimated model is a competing rtsks model and the results shown relate to the full-time 
work escape rate. A likelihood ratio test of the statistical significance of imposing the restrictions is provided 
1 tn the last column. The test statistics show degrees of freedom double than the number of variables dropped,
: since the two exits are estimated simultaneously. All variables except for the ones dropped in turns are the 
I same as in the model of table 5.2. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are given in table 5.1.
; A * indicates statistical significance at the 5% one sided level. The figures in brackets tn the first column 
1 give the value of the etimated coefficients.
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It is difficult to think of a sensible explanation for this result. It is per­
haps the case that the flat rate nature of the unemployment benefit —both 
UB and SB are flat rate— prevents one from the detection of the pure ef­
fect of the benefit level. When the benefit is found to be significant one is 
actually simply estimating the work disincentive effects of the additions for 
dependent spouse and children15. Once these factors have been controlled for 
the estimated benefit parameter is not significant any longer. However, the 
spouse’s participation in the labour force relates to four months before the 
first survey interview (see Section 5.2) and the dependent children additions 
are payable for dependent children of any age up to sixteen, so that only part 
of these additions (if any) is captured by the dummy for the presence of any 
child aged less than five in the household.
However, the fact that the estimated standard errors on the benefit level 
coefficient do not vary much if the variable “spouse work” is included in the 
model supports the view that this variable proxies contacts with the labour 
market. If the variable “spouse work” removed all identifying variance in the 
benefit level, the standard error on the benefit coefficient should be much 
larger when this variable is included than when it is excluded.
None of the other specifications affect the significance —or better, the 
insignificance— of the impact of the benefit level. In particular, the coeffi­
cients on other unemployment income is found not significant. However, it 
shows the expected negative sign.
5.5 The predicted mean unem ploym ent du­
ration
I have computed the predicted mean duration16 of unemployment for given 
values of the explanatory variables. Following Katz and Meyer (1990), the 
predicted survivor function at a given week t is the predicted probability of 
a spell lasting until t, which can be written as:
Gi(<) = Gi(i|i^(r); x, [t )'3\ t  = 0. ••• , /  — 1) =  e*p{- /  <?i(u)du}, (5.1)
Jo
where the hat indicates estimated quantities. The aggregate survivor func­
tion for the sample is given by:
= (5.2)
J i=l
15Given the flat rate nature of both UB and SB most of the variation in the amounts 
of unemployment benefit is due to the additions for dependent spouse and children. The 
dummy for the presence of young children in the household may capture the disincentive 
effect of the unemployment benefit additions for dependent children. The dummy for the 
spouse's labour force participation might capture the incentive effect of not receiving any 
benefit addition for dependent spouse. The incentive and disincentive effects are defined 
with respect to the unemployed's decision to go back to work.
16The statistical formula for the expected mean duration was defined in Section 312.
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where N equals the number of observations. The predicted mean weeks of 
unemployment are set equal to the predicted weeks of unemployment accu­
mulated by week t; i. e. :
M(*) =  £ G ( t ). (5.3)
T=1
Table 5.4: Predicted mean unemployment duration, before exiting into full­
time work
Set of values of the explanatory variables
mean dur 
t =  71
mean dur 
t =  62
(a) All explanatory variables are set equal to zero (except 
for the weekly baseline constants)
57.8 50.09
(b) All continuous variables take their mean value (unem­
ployment rate, log benefit level and log predicted earnings). 
The dtchoiomous variables full-time work in the year before 
and married take unitary value
41.5 37.2
(c) All continuous variables take their mean value. The 
dichotomous variables full-time work year before, married, 
| spouse working, searching less than before, valuing leisure 
more than labour and receiving only UB take value one
47.5 41.7
(d) All continuous variable take thetr mean value, mantal 
status equals one
46.5 41
(e) All continuous variable take their mean value. Man­
tal status, full-time work year before, spouse working one 
month before take value one
35.7 32.6
(f) All continuous variable take thetr mean value. Marital 
status, full-time work year before, last occupation unskilled 
take value one
47.0 41-4
The observed mean duration for exit into full-time work, including the nght- 
censortd, is of ^7.5 weeks. The estimated coefficients on the explanatory 
i variables used for the simulations are those of model (S) of table 5.2. The 
j  baseline estimates of model (2) are plotted in figure 5.1.
The results are shown in the Table 5.4 and relate to exit into full-time 
work. The final time t was set equal to 71 weeks, which is the maximum du­
ration observed, and, alternatively, to 62 weeks, given that all right-censoring 
takes place from week 63 onwards and that very few observations exit from 
unemployment after week 63 (see Table 2.2). Unless otherwise indicated, the 
dichotomous variables take value zero, which corresponds to the base group.
The observed mean unemployment duration for the unemployed that ex­
ited into full-time work is equal to 33.6 weeks; observed mean unemployment 
duration for the sample amounts to 46.9 weeks (see Table 5.1). These figures 
exclude the right-censored. The appropriate figure for comparison purposes 
is here the mean unemployment duration for exit into full-time work taking
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into account also right-censoring; i. e. 47.3 weeks. The observations exiting 
to states other than full-time work are treated as if right-censored.
I find that the predicted mean unemployment duration under the as­
sumptions made does not differ much from the observed sample mean. This 
result is not surprising given that in all specifications but (a) the continuous 
variables have been set equal to their average value and most of the dummy 
variables have been set equal to zero, which corresponds to the base group17.
An unemployed person that receives unemployment benefit equal to the 
sample average, has expected earnings equal to the sample average, was in 
full-time work most of the the year before the commencement of the unem­
ployment spell and is married (case b), has a predicted mean unemployment 
duration equal to about 41 weeks. For an unskilled worker in the same 
situation (case f) the mean unemployment duration is longer and equal to 
47 weeks. For a skilled or semi-skilled worker — which is the base for the 
occupation dummies— in the same situation but whose spouse was work 
ing sometime before the commencement of the sampled unemployment spell 
(case e), the predicted mean unemployment duration is lower and equal to 
about 38 weeks.
5.6 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, I have estimated a competing risks model of the re-employment 
probability. It is possible to conclude that the variables considered explain 
reasonably the determinants of the individual probability of leaving unem­
ployment to take up a full-time job. Most variables were found out to affect 
the hazard rate significantly and in the expected direction. I summarize 
below the results that I consider most interesting.
A perhaps surprising result is that the level of unemployment benefit does 
not affect significantly the full-time work hazard rate. This result was shown 
to be reasonably robust. Only if the dummies for the spouse's participation 
in the labour force and the presence in the household of any child aged less 
than five years were dropped from the model would the impact of the unem­
ployment benefit level become statistically significant —and even then it is 
still small. There is no obvious explanation for this result. The insignificance 
of the benefit impact might be due to the limited information on the pat­
tern of benefit receipts available in the LSUS data. However, previous UK 
studies that found a significant benefit level effect (with administrative data 
on benefit receipts) relate to the late seventies when the unemployment rate 
was much lower and there was more variation in the level of benefit receipts.
I find that diminished search intensity reduces the re-employment prob­
17The base group for any of the dummies considered has been defined in Section 5.2.
It normally corresponds to the most numerous group. One exception is the dummy for 
the economic activity undertaken for most of the year before the commencement of the 
sampled unemployment spell.
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ability by 50%. Valuing leisure more than labour reduces the (conditional) 
probability of leaving unemployment to enter full-time work by about 24%. 
If the spouse worked one month before the partner started his unemployment 
spell, the re-employment probability increases by about 50%. My preferred 
interpretation for this result is that a “working spouse” represents tighter 
contacts with the labour market, which result in a higher probability of find­
ing a job.
The presence of a child aged less than five years in the household reduces 
by 1 /5 the probability of finding a full-time job. This result is rather surpris­
ing since the sample consists only of male unemployed. Interestingly, this 
impact is as large as that of leisure preferences. Perhaps, valuing staying 
at home with young children instead of working is one way of expressing 
preferences for leisure over labour.
I conclude that considering part-time work together with full-time work 
does not affect substantially the results of estimation of the re-employment 
probability. This is probably due to the small number of observations exiting 
into part-time work.
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Chapter 6
Unem ploym ent duration and 
the duration of entitlem ent to  
unemployment benefit
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I investigate the relationship between the duration of enti­
tlement to unemployment benefit and the individual probability of leaving 
unemployment for Britain. The 1993 UK Budget announced that the du­
ration of entitlement to the national insurance unemployment benefit (UB) 
will be reduced to six months from 1995. No attempt has been made until 
the present study to estimate the impact of the potential duration of enti­
tlement to unemployment benefit on the hazard rate for the UK, at least to 
my knowledge. Some evidence on whether the impact of the benefit level 
varies as the unemployment spell lengthens is gathered by Narendranathan 
and Stewart (1993a).
It has been pointed out that the rules governing the duration of enti­
tlement to unemployment benefit might contribute to explain differences in 
unemployment rates across western economies more than differences in the 
level of unemployment benefit (Katz and Meyer, 1990). Cross-countries com­
parisons based on aggregate time-series data (on the unemployment rate and 
on the level and the duration of the unemployment benefit) have confirmed 
that the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit might influence 
considerably the rate of unemployment and the expected duration of unem­
ployment in a number of countries among which also the U. K. (Jackman et 
al., 1991, Burda, 1988). The main drawback of such studies is that it is hard 
to construct an average aggregate measure of the level and the duration of 
the unemployment benefit since normally benefit payments vary considerably 
across individuals.
The institutional features of the unemployment benefit scheme in the 
UK were described in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1. In the UK (as in the US,
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the Netherlands and many other countries), the national insurance benefit 
has a limited duration while the social assistance benefit (means-tested) has 
potentially infinite duration (as long as the unemployed show that they are 
actively searching for work). Since the UK unemployed may receive both 
benefits at the same time, it is not straightforward to think of the potential or 
expected duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit. In what follows, 
I distinguish two groups of the unemployed with respect to the expected 
duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit: the recipients of “only UB” 
and the recipients of “SB with or without UB” . I make an attempt to obtain 
estimates of the impact of the expected exhaustion of the national insurance 
benefit (UB) on the hazard rate. Two approaches to detecting the benefit 
entitlement effect with the LSUS data are adopted. First, the preferred 
model is estimated for the two groups of the unemployed pooled together. 
Some timevarying dummies are used to model the residual entitlement period 
to unemployment benefit for “only UB” recipients. Second, the model is 
estimated separately for the two groups of unemployment benefit recipients. 
The two estimated hazard rates are compared.
I investigate also whether the expected duration of entitlement to unem­
ployment benefit has a different impact on the re-employment hazard than 
on the hazard of exit to states other than full-time work. The implications 
for economic policy are indeed quite different. Findings of a negative in­
fluence of longer durations of entitlement to unemployment benefit on the 
re-employment probability would favour the introduction of economic poli­
cies aimed at reducing the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit. 
If, instead, the exhaustion of entitlement to the benefit leads to withdrawal 
from the labour force, the same policy would be ineffective in increasing the 
rate of exit from unemployment into employment, which I assume should 
be the aim of economic policy (together with granting a minimum level of 
subsistence income to the unemployed).
The structure of this chapter is the following. In section 2, the background 
theory and the existing evidence are reviewed. The impact of the expected 
exhaustion of entitlement to unemployment benefit on the hazard rate is 
discussed for the case of the UK. In section 3, the problems of detecting 
an entitlement effect with microdata are illustrated. First, typical problems 
that have arisen in the literature are reviewed and related to the LSUS data. 
Next, the drawbacks that are peculiar to the LSUS data are discussed. In 
section 4, the main features of the data for the purpose of the analysis of the 
duration of benefit entitlement are described. The results of estimation are 
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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6.2 Theory and existing evidence
Theoretical models predict1 that as the time of exhaustion of entitlement 
to unemployment benefit nears the probability of leaving unemployment in­
creases, all things equal. Moffit and Nicholson (1982), who adopt a con­
ventional labor-leisure framework of analysis, argued that the unemployed’s 
budget constraint has a kink at the time of exhaustion of unemployment ben­
efit and that most unemployed maximize their utility at this kink. Within a 
job search framework of analysis, Mortensen (1977) proved that allowing for 
the limited duration of unemployment benefit introduces a non-stationarity 
into the model. The author argued that as the time of exhaustion of entitle­
ment to unemployment benefit nears, the unemployed increase their search 
intensity and lower their reservation wage. This results in a rise in the hazard 
rate. Van den Berg (1990) developed a formal model of non-stationarities 
in job search models, proving that an expected decline in the level of bene­
fit paid raises the unemployment benefit elasticity of the hazard rate. The 
expected exhaustion of unemployment benefit is comparable to an expected 
decline in the level of unemployment benefit.
Some empirical studies have found evidence in favour of the hypothesis 
that the hazard rate rises near the time of unemployment benefit exhaustion; 
for example, for the US, Katz (1986), Katz and Meyer (1988, 1990), Meyer 
(1990), Han and Hausman (1990); for Canada, Ham and Rea (1987); for the 
Netherlands, van den Berg (1990) and Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993).
Previous UK studies have allowed the impact of the level of unemploy­
ment benefit on the hazard rate to vary over time with the lengthened dura­
tion of the unemployment spell (Narendranathan et al. 1985, Narendranathan 
and Stewart, 1993 ad 1993a). These studies have detected a declining im­
pact of the level of unemployment benefit on the hazard rate as the spell 
of unemployment progresses. In particular, the effect of the level of unem­
ployment benefit is found to become statistically insignificant after the first 
five or six months of unemployment. However, this evidence is inconclusive 
with respect to the impact of the potential duration of entitlement to unem­
ployment benefit since the UK unemployment benefit schemes are such that 
the level of unemployment benefit paid does not necessarily decline during 
the course of the unemployment spell (see for instance Table 2.12). Some 
limited evidence on the effect of benefit entitlement on unemployment du­
ration was gathered by Wadsworth (1991a), who used data matched from 
two years of the British Labour Force Survey (1983/84) and found that non­
claimants of unemployment benefit had a lower unemployment duration; due 
however to a higher withdrawal rate from the labour force. Also, Schimdt 
and Wadsworth (1993), who employed matched data from the Labour Force 
Survey for the period 1983-89 to investigate the impact of entitlement to un-
‘Some insights into the issue of the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit 
and a brief review of the literature were provided in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1.
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Figure 6.1: The duration of the entitlement effect
employment benefit on individual search intensity, concluded that excluding 
workers from the benefit system leads them to search less extensively.
An important feature of the UK benefit scheme is that the two benefits, 
I’B and SB, can be received simultaneously, if the unemployed’s resources 
including UB fall below their needs (as mentioned in Sectionl.3). In this 
case, the unemployed will receive both benefits at the same time. Having 
successfully passed the means-tested requirements for the award of the social 
assistance benefit (SB) when they were already receiving the national insur­
ance benefit (UB) (for instance, at the commencement of their unemployment 
spell), should make the unemployed quite confident that upon exhaustion of 
entitlement to UB the foregone UB payment will be replaced by a corre­
sponding SB payment. Therefore, 1 assume that the unemployed receiving 
both types of benefits at the commencement of their unemployment spell 
behave as SB recipients rather than as UB recipients with respect to their 
expectations about the potential duration of the unemployment benefit.
The predicted impact of the expected exhaustion of entitlement to benefit 
on the hazard rate in the case of Britain is summarized in Figure 6.1. Two 
groups of the unemployed with respect to unemployment benefit receipts at
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the commencement of their unemployment spell are distinguished: recipients 
of (only) UB and recipients of SB (either by itself or in addition to UB). The 
type of unemployment benefit received is assumed not to vary over time, at 
least until time “p” when the national insurance unemployment benefit UB 
expires. The theory is inconclusive about the time at which the hazard rate 
starts to rise due to the expectation that the benefit will expire in the near 
future. I assume that for recipients of “only UB” this time is equal to about 
ten weeks before the exhaustion of entitlement to UB. A similar assumption 
was made by Katz and Meyer (1988) for a sample of US unemployed. The 
hazard rate for the recipients of SB (with or without UB) does not vary as 
a function of the duration of entitlement to benefit since SB is unlimited in 
time.
After the exhaustion of UB (time p) the hazard rate might remain con­
stant or decrease. However, if the (once) “only UB” unemployed begin to 
receive SB upon UB exhaustion, from time p onwards their behaviour is likely 
to be similar to that of the SB unemployed. Theliazard rate might sharply 
decrease and then remain constant.
6.3 The problems with the detection of the 
entitlem ent effect
Nothwithstanding the considerable evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
the hazard rate rises significantly as the time of benefit exhaustion nears, 
some authors are sceptical about the possibility of detecting a true impact 
of unemployment benefit exhaustion on the individual re-employment prob­
ability (for instance; Fallick, 1991). It is fair to say that there are problems 
which may impair the detection of the “true” or ‘‘pure” impact of the ex­
pected exhaustion of benefit entitlement on the hazard rate.
The first and most serious problem concerns the identification of the effect 
of the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefit from that of time 
dependency in the hazard. The duration of entitlement to unemployment 
benefit may be fixed at the same period of time for everybody in the sample. 
This is normally the case in the US and in the UI\. However, in the UK the 
duration of entitlement to benefit is different for recipients of “only UB2” and 
recipients of “SB” (either on its own or together with UB). This difference 
should hopefully allow to identify the effect of the (expected) limited duration 
of UB. However, even if a flexible baseline hazard rate is modelled it might be 
difficult to identify separately the effect of the benefit entitlement duration
2The duration of entitlement may vary for the recipients of UB because of the so 
called “linked spell rule", which links together for entitlement duration purposes spells 
of unemployment separated by less than a fixed number of weeks of work. This possible 
source of variation was allowed for in the construction of the entitlement duration variable 
(see Section 2.5.1 and Table 2.10). It was however found that the maximum potential 
duration of UB is 52 weeks for more than 90% of UB recipients.
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from any time dependency effect.
A second problem arises from the fact that normally the duration of enti­
tlement coincides with periods such as six months (for instance, in the U. S.) 
or the year (in the U. K.). There is some evidence that the unemployed tend 
to misreport their unemployment durations by rounding up their responses 
to periods of time such as six months or a year. Evidence in favour of such 
rounding errors in survey responses is gathered by Poterba and Summers 
(1984) and by Sider (1985). Sider (1985) finds for the US that unemploy­
ment durations are typically rounded by the survey participants to durations 
of a month, a quarter, half a year, a year. Therefore, in the case of self- 
reported unemployment durations, the detection of large increases in the 
re-employment probability near the time of benefit exhaustion may perhaps 
be explained by rounding errors made by the unemployed in reporting their 
unemployment durations rather than by an entitlement exhaustion effect. 
This type of argument is used, for instance, by Fallick (1991), who analyses 
a sample of US displaced workers and concludes that there is no evidence 
that any spike in the hazard rate can be explained by the exhaustion of en­
titlement to unemployment benefit. Administrative data on the duration of 
unemployment spells, such as those used for instance be Katz and Meyer 
(1988) —who found a significant entitlement duration effect— are however 
free from such rounding error problems.
In the case of the LSUS data rounding errors of this type are unlikely to be 
a problem, at the second interview, the unemployed are asked retrospective 
questions about what they were doing in each week during the period of 
time falling between the first and the second interview (I have constructed 
the duration of the unemployment spells using such information, as described 
in Section 2.4.2). In this case, there should be less scope for rounding error 
than when questions such as “for how long were you unemployed?" are asked. 
It is instead not possible to exclude that replies to such questions on the 
economic activity week-by-week might be affected by recall error. However, 
recall errors should not constitute a major problem for the identification of 
the benefit entitlement duration effect since they are probably random and 
they are unlikely to be clustered at a year (which is the time of exhaustion of 
UB). On the other hand, given the small size of the sample considered, the 
fact that there is not much variation in the length of the entitlement period 
might raise the chances of detecting a spike in the hazard rate near the time 
of benefit exhaustion by simply plotting the empirical hazard rate.
One further problem that might create a ‘'spurious1’ entitlement duration 
effect is that some unemployed may stop claiming unemployment benefit a 
few weeks before their entitlement actually expires. For instance, in some US 
states there is a limit on the total amount of unemployment benefit payable 
in a year (which depends on the individual’s last earnings). If this limit is 
binding the unemployed might receive a very small payment in the last week 
of entitlement to benefit and not bother to collect it. Meyer ( l 990, footnote 
22) finds evidence in favour of this hypothesis. He concludes, however, that
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only a small part of the increase in the hazard rate just before benefit ex­
haustion can be explained by this phenomenon. In the UK, UB is flat rate 
and there is no yearly ceiling on the amounts paid, so that this problem does 
not arise.
6.4 The data
The reader is referred to Chapter 2 for a description of the main features of 
the data and to Chapter 5 (Section 5.2) for a definition of the explanatory 
variables of the model. In this Section, I review some of the results of the 
(descriptive) analysis of the type and amount of benefit that were presented in 
Chapter 2. Then, I provide descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
for the two groups of benefit recipients (see Table 6.1) and comment upon 
the main differences. A description of the time varying dummies employed 
to capture the impact of the expected exhaustion of entitlement to benefit 
concludes this section.
6.4.1 D escriptive sta tistics o f benefit receipts
Out of the 2035 observations selected for the econometric analysis, 736 (36.2%) 
unemployed reported to receive (only) UB at the commencement of their reg­
istered unemployment spell —approximated by the time of the first interview— 
and 1205 (59.2%) reported to receive SB, either by itself or together with UB 
(see Table 2.8). Those unemployed that reported that they did not receive 
any unemployment benefit at the first interview (about 5%)3 are dropped 
from the econometric analysis since it is not known what type of benefit they 
might have received thereafter.
About 95% of the unemployed that were receiving SB, either by itself 
or in addition to UB, at the first interview, were still receiving SB at the 
second interview (see Table 2.9)4. This implies that the unemployed that 
receive SB at the commencement of their unemployment spell are likely to 
continue to receive SB throughout their unemployment spell. In particular, 
the unemployed that receive SB together with UB at the commencement 
of their unemployment spell are likely to continue to receive SB after ex­
hausting their entitlement to UB. The rationale for these results is that the
3Tliese unemployed are perhaps awaiting unemployment benefit receipts or temporarily 
suspended from benefit receipt or misreporting their benefit receipts. They might also be 
unemployed that have already exhausted their entitlement to UB because of the link spell 
rule.
4The unemployment benefit received at the second interview is recorded only for the 
unemployed that have not yet left unemployment (right-censored spells). One should 
keep this in mind since the type of unemployment benefit received over time might affect 
the probability of leaving unemployment, i. e. the probability of being still unemployed 
(right-censored) at the second interview.
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unemployed that pass the means-test at the commencement of their unem­
ployment spell axe likely to continue to pass it thereafter. This implies that 
upon UB exhaustion a similar amount of SB is probably to be received. The 
type of benefit received varies instead considerably over time for the unem­
ployed that receive only UB at the commencement of their unemployment 
spell. These findings support at least in part the assumptions I have made 
concerning the impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefit. 
In particular, about 40% of the “only UB” unemployed (with right-censored 
spells) report to receive no benefit at all at the second interview (see Table 
2.9).
However, in Table 2.12 it was shown that quite a considerable number 
(more than 30%) of the “only UB” unemployed with right-censored spells 
report to receive (at the second interview) amounts of unemployment benefit 
much larger than those reported at the first interview. This is probably 
due to that fact that their financial situation (or their family situation) is 
changed in a substantial manner. Of course, one should always remember 
that information on unemployment benefit receipts at the second interview 
is only available for the right-censored unemployed and that the type and 
amount of benefit received might contribute to determine the rate of exit 
from unemployment. Therefore, it is possible and presumably likely that 
those unemployed that already exited from unemployment before the time of 
the second interview experienced on average a larger drop in the amount of 
benefit received (especially at the time of UB exhaustion ) than those right- 
censored unemployed. In particular, about 77% of the “only UB” unemployed 
are observed to exit from unemployment before the second interview. The 
same figure for the recipients of SB (with or without UB) is about 56%..
Moreover, from the evidence presented in Table 2.12, it emerges that 
about 60% of the “only UB" unemployed experiences a complete (for about 
44%) or partial (for about 15%) drop in the amount of benefit received at the 
second interview relative to the amount reported at the first interview. The 
same figure for recipients of SB (with or without UB) is about 32% with only 
3% of them reporting to receive no benefit at all (at the second interview).
The following problems that may impair the detection of the effect of 
the duration of entitlement to UB are due to some particular features of the 
LSUS survey. The first is that the number of the unemployed observed is 
quite small: 736 unemployed report receiving “only UB” (at the first inter­
view) out of about 2000 unemployed. The second is that, as already discussed 
in several occasions (see Sections 2.3 and 2.5.3), the survey contains little in­
formation on any changes in the pattern of benefit receipts over time. It 
would, instead, be important in order to estimate the effect of the benefit 
entitlement duration to know how benefit receipts vary over time; whether 
the ‘'only UB” unemployed gain entitlement to SB upon UB exhaustion (or 
maybe even sometime before): whether, when and by how much the amount 
of benefit received falls during the course of the unemployment spell. Fi­
nally, it is possible that some unemployed misreported the type of henefit
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received, which would obviously impair the analysis I carry out. I find for 
the LSUS sample that almost 90% of the “only UB” recipients (at the first 
interview) are likely to have correctly reported the type of benefit received 
(see Section 2.5.3).
6.4.2 D escrip tive sta tistics o f th e  exp lanatory  vari­
ables
Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are given in Table 6.1. It 
emerges that those who receive “only UB” (at the first interview) are more 
likely on average to have held a full-time job for most of the year before 
the commencement of their registered unemployment spell. This finding is 
plausible given the rules that regulate entitlement to UB (see section 1.3).
Recipients of “only UB” are also more likely to be older on average than 
other unemployment benefit recipients. This might be perhaps explained by . 
the fact that the category “recipients of only UB” exclude the unemployed 
receiving SB together with UB; i. e. joint payments of UB and SB.
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of the economic variables
Receive only UB Receive SB Benefit receipients
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Left truncation period 13.3736 1.0473 13,4241 1.0527 13.4049 1.0507
Unemployment duration (weeks) 45,5340 19,3854 48.2415 18.7074 47.2148 19.0078
F /t work most of the year before U. 0,8111 0.3917 0.5693 0.4954 0.6610 0.4735
Unemployed most of the year before U. 0,1141 0.3182 0.2896 0.4538 0.2231 0.4164
| Sick no work most of the year before U. 0.0272 0.1627 0.0398 0.1957 0.0350 0.1839
Professional/Intermediate Occupation 0.2269 0.4191 0.1295 0.3358 0.1664 0.3725
Unskilled Occupation 0,0584 0,2347 0.0614 0.2402 0.0603 0.2381
Occupation not available 0.0421 0.2010 0.0846 0.2785 0.0685 0.2527
Age 20-24 0.0924 0.2898 0.1477 0.3550 0.1267 0.3328
Age 25-34 0.2065 0.4051 0.4033 0.4908 0.3287 0.4699
Age 35-44 0.1929 0.3949 0.2805 0.4494 0.2473 0.4316
Age 45-54 0.2948 0.4563 0.1286 0.3349 0.1917 0.3937
Age 55-58 0.2133 0.4099 0.0396 0.1957 0.1056 0.3074
Has any child old less than 5 0,1630 0.3697 0.4639 0.4989 0.3496 0.4770
Mamed 0.8859 0.3182 0.8506 0.3566 0.8640 0.3429
Spouse working 1 month before U. 0.4565 0.4984 0.1261 0.3321 0.2514 0.4339
Searches less than before 0.1399 0.3472 0.0622 0.2417 0.0917 0.2887
Values Leisure more than Labour 0.1875 0.3906 0.0966 0.2965 0.1324 0,3390
Experiences some shortage of money 0.5897 0.4922 0.8274 0.3761 0.7372 0.4402
House owner outright/with mortgage 0.4 7J 5 0.4995 0.3129 0.4639 0.3730 0.4637
County unemployment rate 13.4753 3.2963 13.6656 3.1372 13.5935 3. ¡990
t'B /SB  amount tn £ , logs 3.3945 0.2979 3.7999 0.4316 3.6462 0.4335
Predicted earnings, in £ , logs. 4.5001 0.4325 4.4200 0.5330 4-4504 0.4967
pred. earn, not available 0.0068 0.0822 0.0124 0.1109 0.0103 0.1010
total savings at tk. £ 2990.7 8694-6 367.5 1468.0 1365 5624.7
total debt at tk. £ 486.5 1661.0 673.6 3146.7 633.7 2753.9
Weeks of UB left, ¡6-6 0.J053 0.3070
Weeks of UB left, 5-1 0.0965 0.2966
Weeks of UB left, 6 0.0910 0.2677
7-3 ueeks past UB exhaustion 0.0694 0.2*53
i or more weeks past UB exhaustion 1 I I 0.0820 0.2743
The number of the unemployed receiving only UB is 736; ¡205 get SB or jointly SB and UB. The total number 
of benefit recipients 15 then 1941. The dichotomous variables take value one when the condition stated for each of 
them 15 satisfied. The mean duration is taken over all observations (including the right-censored observations). The 
logarithms are taken over the nonzero observations. Time tk relates to one month before the commencement of the 
unemployment spell. UU. H stands for the observed unemployment spell.
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The recipients of UB that are aged over forty-five might be more likely 
to have higher levels of savings and therefore they may not be entitled to 
SB. Younger recipients of UB are instead more likely to have lower levels 
of savings and may gain entitlement to SB (together with UB). Indeed, it 
appears that receipients of “only UB” at the first interview are on average 
much wealthier than recipients of SB (with or without UB)5. This might also 
explain why a lower proportion of the “only UB” unemployed report to suffer 
from a shortage of money and a larger proportion report to own the house 
where they live.
From inspection of Table 6.1, it emerges that the proportion of the 
unemployed with diminished search intensity is higher among recipients of 
only UB. Similarly the proportion of the unemployed that value leisure more 
than labour is higher among the “only UB” group. Perhaps, also these 
findings might be due to the fact that the only UB unemployed are on average 
wealthier than the unemployed that receive SB (either by itself or together 
with UB). It seems plausible that higher levels of financial wealth may result 
in a lower intensity of search and a higher valuation of leisure as relative to 
labour (see Chapter 7).
The distribution of the total savings of the unemployed receiving only 
UB or SB (with or without UB) at the first interview (which is the time to 
which most of the variables discussed above relate) is shown in Table 6.2 
below. It appears that “only UB” recipients are considerably wealthier than 
“SB recipients’-. The percentage of “only UB” unemployed that report zero 
amounts of savings (about 28%) is considerably lower than the corresponding 
figure (about 51%) for “SB" unemployed. Almost 100% of the unemployed 
receiving SB (with or without UB) at the first interview report savings below 
•£'3000. The same figure for recipients of “only UB” is about 73%. It is 
interesting to compare the number of the unemployed in the different benefit 
groups with savings below (above) £3000 since this was the threshold level 
of savings above which the unemployed was not entitled to the means-tested 
benefit (SB) in 1982/83. This is done in Table 6.3 below. The number 
of “only UB” unemployed with savings above the threshold is considerable 
higher than that of SB recipients.
Although the relationship between the unemployed’s financial resources 
and unemployment duration is the subject of Chapter 7 (to which the reader 
is referred for a more complete treatment of the issue), I shall test for the sen­
sitivity of the results obtained to the inclusion of savings and debt amounts 
among the regressors in Section 6.5.3.
5The levels of savings and debt of the unemployed given in Table 6.1 relate to one 
month before the commencement of the observed unemployment spell. This reference 
time was chosen since the level of savings and debt at the time of the first interview might 
be endogeneous to the model; i e. they might be simultaneously determined with the 
duration of the unemployment spell.
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Table 6.2: The amounts of savings at the first interview
amovnfe, £ Receive only UB Receive ÈB with or without UB
% c«m. % % cum. %
0 28.3 28.3 51.3 51.3
<  1 0 0 17.1 45.4 29.4 80.7
< to o 5.4 50.8 4.5 85. i
<  500 5.0 55.8 4 4 89.6
< 1000 6.0 61.8 5.0 94.6
< 2000 6.3 68.1 4-5 99
< 3000 4*7 72.8 0.7 99.8
<  5000 7.8 80.6 0.1 99.9
<  1 0 0 0 0 7.2 87.8 0.1 100
< 15000 3.9 91.7
< toooo 2.1 93.8
< 30000 3.5 97.3
< 50000 1.7 99.0
< 100000 1.0 100
mean value, / 4248.1 (SD  11047.0) 153.9 (SD  427.6)
The total savings variable is defined in Chapter 7 or 1. The total amounts of 
savings relate to the principal respondent; i. t. the spouse's savings (if any) 
are not taken tntc account
Table 6.3: Percentage of the unemployed with savings above the threshold 
level
Time Receive only UB
ssX
17%
Receive SB (with or without 
UB)
~sW
l9f
tk
tl
The amounts of savings considered are total savings reported and re~ 
late to the principal respondent; i. e. the spouse's savings (if any) are 
not taken into account. The total savings variable is defined in Chap­
ter 7. The times It and tl relate respectively to one month before the 
commencement of the unemployment spell and to the first interview.
6.4.3 T he “tim e left to  benefit exh au stion  ” dum m ies
The impact of the expected exhaustion of UB is modelled with a set of time 
varying dummies which take value one in some chosen intervals of time6 for 
the unemployed that reported to receive only UB at the first interview. The 
base for these dummies are the unemployed reporting to receive SB (either 
by itself or together with UB) and the “only UB” unemployed in week 11-41 
(except when this additional dummy is included).
Some uonly UB” unemployed (about 6%; i. e. 49 out of 736) that reported 
at the first interview benefit amounts obviously different from the fiat rates 
UB amounts (which are fixed by law) were recoded for the purpose of the con­
struction of these dummies as receiving SB7. The following intervals of time
6This approach is basically the same than that adopted by Katz and Meyer (1988).
7These unemployed reported benefit amounts of less than .£12.50, which corresponds to
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before exhaustion of entitlement to unemployment benefit were considered:
• ten to six weeks of entitlement to UB left before exhaustion of entitle­
ment;
• five to one weeks of entitlement to UB left;
• zero weeks of entitlement to UB left; i. e. last week of entitlement to 
UB, which corresponds to the 52nd week of unemployment for more 
than 90% of the recipients of UB at the first interview;
• from one to three weeks past the exhaustion of entitlement to UB;
• four weeks or more past the exhaustion of entitlement to UB.
These time varying dummies were constructed using the method sug­
gested by Rohwer (1P92)8. Introducing these additional time varying dum­
mies for recipients of “only UB” in the time intervals going from about week 
42 onwards is equivalent to shifting the baseline hazard rate for the recip­
ients of “only UB” from week 42 onwards. I test for the sensitivity of the 
results to the introduction of a further time varying dummy taking value one 
from week 11 (the first observed week of unemployment) to week 41 for the 
“only UB” group. The sensitivity of the estimates to alternative assumptions 
about the form of the baseline hazard rate is also tested.
6.5 Results of estim ation
The conditional probability of leaving unemployment is first estimated by 
non-parametric methods. Next, the model given by Equation 3.36 of Chapter 
3 is estimated for the full sample of benefit recipients, i. e. for the two groups 
of benefit recipients pooled together. Then, the model is estimated separately 
for two groups of benefit recipients and the two estimated hazard rates are 
compared.
6.5.1 N on-param etric K aplan-M eier estim ates
Non-parametric estimates of the survivor functions were obtained using the 
Kaplan-Meier method. I have estimated the survivor functions for the full 
sample of benefit recipients and for the two groups of UUB only” and “SET 
recipients9. The survivor functions for the single risk model and for the
the November 1982 minimum reduced rate without any addition for dependants, or larger 
than /4 3 , which corresponds more or less to the full rate with additions for dependent 
spouse and children at November 1982.
6This method has also been adopted to construct the time varying unemployment 
benefit level variable.
9These two groups are defined with respect to reported benefit receipts at the time of 
the first interview.
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Figure 6.2: Single risk survivor functions
competing risks of exit into full-time work or into “other states”10 were also 
estimated. The duration of the completed spells of unemployment by the 
exit states for recipients of only UB and for recipients of SB (with or without 
UB) is presented in Table 8.10, in the Appendix. The estimated survivor 
functions for the two groups and for the single risk case are plotted and 
compared in Figure 6.2.
The survivor function for recipients of “only UB” (see Figure 6.2) lies 
above that for the other benefit recipients until about week 50, thereafter the 
two curves tend to coincide. This implies that the (conditional) probability 
of leaving unemployment is higher at any time until about week 50 for the 
“SB. with or without UB“ group rather than for the “only UB” group. After 
week 50. the two groups do not differ substantially with respect to their 
probability of leaving unemployment. One possible explanation for this result 
lies in the fact that the “only UB” unemployed are older on average than the 
“SB” unemployed. The expected impact of older age on the hazard rate is 
negative11.
l0The reader is referred to the preceding Chapters for a definition of the “other states” 
exit.
11 Another explanation is that the “only UB” unemployed are richer on average. How­
ever. this possibility is excluded on the basis of some tests carried out in the last section.
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Figure 6.3: Empirical hazard rates. Full-time work exit
However, according to the Log Rank test statistics12, based on the Kaplan 
Meier standard errors, the two groups of benefit recipients are statistically 
different ( \ 2 = 9.0). If the 95% confidence intervals are taken into account, 
the two curves are significantly different only during the first few weeks. In­
deed, after the first few weeks of unemployment, the survivor curve for the 
“SB*' group is “contained7' between the two 95% confidence bands for the 
survivor curve of the “UB only” group (see Figure 6.2). The survivor curve 
for the “UB only’1 group is contained between the two 95% confidence bands 
of the survivor function for the “SB* group13.
12See Kalbfleish and Prentice, 1980, pp. 16-18.
13The lower bound of the survivor curve for the “SB” group is not plotted since the 
survivor function for this group lies behind or coincides with the UB survivor function 
at any time, which implies that its confidence band lies also behind the “UB” survivor 
function at any time. This confidence band is simply not plotted for clarity purposes in 
order not to burden the figure with several curves.
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Figure 6.4: Empirical hazard rates. Other states exit
The two hazards for the competing risks of exit into full-time work and 
into other states are plotted respectively in Figures 6.4 and 6.5.1. The empir­
ical hazard rate of the “only UB" unemployed shows larger spikes than that 
of the “SB with or without UB" unemployed for either exit considered. The 
behaviour of the two hazards over time is quite different for either exit. How­
ever. the Kapian-Meier estimates do not allow for individual heterogeneity. 
In the next sections individual (observed) heterogeneity is allowed for.
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6.5.2 R esu lts o f estim ation  o f th e  pooled  groups m odel
The model of Equation 3.36 of Chapter 3 is estimated for the two groups 
of unemployment benefit recipients pooled together. The baseline hazard 
rate is allowed to vary each week. The estimated model is very similar to 
that estimated in Chapter 5 except for the inclusion of the UB entitlement 
duration dummies among the explanatory variables. However, the model of 
Chapter 5 was estimated also for the unemployed that reported not to receive 
any unemployment benefit at the first interview.
The estimated impacts of the explanatory variables for the exit into full* 
time work (see Table 6.4) are very similar to those of the model estimated 
in Chapter 5 (model 2 of Table 5.2) except for the estimated coefficient on 
the dichotomous indicator of whether the unemployed was in receipt of uonlv 
UB” at the first interview, which is now found not significantly different from 
zero. This result confirms perhaps my view that the dummy for the receipt 
of only UB at the commencement of the unemployment spell (the time of the 
first interview, in practise) captures at least in part the impact of differences 
in entitlement duration between the two benefit recipients groups. When the 
impact of the duration of entitlement to UB is modelled separately —via 
the five time varying dummies— the estimated coefficient on the “only UB” 
dummy becomes not significantly different from zero. The reader is referred 
to Chapter 5 for a discussion of the impact of the explanatory variables. 
The discussion below focuses on the impact of the duration of entitlement to 
unemployment benefit.
The first, perhaps surprising, result is that the expected exhaustion of 
entitlement to UB affects the probability of leaving unemployment to exit to 
states other than full-time job more than the probability of re-employment 
into a full-time job.
In the exit to full-time work only the coefficients on the first and the 
last dummy are significantly different from zero. However, the estimated 
coefficients on the UB entitlement duration dummies have all the expected 
positive sign. In the other states exit, all the UB entitlement duration dum­
mies except the first are found to have a statistically significant impact. The 
estimated coefficients are positive as predicted by economic theory. The 
robustness of the estimated coefficients on the two sets (for the two exits 
considered) of the benefit entitlement duration dummies is tested below (see 
Table 6.6).
It is perhaps difficult to interpret the estimates of the impact of UB 
approaching exhaustion for the exit into full-time work. According to the 
estimates of Table 6.4, at the time when there are ten to six weeks of enti­
tlement to UB left, the chances of exiting from unemployment into full-time 
work are. for recipients of “only UB”, two and half times higher in each week, 
all things equal. Then, from four weeks after benefit exhaustion onwards the 
chances of leaving unemployment increase by about 70%. in relation to the 
base, in each of the following weeks. Instead, from five weeks before exhaus­
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tion of entitlement to UB to three weeks past exhaustion, the chances of 
leaving unemployment to enter full-time work are not significantly different 
in relation to the base.
Table 6.4: Results of estimation
Variable Full-time exit Other states extt
C"ffUM
0.3658•  
0.3389*  
•OMU 
0.S003*
■ 0.4565*
0.1097 
0.1877*
■ 0.6489* 
■1.1946* 
• O.ttiS*
0.1779 
0.3389*  
0.1490*
■ 0.8005* 
-0.S67Î*
0.3000* 
• 0.02/2 
• 0.0905 
-0.0375 
0.6631* 
3.1247* 
0.9313* 
0.1513 
0.6993 
0.3 4 66 
0.54630
S E SE
F /t work year before 
Unemployed year before 
Sick year before 
Profes. /Interm. Occ. 
Unskilled Occupation 
Age 20-24 
Age 35-44 
Age 45-54 
Age 55-58
Mas any child aged < 5 
Married
Spouse working month before 
experiences money shortage 
Searches less than before 
Values Leisure more 
House owner
County unemployment rate 
Receives only UB 
UB/SB time varying 
Predicted earnings 
A0 pred. earn.
- 6-10 weeks
- 5-1 weeks 
0 weeks
+ 1-3 weeks 
+ 4 weeks-oc
0*1457
0.1559
0.3114
0.1008
0.1745
0.1090
0.0918
0.1133
0.1759
0.0886
0.1251
0.0905
0.0889
0.1794
0.1185
0.0752
0.0109
0.0943
0.0643
0.2079
0.9846
0.2452
0.2768
0.6799
0.3074
0.2051
-0.6759* 
-0.4452 
0.1916 
0.4823* 
-0.1580 
-0.0901 
0.1172 
-0.2286 
-0.0489 
-0.2079 
-0.2789 
0.3193 
-0.2170 
-0.0829 
- 0.1121 
0.2145 
-0.0764 
0.1911 
-0.0269 
-0.8274* 
-3.1826 
0.5466 
1. 2464*  
3.63 Î 7* 
1.70340 
0.95190
0.2132 
0.2349 
0.1629 
0.1992 
0.2903 
0.2417 
0.1910 
0.2194 
0.2496 
0.1691 
0.2007 
0.1743 
0.1918 
0.3430 
0.2170 
0.1823 
0.0891 
0.1476 
0.0204 
0.4! 52 
1.9351 
0.6013 
0.3860 
0.6735 
0.4176 
0.3490
Max. likelihood: 6142.7. A weekly baseline 15 estimated, the estimated coefficients 
on the weekly segments of the baseline hazard rate are given in Table 8.11 in the 
Appendix. A likelihood ratio test of the restrictions imposed by estimating the 
model (2) of Chapter 5 only for the recipients of benefit, instead of the present 
model unth the benefit duratton dummies, rejected the restrictions — 108.4/
Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables are provided tn the preceding tablt, 
m the data section. A * indicate statistical significance at the two-sided 5% level.
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I have made an attempt to find a plausible interpretation of these results. 
It is possible that the “only UB” unemployed being aware that UB will expire 
after a year of entitlement start to increase their search effort in the last ten 
weeks of entitlement (if they have not yet succeeded in securing themselves 
a job). However if they have not yet found a job in the last month before 
benefit exhaustion they might decrease their search effort back to normal 
levels because of discouragement or perhaps hope that they will be able to 
claim SB upon UB exhaustion. About one month after exhaustion, the “once 
only UB” unemployed that were neither able to find a job nor perhaps to 
claim SB, will again increase their search intensity but not as much as before 
(when there were from ten to six weeks of entitlement left) since they are 
now more discouraged.
Let us look next at the probability of leaving unemployment to states 
other than full-time work. In this case, all the UB entitlement duration 
dummies except the first, relating to ten to six weeks left before unemploy­
ment benefit exhaustion, are significant. This result might perhaps be seen 
as confirming the previous “story”, if one agrees (or assumes) that exit to 
full-time work is the unemployed’s “first best” . When there are five to one 
weeks of benefit entitlement left, the chances of leaving unemployment to 
other states (for the “only UB unemployed” that have not yet exited from 
unemployment) increase by three and half times as much in each of these 
weeks and in relation to the base. In the last week of entitlement to UB, 
the probability of exiting to states other than full-time work for “only UB” 
recipients increases enormously, by about 38 times (in relation to the base). 
Then, from one to three weeks after benefit exhaustion, the probability of 
exiting to other states is five and a half times higher in each of these weeks 
and in relation to the base. From four weeks after exhaustion onwards the 
chances of exiting to other states are in each week two and half times larger 
(in relation to the base).
It is possible that part of the enormous increase in the probability of 
exiting to other states in the last week of entitlement is due to some unem­
ployed classifying themselves as non-registered unemployed under the cate­
gory ‘"other economic activities” . Rounding error in the replies seems here 
not a good explanation, given that the year would seem the most likely figure 
to round responses to but the dummy for 0 weeks of entitlement left is not 
even significantly different from zero for the exit into full-time work.
Finally, it is interesting to notice that all but one of the benefit duration 
dummies that are statistically significant are also significantly different from 
the preceding and following dummy, as shown in Table 6.5. This implies 
that the impact of the expected exhaustion of entitlement to unemployment 
benefit is different in at least some of the time intervals considered. The 
robustness of the estimated entitlement duration effect is tested below.
The baseline hazard for the exit into full-time work is plotted in Fig­
ure 6.5. The baseline of the estimated model presented in Chapter 5 (see 
Figure 5.1), where the entitlement effect was not controlled for, is also plot-
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Table 6.5: The significance of the differences between the estimated coeffi­
cients of the benefit entitlement duration dummy
Benefit duration dummy fln “ An S E (0 n -  /?m)
Full-time exit
-6-10 weeks, -5-1 weeks 0.78* 0.36
-5-1 weeks, 0 weeks 0.55 0.729
0 weeks, +1-3 weeks 0.37 0.74
+1-3weeks, +4 weeks-oo 0.10 0.35
Other states exit
-6-10 weeks, -5-1 weeks 0.69 0.59
-5-1 weeks 0 weeks 2.39* 0.76
0 weeks, +1-3 weeks 1.93* 0.75
+ 1-3weeks, +4 weeks-oo 0.75* 0.48
A * indicates significance at the two sic ed
5% level.
ted for comparison purposes. The estimated coefficients on the weekly steps 
of the baseline hazard are given in Table 8.11 in the Appendix.
The tw’o estimated baselines follow a similar pattern over time. Spikes in 
the hazard are found at the same points in time as before14. However, if the 
effect of the limited duration of UB is controlled for (with the UB entitlement 
duration dummies), the spikes after w’eek forty are smaller in size. Part of 
the variation over time is captured by the UB entitlement duration dummies. 
The estimated coefficients of the weekly baseline for the exit to other states 
are not significantly different from zero. The baseline for the exit to other 
states is. therefore, not plotted.
Som e sensitiv ity  analysis
It seems interesting to compare the results obtained here with those of the 
corresponding single risk model15 since many of the previous studies were 
carried out in a single risk framework of analysis. This is done in Table 6.6 
together with other types of sensitivity tests. All the estimated coefficients 
on the UB entitlement duration dummies in the single risk model are sig­
nificantly different from zero and positive. The dummy for the last week of 
entitlement to UB is more than twice the size of the other dummies. How­
ever. we know that most of this impact is due to exit into states other than
14The significance of any spike in the baseline was discussed in Section 4.4.2 of Chapter 
4. where a simpler model was estimated.
l5The likelihood function for this model is given by Equation 3.34 of Chapter 3.
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Figure 6.5: Baseline with/without benefit entitlement duration dummies
full-time work. This confirms the importance of distinguishing the exit states 
out of unemployment whenever the data available allow' one to do so.
The main model of Table 6.4 was re-estimated without the dummy for 
recipients of “only UB” (Model (1) of Table 6.6). A likelihood ratio test, 
in the last column of Table 6.6, indicates that the null hypothesis that the 
estimated coefficient on this dummy is not significantly different from zero 
cannot be rejected. The significance and the sign of the estimated coefficients 
on the set of time varying dummies for the duration of entitlement to IJB are 
not affected by the exclusion of this dummy from the model. The magnitude 
of the estimated coefficients on the entitlement duration dummies does not 
change substantially.
The model was then estimated with an additional time varying dummy 
taking value one from week 11 (corresponding to the observed commence­
ment of the unemployment spell because of the left truncation problem) to 
week 41 for recipients of only UB (Model (2)). The addition of this variable 
allows the baseline hazard rate to shift for recipients of “only UB” from the 
commencement of the unemployment spell rather than from week 42. The 
estimated coefficient on this additional variable is statistically not significant 
for any of the two competing risks exits. A likelihood ratio test of Model 
(2) against Model (1) indicates that the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
on the additional variable is not significantly different from zero cannot be
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rejected16.
Model (3) has only the entitlement duration dummies (and the weekly 
“pieces” of the baseline hazard rate) as explanatory variables of the model. 
The interest of estimating such a model is to check whether there is any 
significant change in the estimated coefficients on the entitlement duration 
dummies. The significance and the sign of the estimated coefficients is not 
affected except for the coefficient of the dummy “week 0 to week 41”, which 
becomes significant for the hazard of exit into full-time work. Also, the sign 
of the estimated coefficient on the dummy “week 47-51" (not significant) 
becomes now negative for the full-time work hazard. The magnitude of 
the estimated coefficients does not change substantially, at least for those 
coefficients that are statistically significant (except for the coefficient on the 
dummy “week 0-41” in the full-time hazard).
In model (4), the baseline hazard rate is allowed to vary every two weeks 
rather than each week. I am interested in whether changes in the specification 
of the baseline hazard rate affect the estimated coefficients on the benefit 
duration dummies.
16Model (2) does not contain the dummy for receipt of “UB only” among the regressors 
since, when the time varying dummy ‘‘week 0 to week 41” is added to the model, the set 
of time varying dummies for the UB entitlement duration left and the dummy for receipt 
of “only UB” become highly collinear. This is the reason why model (2) is compared with 
model (1) rather than with the “Base” model.
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Table 6.6: Sensitivity analysis
Estimated
Model
(Same covari- 
ates as main 
model)
- 9-52 weeks
Unemployment 
- 6-10 weeks
Benefit entitle1 
- 5-1 weeks
ment durati 
0 weeks
on Dummies 
+ 1-3 weeks + 4~oo
Max. 
Loglik.
! Base Model, f*t
Base Model, 
oth
0.93130 
(0.2452) 
0.5486
(0.6013)
0.1513 
(0.2768) 
1-2464*
(0.3880)
0.6993 
(0.6799) 
3.63170
(0.6735)
0.3488 
(0.3074) 
1.70340
(0.4178)
0.5463 
(0.2051) 
0.95190
(0.3490)
-6142.7
Single risk 
model
O.86950
(0.2268)
0.4 84 5 0
(0.2183)
1.757O0
(0-4744)
0.87410 
(0.2258)
O.7O7O0
(0.1689)
-5656.3
tiodel (1), f-t, 
Model ( l ) t oth.
O.86620
(0-2404)
0.4349
(0.5924)
0.1049 
(0.2724 )
1.13680 
(0.3740)
0.6652
(0.6783)
3.51450
(0.6637)
0.3153
(0.3047)
1.6OO60 
(0.4050)
O.5O730
(0.2002)
0.64180 
(0.3320)
-6143.7 
M (l), Base 
M
X? = 2
Model (2), /-< 
Model (2), oth
-0.0905 
(0.0943) 
-0.2170 
(0.1918)
0.84 08 0 
(0.24 50) 
0.3316 
(0.6003)
0.0608
(0.2762)
1.O2940
(0.3862)
0.6088
(0.6814)
3.41470
(0.6704)
0.2583
(0.3109)
1-48640
(0.4187)
O.45580 
(0.2078) 
0.734 9 0 
(0.3467)
-6142.6 
M(2), M (l) 
X2 = 2.2
Model (3). ft
i
Model (3), oth
-O.19290 
(0.0765) 
-0.1833
(0.1626)
O.66950
(0.2417)
0.3362
(0.5924)
-0.1152 
(0.2732) 
1.05330
(0.3754 )
0.4976
(0.6836)
S.52770
(0.6477)
0.1271
(0.2976)
1.61340
(0.3640)
O.4O680
(0.1945)
O.68320
(0.3089)
• 6306.1 
M(3), M(2)
331.0
Model (4), f ’t 
Model (4), oth
-0.0901 
(0.0943) I 
-0.2126 | 
(0.1917) |
0.75240 
(0.2324) 
0.2369 
(0.5723)
0.0680
(0.2735)
O.94S40
(0.3726)
0.3795 
(0.6252) 
1.95470 
(0.5996)
0.3229 
(0.3046) 
1.6666* 
(0.3971)
0.4452* 
(0.2065) 
G.79120 
(0.3434) 1
-6170.0 
hi(4). M(2) 
Xl< = 54.8
Weibuli, f-t 
Weibuli param­
e­
ter exp(-O.SS)0 
(SE 0.13) 
Weibuli. oth 
Weibuli param- 
t *
ter erpf-0.71)m
(SE 0.32) !
• 0.1637 
(0.1669)
-0.4433 
(0.4217)
\
1.1673*
(0.4114)
1!
0.113* ■ 
(1.0646) j
\
!
i
0.2316 
(0.4470)
2.2906*
(1.0697)
0.0760
(1.0253)
3.5466 0 
(1.6216)
0.6174
(0.5081)
3.29530 
(1.3758)
0.6565 i 
(0.3732) |
i
1.7266 j 
(0.9652)
-6210.4
The base model is the model of Table 6.4• The only Uti dummy taking value one for the recipients oj only UB (which 
was however not significantly different from zero) is dropped from model (1), (2), (3), (4). (5). Model (1) is the same 
as the base model except for the exclusion of this UUB only” dummy from the regressors. Model (2) is the same as
model (I) except for the inclusion of the dummy “Week G-4/", which takes value one from week 1 to week 41 for the 
I recipients of only VB. Model (3) has only the time varying dummies “time left to exhaustion of UB" as regressors and a 
• weekly baseline. Model (4) is the same as model (2) but the baseline hazard rate is allowed to vary each two weeks rather 
| than each week as in the base model, in model (I), (2) and (3). Standard errors tn brackets. A 0 indicate statistical 
j significance at the two-sided 5% level. uf-t*' stands for full-time work exit, **oth*' stands for other states exit. Likelihood 
' ratio tests between the two models indicated are given tn the last column.
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From Table 6.6, it emerges that the statistical significance, the sign and 
the magnitude of these coefficients do not change substantially except for 
the coefficients on the last week of entitlement (week 52). The coefficients 
on the last week of entitlement, for both hazards of exit into full-time work 
and into other states, are in model (4) almost half the size than the corre­
sponding coefficients in model (2). In particular, the estimated coefficient 
on the last week of entitlement for the other states hazard indicates that the 
other exits hazard increases during the last week of UB entitlement for “only 
UB” recipients by seven times according to model (4) and by about 34 times 
according to model (2).
I have then estimated a Weibull model (see Table 6.6). The sign of the 
estimated coefficients on the benefit duration dummies is the same as in 
model (2). The significance and the magnitude of the estimated coefficients 
are quite different from those of model (2). In particular, the estimated coef­
ficients of the other states hazard rate are larger in magnitude than in model 
(2). The estimated coefficients on the last dummy (“+  4 weeks onwards) is 
not significant in any of the two exits, while it was significant for both exits in 
model (2). Significant negative time dependency is detected in both hazards. 
One would expect the Weibull model to shed a more considerable amount of 
unobserved heterogeneity than the piecewise linear model (see Section 4.6).
I conclude that the estimated coefficients on the benefit entitlement dura­
tion dummies are quite robust, though the estimates are sensitive to different 
specification of the baseline hazard rate17. There is robust evidence that the 
expected exhaustion of the insurance benefit (UB) raises the hazard rate of 
the ‘‘only UB” unemployed to a higher level near the time of benefit exhaus­
tion. In particular, the hazard of exiting into states other than full-time work 
increases more than the full-time job hazard, as the expected exhaustion of 
UB nears.
6.5.3 A re th e  two benefit recip ients groups signifi­
cantly  different?
1 have estimated the model separately for the two groups of benefit re c ip ­
ients. 1 am interested in the detection of differences in the hazard rates of 
the two groups. Following the theoretical predictions, the hazard rate for 
the recipients of ‘‘only UB” should show larger spikes near the time of ben­
efit exhaustion, while the baseline hazard rate for recipients of SB (with or 
without UB) should be smoother.
The results of estimation for the explanatory variables18 and for the exit 
into full-time work are given in Table 8.12 in the Appendix. The estimated 
hazard rates for a representative person19, for both groups of benefit recip-
''This might indicate the presence of unobserved heterogeneity which should be taken 
care of. in future work.
*°The benefit duration dummies are then dropped from the model.
1!*The representative individual is constructed assuming that all continuous variables
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Figure 6.6: Hazard rates. Full-time work exit
ients and for exit into full-time work are plotted in Figure 6.6. The corre­
sponding hazards for exit into other states are plotted in Figure 6.5.3.
The estimated baseline hazard for recipients of “only UB” shows larger 
spikes and more variability than the estimated baseline hazard for the other 
benefit recipients. The behaviour of the unemployed that receive only UB at 
the first interview —which is the best approximation of the starting time of 
the unemployment spell, allowed for by the LSUS data— is more sensitive 
to the elapsing of time than the behaviour of the unemployed receiving SB. 
However, part of this difference is due to the smaller number of the ‘'only 
UB" unemployed.
take their mean value; the dummies for whether the unemployed is “married” and he has 
“any child aged less than five” take value one; all the other dummies are set to zero; i. e. 
the unemployed person is in the base group for these dummies.
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Figure 6.7: Hazard rates. Other states exit
The null hypothesis that the two groups of benefit recipients are not dif­
ferent in their (conditional) probabilities of leaving unemployment is rejected 
on the basis of a likelihood ratio test ( x ^  =  186.8). This result confirms 
that the type of benefit received at about the commencement of the unem­
ployment spell might affect substantially the individual probability of leaving 
unemployment.
I have also tested how different levels of savings (and debt) affect the 
behaviour of the two groups of the unemployed. Indeed, the two groups 
have very different distributions of savings, as shown in Section 6.4.2. I am 
interested in the unemployed's savings more than in the unemployed’s debt 
since the award of SB is determined on the basis of the unemployed’s level 
of savings.
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I test the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the additional variables 
for the levels of savings and debt are not significantly different from zero by 
means of a likelihood ratio test.
Table 6.7: The impact of savings on the hazard rates of two groups
Variable
label
Recipients 
Full-time work
of only UB
Other exits
S B / joint S 
Full-time work
'B and UB
Other exits
Total savings,in 
100 £
Total debt, in 100 
£
-0.0012 (0.0010) 
0.0009 (O.OOSt)
-0.0012 (0.0013) 
0.0054 (0.0053)
0.0004 (0.0032) 
-0.0049* (0.0025)
o .o o te  ( 0.0041)
-0.0027 (0.0043)
Max. log-lik. 
Lik. ratio test
-£326.9 
x l -  3.6
-3636.1 
XÎ =  37.8
The estimated models are the same as those of Table 8.I t, except for the inclusion of the savings 
and debt variables. The baseline hazard rates arc allowed to vary each week. Descriptive statistics 
of explanatory variables ire provided »n the Table 6.1. A * indicates statistical significance at the 
two-sided 5% level. Standard errors are given in brackets. The likelihood ratio tests are carried 
out agatnst the models of Table 8.12.
The estimated coefficients on levels of savings and debt are reported in 
Table 6.720. None of them is significantly different from zero except for the 
coefficient on the debt variable for the full-time work hazard of the “SB 
with or without UB” group. The negative sign on this coefficient is perhaps 
due to the fact that debt proxies access to credit and access to credit has a 
positive impact on the reservation wage. Also, debt may proxy low skill or 
low motivation (for this group).
According to the likelihood ratio tests, the null hypothesis that the ad­
ditional variables (savings and debt levels) have a non-zero impact on the 
hazard rate cannot be rejected for the “only UB group” but it can be re­
jected for the “SB with or without UB” group. On the basis of these results 
one would conclude that the hazard rate of the “only UB" unemployed is 
not affected bv their levels of savings (or debt). Similarly, the hazard of the 
"SB with or without UB” group is not affected by the unemployed's savings. 
It is instead affected to a minor extent by the unemployed's debt. These 
results would suggest that allowing for the impact of savings (and debt) on 
the hazard rate does not affect the estimates of the benefit duration effect. 
However, the impact of savings on the hazard rate is analysed more in depth 
in Chapter 7.
?0The savings and debt variables relate to one month before the commencement of the 
unemployment spell. This reference time is chosen in order to avoid potential endogeneity 
problems. The analysis of the relationship between the unemployed's financial resources 
and the (conditional) probability of leaving unemployment is the subject of Chapter 7, to 
which the reader is referred.
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6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have estimated the relationship between the potential dura­
tion of entitlement to the national insurance benefit (UB) and the probability 
of leaving unemployment.
My conclusion is that there is some evidence that the hazard rate of 
“only UB” recipients rises near the time of exhaustion of entitlement to UB. 
However, the estimated size of the impact of the expected exhaustion of 
benefit entitlement is sensitive to the specification of the baseline hazard 
adopted. There is a larger effect of the expected benefit entitlement duration 
on the other states hazard than on the full-time job hazard. This finding 
highlights further the importance of using competing risks specifications of 
the hazard rate.
Future studies should aim at gathering more evidence on the impact of 
the expected exhaustion of the benefit on the re-employment probability. 
The issue is especially important in light of the 1993 Budget announcement 
that the duration of UB will be cutted down to six months since 1995.
In order to draw firm economic policy conclusions a larger sample size is 
probably needed.
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Chapter 7
The unemployed’s financial 
resources and the probability 
of re-employment
7.1 Introduction
The impact of different levels of savings and debt on the individual re­
employment probability is a neglected area of research. Most developed 
economies provide some social assistance in terms of financial support to the 
unemployed, presumably on the assumption that unemployed persons may 
experience financial hardship and that they may face borrowing constraints. 
In spite of this, there is very limited evidence on the level of financial re­
sources of the unemployed and on whether the levels of financial resources 
influence the duration of the unemployment spell.
In the simplest model of job search, the assumption of risk neutrality leads 
to the specification of the objective function of the unemployed in terms of 
income maximization rather than in terms of the maximization of the utility 
derived from income. Under this set up, only the difference in expected 
future income streams is expected to affect the duration of unemployment and 
the unemployed's level of financial resources plays no role. However, if the 
assumption of risk neutrality is relaxed, the level of financial resources might 
exercise an influence on the probability of leaving unemployment. It has been 
argued that higher degrees of risk aversion result in a lower reservation wage 
and a shorter unemployment spell (Kohn and Shavell (1974) and Pissarides 
(1974)). One would expect that higher levels of savings (given a certain 
degree of risk aversion) raise the reservation wage. Savings can be used to 
support living standards during unemployment and higher savings allow the 
unemployed to be more “choosy” about accepting job offers.
I study the impact of the unemployed's financial resources on the individ­
ual re-employment probability using the the LSUS data. These data contain 
rich information on the unemployed’s levels of savings and debt. I also look
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at the impact on the re-employment probability of redundancy payments 
and other once-off payments associated with the commencement of the un­
employment spell. These payment may be seen as an (unexpected) increase 
in the level of savings.
A drawback of the analysis is that the unemployed may misreport the 
levels of their savings and debt. In particular, the level of savings might be 
affected by misreporting because the unemployed might fear that they may 
be used by the interviewers to check their entitlement to the means-tested 
social assistance benefit, SB. There is, however, no evidence in this sense.
The structure of the Chapter is the following. In Section 7 .2 ,1 review the 
existing theory (and evidence) and discuss the expected impact of financial 
resources on the re-employment probability. Next, in Section 7.3 the data 
are described. I present some descriptive analysis of the levels of savings and 
debt reported by the unemployed at different points in time. The results 
of estimation are discussed in Section 7.4. Alternative specifications of the 
savings and debt variables are tried out. The last Section concludes.
7.2 The theoretical framework
The literature on the relationship between the financial resources of the un­
employed and the probability of leaving unemployment is very limited. In 
the simplest job search model, the assumption of risk neutrality of the job 
seeker prevents one from allowing non-labour income and financial wealth 
to affect the individual re-employment probability. If the assumption of risk 
neutrality is relaxed, one would expect that higher levels of financial wealth 
result in higher reservation wages and longer unemployment durations, for a 
given degree of risk aversion.
Kohn and Shavell (1974) and Pissarides (1974) argued (within the frame­
work of job search theory) that the more the unemployed are risk averse the 
lower is their reservation wage. This implies a negative relationship between 
higher degrees of risk aversion and the duration of unemployment. Feinberg 
(1976) tested empirically this hypothesis by means of multiple regression 
analysis, using the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The author prox- 
ied risk aversion using replies to questions on conditions of car, having car 
insurance, use of seat belts, cigarette smoking, savings available. He con­
cluded that risk aversion has a significantly negative impact on the expected 
duration of unemployment. The work of Feinberg is about the only empirical 
work on savings and unemployment duration of which I am aware. Other 
studies are for example MacKay and Reid (1972), who allowed for the im­
pact of redundancy payments on the probability of leaving unemployment, 
although this was not their focus of interest. Their work relates to the UK.
The issue of savings and unemployment duration was instead explicitly 
tackled by loannides (1981), although from a different point of view than 
that of the present study. The author modelled the relation between sav-
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mgs and unemployment duration in a job search framework and focusing on 
the dissavings (savings) induced by unemployment (employment). Ioannides 
(1981) concluded that, under the assumption of a perfect capital market, the 
steady state rates of savings during periods of employment and of dissavings 
during periods of unemployment are independent of wealth and constant. In 
this model savings are an endogeneous variable and the capital market is 
assumed to be perfect.
More interesting for the purpose of the applied analysis carried out in 
this Chapter is the work of Danforth (1979), who relates the unemployed’s 
decision to accept a given job offer to their financial endowments. Danforth 
(1979) develops a job search model in which the unemployed are assumed 
to maximize the utility they derive from consumption rather than from in­
come. Within this framework, assuming additively separable utility function 
and decreasing absolute risk aversion, the author proves the following three 
propositions:
• higher levels of wealth result in lower acceptance probabilities, i. e. “the 
rich are more selective” (Danforth, 1979, p. I l l ) ;
• an increase in the level of wealth raises the expected duration of un­
employment; i. e. “the rich search longer” (Danforth, 1979, p. I l l ) ;
• expected returns from search increase with increased search time, i. e. 
“the rich get richer” (Danforth, 1979, p. 111).
Danforth (1979) does not provide any empirical test of these propositions.
To sum up, according to the theoretical predictions the impact of financial 
wealth on the re-employment probability is negative, for a given degree of 
risk aversion. However, higher degrees of risk aversion result in a lower 
reservation wage and a shorter unemployment duration (Kohn and Shavell, 
1974 and Pissarides, 1974).
I estimate here the impact of savings and debt on the re-employment 
probability. The level of savings represents a measure of the unemployed's 
financial wealth. However, it may also proxy risk aversion since more risk 
averse individuals are likely to save more. I allow for the impact of uonce- 
off” payments such as redundancy payments on the individual-remployment 
probability. These payments represent an (unexpected) increase in the un­
employed’s level of wealth. Following the second of Danforth’s propositions, 
increases in the unemployed’s level of wealth affect negatively the individ­
ual re-employment probability and result in longer expected unemployment 
durations. Instead, higher levels of debt may raise the unemployed’s search 
intensity and lead to shorter unemployment durations (all things equal). 
However, debt may also proxy access to credit. The unemployed that have 
access to credit can afford to be more choosy about accepting job offers and 
may therefore have higher reservation wages (and longer expected unemploy­
ment durations).
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7.3 A description of the data
7.3.1 Som e d escrip tive analysis o f  th e  savings and  
debt o f  th e  unem ployed
The LSUS survey is very rich in information on the financial situation of the 
unemployed. The principal objective of this survey was, as stated by the 
survey planners:
“to flesh out discussions of the financial situation of the un­
employed people by looking at the implications of levels of income, 
savings and debts for the material living standards of the families 
concerned. A particular focus of interest was the extent to which 
living standards change during a spell of unemployment ” (Heady 
and Smith, 1989, p. 1).
The unemployed and their spouses were asked many questions on the 
types and amounts of savings accumulated or debt run up. The questions 
covered the situation one month before the commencement of the unemploy­
ment spell and aftei the commencement of the unemployment spell. I have 
constructed total savings and debt variables using the information contained 
in the survey as follows.
The savings of the unemployed at different points in time have ueen de­
fined as the total amount of money held under any of the following forms:
• a bank current account,
• a bank deposit account or bank savings account.
• a Post Office Giro account,
• a National Savings Bank account at the Post Offict,
• a Trustee Savings Bank account,
• a building society account,
• stock shares or other securities.
• Premium bonds,
• a Christmas Club,
• any other form of savings.
I have computed a separate variable for the amounts of any “once-off 
payments” such as redundancy payments or “pay in lieu of notice” received 
just before the commencement of the unemployment spell.
The total level of debt of the unemployed at different points in time was 
computed summing up debt run up under the following forms:
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• informal debt, money owed to friends or relatives,
• institutional debt, money owed to
— a money lender, pawnbroker,
— a bank, under a personal loan agreement and/or as an overdraft,
— a finance house,
— a credit card company,
— any other person or organization.
• arrears debt, defined as any arrears with
— mortgage, payments, including any endowment policy on the mort­
gage
— rent payments
— rate, water rate or sewerage payments
— gas and electricity bills
— HP payments
— insurance premiums, excluding any endowment policy on mort­
gage,
— any other household bills, such as telephone bills,
— any other regular payments.
I have constructed a separate variable for the amount of mortgage capital 
outstanding, if any. at the first interview.
Summary descriptive statistics of the savings and debt reported by the 
unemployed are presented below. I consider two times for the purpose of 
comparison: one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell 
and at the first interview. I look at the net change in the level of individual 
resources passing from one point in time to the next. Next, the resources 
reported by the spouse (if any) of the unemployed are analysed.
Some unemployed refused to reply to questions corfcerning their savings 
and/or debt. These were very few unemployed (less than 1% of the sample) 
and they are coded as if they had reported zero amounts. Some unemployed 
that reported extremely large amounts of savings or debt (greater than 6 
figures in £ )  were coded by the survey planners as “-2”. They are also very 
few (2 cases) and I have recoded them as if reporting zero amounts1. Overall 
the unemployed in these two categories represent much less than 1% of the 
sample, at any time. There should be no large (additional) error introduced 
since it is not possible to exclude that some of the unemployed that reported 
zero amounts of savings were actually misreporting larger amounts.
‘They are however excluded from the econometric analysis which is carried out in 
Chapter 7.
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Table 7.1: The amounts of savings before and after the commencement of the
unemployment spell
upper bounds Percentage of the unemployed that reported such amounts
amounts reported One month before U At thie first interview
I in £ % % n cum. % (*) % % C ) cum. % (*)
1 0 36.2 42
< 10 8.5 13.8 13.8 13.2 22.8 22.6
< 100 11.3 18.3 32.1 11.1 19.2 42
< 300 10.6 17.2 49.3 7 12 54
< 500 5.9 9.6 58.9 2.7 4-7 56.7
< 1000 6 9.7 68.6 5.5 9.5 66.2
< 1500 3.6 5.8 744 3.1 5.3 73.5
< 2000 3.4 5.5 79.9 2.3 4 77.5
< 3000 2.8 4.5 844 2 3.5 81
< 4000 2.3 3.7 88.1 2.2 3.8 64.8
< 5000 1.6 2.6 90.7 1.2 2 66.6
< 10000 2.3 3.7 944 2.6 4-S 91.6
1 < 15000 1.1 1.9 96.3 2.5* 2.6 944
< 20000 0.7 1.2 97.5 0.9 1.6 96
< 25000 0.6 1 98.5 1.1 1.6 97.6
< 50000 0.6 1 99.5 0.9 1.6 994
> 50000 0.3 0.5 100 04 0.6 100
; The tab It relates to the subsample of male participants in both sample interviews (2035 units, see Section 2.4-1).
The (*) indicates that the percentage u  taken over the observations that report positive savings.
The amounts of total savings reported by the unemployed (not consider­
ing the amounts reported by their spouses) one month before the commence­
ment of the unemployment spell and about three months into the spell are 
described in table 7.1. About 38% of the unemployed report having no sav­
ings one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell. About 
8.5% report small positive amounts of savings of less than £10, at the same 
date. These small amounts of savings reflect probably transaction balances 
held in accounts rather than in the pocket. About 11% of the unemployed re­
port positive amounts of savings larger than £10 and smaller than £100, one 
month before the commencement of the unemployment spell. Almost 11% 
report positive amounts larger than «£'100 and smaller than .£’300. Almost 
6% report positive amounts larger than £300 and less than £'500. Overall, 
almost 35% of the unemployed report positive amounts of savings of less than 
£500 one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell.
The unemployed with savings larger than £500 and less than £1000 are 
6%. Almost 10% of the unemployed report savings larger than £1000 and 
less than £3000. The reader should perhaps be reminded that £3000 corre­
spond to the threshold level of the savings of the nuclear family below which 
the unemployed would gain entitlement to the means-tested unemployment 
benefit in 1982 (if they had passed the income test)2. Overall, about 50%
2The award of SB is conditional on passing both an income test and an assets test. 
The reference period is taken to be 1982 since all the information on benefit receipt at the
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of the unemployed report positive amounts of savings of less than £3000, 
one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell. Including 
also the unemployed reporting no savings at the same date, the correspond­
ing figure becomes about 90%. The proportion of the unemployed reporting 
amounts of savings larger than £3000 is about 10% one month before the 
commencement of the unemployment spell.
Almost half (46.9%) of the unemployed with positive amounts of savings 
at the first interview report savings of less than £3000. Overall (including 
the zero amounts) 89% of the unemployed report amounts of sayings lower 
than £3000 at the first interview.
About four percent less of the unemployed report having any savings 
after the commencement of their unemployment spell: the percentage of the 
unemployed that report no savings (of any type) is 38.2% one month before 
the commencement of the unemployment spell and 42% three months into 
the spell. Instead, the number of the unemployed with savings of less than 
£10 increases by abcut 5% at the first interview (three months into the 
unemployment spell). The number of the unemployed with savings greater 
than £100 but less £5000 decreases slightly at the first interview relative to 
one month before the commencement of the observed unemployment spell. 
Instead, the number of the unemployed with savings larger than £5000 goes 
up by about 2%. This is probably explained by the receipt of redundancy or 
severance payments.
Table 7.2: The amounts of once-off payments
Upper bounds Percentage of the unemployed that re­
ported such amounts
in / 9f % (V | c«m. % ( m)
0 56.4
< 10 0.1 0.2 0.2
< 100 S.fi 20.1 20.3
< 300 11.1 25.5 45.6
< 500 3.7 6.5 54.3
< 1000 4.1 \ 9'4 63.7
< 1500 2.3 | 69.0
< sooo 1-f ! J.T 72.7
< 3000 2.4 5.4 76.1
< 4000 1.6 4-0 62.1
< 5000 1.7 3.6 65.9
< iOOOO 3.0 6.7 92.6
< 15000 1.1 2.5 95.1
< 20000 1.1 2.5 97.6
> 20000 1.1 2.5 100
The table relates to the subsample oj male participants in
both sample interviews (203$ units, see Section 2.4-1)- The
(*) indicates that the percentage is taken over the non-2ero
observations.
first interview is collected in 1982 amounts, which were in force until November 1983. .
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Descriptive statistics of the amounts of redundancy payments and other 
“once-off” payments are given in Table 7.2. These payments are due to the 
ending of a work contract: they go from redundancy and severance payments 
to pay in lieu of notice and “week in hand”. About 43% of the sample report 
to have received some “once-off” payment just before the commencement of 
their unemployment spell. However, the majority (54%) of the unemployed 
with positive “once-off’ payments reports payments of less than £500. These 
small amounts are “week in hand” or “pay in lieu of notice” payments. Some 
of the unempoyed report instead much larger amounts. For instance, about 
6% (of those that report positive “once-off” payments) report amounts larger 
than £10000. These large amounts are redundancy or severance payments.
The total amounts of debt run up with friends, relatives, financial insti­
tutions and being in arrears with one’s payments are shown in Table 7.3. 
Almost 50% of the unemployed report some debt one month before the be­
ginning of their unemployment spell and almost 60% report some debt three 
months into the unemployment spell (at the time of the first interview). The 
majority of the unemployed that are in debt owes amounts of money not 
larger than £500, at the two times considered. About 90% of them reports 
amounts of debt not larger than £3000 and about 95% not larger than £5000, 
at any time considered.
Table 7.3: The amounts of total debt run up
Upper bounds Percentage of the unemployed that reported such amounts
amounts reported One month before U At the first interview
»n £ 9f % C ) cum. % (*) % % (*) cum. % (*)
0 53.7 41-6
< 10 0.3 0.7 0.7 1.3 2.3 2.3
< 100 6.2 ¡7.7 16.4 13.7 23.5 25.6
< 300 ¡1.4 24.6 43.0 13.6 23.6 j 49.4
< 500 6.3 13.6 56.6 6.9 U .8 61.2
< ¡000 * ¡7.3 73.9 10.5 ¡6.0 79.2
< ¡500 S.* \ * * 62.1 3.5 6.0 65.2
< 2000 \1 A1 *■ 4-3 66.4 2.4 4-1 69.3
< 3000 £.5 j\ 5-4 91.6 2.5 4-2 93.5
< 4000 1.2 ' 2.6 94-4 1.3 2.2 95.7
< 5000 0.7 1.5 95.9 0.7 1.2 96.9
< 10000 0.9 J.9 97.6 0.9 1.5 96.4
< 15000 0.4 0.9 96.7 0.4 0.7 99.1
< 20000 0.2 0.4 99.1 0.1 0.2 99.3
< 25000 0.1 0.2 99.3 0.1 0.2 99.5
< 50000 0.3 0.7 ¡00 0.3 0.5 100
> 50000 0 0 ¡00 0 0 100
The table relates to the maie participants m botk sample interviews. the (*) indicates
that the percentage is taken over the non-zero’s observations. Total debt is defined as
the sum of informal, institutional and arrears debt. The debt run by the spouses u  not
taken into account m thts table.
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Next, I look at the amounts of debt of different types reported. I distin­
guish informal debt (with friens and relatives) from institutional debt (with 
banks or other financial institutions) and arrears with payments. In table 7.4, 
I show the amounts of informal and institutional debt reported by the unem­
ployed. About 11% of the unemployed owe money to friends and/or relatives 
one month before the commencement of their unemployment spell. The cor­
responding figure three months into the spell is almost 20%. The majority of 
the unemployed that report owing some money to friends and/or relatives, 
have borrowed amounts of less than £300 (respectively, 56.4% one month 
before unemployment and 68.2% about three months into the spell). About 
90% of the unemployed with “informal debt” have borrowed from friends and 
relatives sums of not more than £1000. Overall, the amounts of debt run up 
with friends and relatives are quite small. However, the number of the un­
employed in debt with their friends and relatives increases (almost doubles) 
three months into the unemployment spell relative to one month before the 
commencement of the unemployment spell.
The number of the unemployed that run “institutional debt” is larger 
than the number of the unemployed in “informal debt”. The number of the 
unemployed in debt with some financial institutions is about 31% one month 
before the commencement of the unemployment spell. The same figure is 
about 35%, after three months of unemployment, at the first survey interview. 
However, the majority (about 53% one month before the commencement of 
the unemployment spell and about 58% three months into the spell) of those 
reporting some debt with financial institutions owes sums not larger than 
£500. About 70% of them report owing sums not larger than £1000 and 
about 90%. not larger than £3000.
The amounts of arrears with payments reported are illustrated in ta ­
ble 7.5. The proportion of the unemployed that reports to be in arrears with 
some payments is about 19% one month before the beginning of the unem­
ployment spell. The corresponding figure three months into the spell is about 
34% . About 40% of the unemployed are in arrears with their payments for 
not more than £100 and about 80% for not more than £300, at the two 
points in time. Very few unemployed are in arrears with their payments for 
more than £1000. at the two times considered. From the table, it emerges 
that the number of people that are in arrears with some payments (see list of 
arrears payments above) is 15% higher, passing from one month before the 
commencement of the unemployment spell to three months into the spell. 
The number of the unemployed that are in arrears with their payments is al­
most doubled three months after the commencement of their unemployment 
spells.
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Table 7.4: Institutional and informal debt before and after the commencement
of the unemployment spell
INFORMAL Percentage of the unemployed that reported such amounts
D EBT
Upper bounds, One month before U At the first interview
in £ % * n cum. % (*) % % (*) cum. % (*)
0 89 79.9
< 10 0.2 1.8 1.8 1.5 7.5 7.5
< 100 2.6 23.6 15.4 7.2 35.8 43.3
< 300 3-4 31 56.4 5 24.9 68.2
< $00 1.7 15.5 71.9 2.6 12.9 81.1
< 1000 1.7 15.5 87.4 2.1 10.4 91.5
< 1500 0.4 3.6 91 0.5 2.5 94-0
< 2000 0.3 2.7 93.7 0.3 1.5 95.5
< 3000 0.3 2.7 96.4 0.4 2 97.5
< 4000 0 0 96.4 0.2 1 98.5
< 5000 0:3 2.7 99.1 0.2 1 99.5
< 10000 0.1 0.9 too 0.1 0.5 100
INSTITUTIONAL Percentage of the unemployei ! that reported such amounts
DEBT
Amounts reported One month before U At the first interview
in £ % % (*) cum. % (*) % % n cum. % (*)
0 68.9 65.3
< 10 0.5 1.6 1.6 1.3 3.7 3.7
< 100 4.5 145 16.1 6.4 18.4 22 1
< 300 6.6 22.0 36.1 8 23 45.1
< 500 4-6 14.6 52.9 4-7 13.6 56.7
< 1000 5.6 16.0 70.9 5.6 16.7 7 5.4
< 1500 2.4 7.3 78.2 2.6 7.5 82.9
< 2006 2 6-4 64.6 1.6 5.2 86.1
< 3006 1.6 5.6 90.4 1.5 4-3 92.4
< 4000 0.7 2.3 92.7 0.7 2.0 94-4
< 5000 0.4 1.3 94-0 0.4 1.2 95.6
< 10000 0.7 2.3 96.3 0.7 « 97.6
< 15000 0.4 1.3 97.7 0.3 0.9 96.5
< 20000 0.2 0.7 96.4 0.1 0.3m 96.6
< 25000 0.1 0.3 96.7 0.1 0.3 99.1
< 50000 0.3 1 99.7 0.3 0.9 100
> 50000 0.1 0.3 100 0 0 100
The table relates to the male participants in both sample interviews. The (*) in¿i*
cates that the percentage is taken over the non-zero fs observations. Informal debt
15 defined as the debt run up with friends and/or relatives. Institutional debt is de•
fined as above as debt run up with some financial tnjftfvfion« such as banks, building
societies, etc. etc. .
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Table 7.5: The amounts of arrears debt before and after the commencement
of the unemployment spell
Upper bounds Percentage of the unemployed that reported such amounts
amounts reported One month before U At the first interview
in £ % * n cum. % (*) % * C ) cum. % (*)0 81.2 66.6
< 10 0.3 1.6 1.6 1.1 3.3 3.3
< 100 7.4 39.4 41-0 14-8 44-3 47.6
< 300 6.8 36.2 77.2 11.2 33.5 81.1
< 500 1.9 10.1 87.3 2.6 7.8 88.8
< 1000 1.7 9 96.3 2.8 8.4 97.2
< 1500 0.5 2.7 99.0 0.5 1.6 98.8
< 2000 0.1 0.5 99.5 0.2 0.6 99.4
< 3000 0.1 0.5 100 0.2 0.6 100
The table relates to the male participants in both sample interviews. The (*) indu
cates that the percentage ij taken over the non-zero’s observations. Arrears debt is
defined as above as arrears with any types of payments. Debt run by the spouses is
not taken into account here.
In Table 7.6, I compare the unemployed’s “net savings” at the time of 
the first survey interview and one month before the commencement of the 
unemployment spell. I have computed the “net savings” of the unemployed 
at a given point in time by subtracting the total debt from the total savings, 
for the unemployed that reported positive amounts of savings or debt. The 
proportion of the unemployed that reported either non-zero amounts of sav­
ings or non-zero amounts of debt one month before the commencement of 
the unemployment spell is 80%. The corresponding figure at the first survey 
interview is 86.3% and at the second survey interview 78.9 %. The unem­
ployed that reported no savings nor debt at a given point in time have zero 
net balances. They are not included in the table below.
One month before the commencement of the unemployment spell, about 
35% of the unemployed have negative net balances. About 45% have positive 
balances at the same dale. About 20% of them have zero net balances, as 
already mentioned —this figure is not reported in the table. About 6% of 
the unemployed is in (net) debt for less than £100 one month before the 
commencement of the sampled unemployment spell. About 13% is in (net) 
debt for amounts larger than £100 and smaller than £500. About 6% is 
in debt for more than £500 and less than £1000. Overall, about 25% of 
the unemployed has negative (net) balances of less than £1000, one month 
before the commencement of their unemployment spell. Almost 10% of the 
unemployed has negative (net) balances of more than £1000, at the same 
date.
About 10% of the unemployed has positive net balances of less than £100, 
one month before the commencement of the their unemployment spell. About 
11% has positive net balances larger than £100 and smaller than £500. 
About 5% has positive net balances larger than £500 and less than £1000. 
Overall, about 26% of the unemployed has positive net balances smaller than
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£1000, one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell. 
Almost 9% has positive net balances larger than £1000 and smaller than 
£3000. Overall, about 17% of the sample has positive net balances larger 
than £1000.
The number of the unemployed in (net) debt is about 11% higher at the 
time of the first interview relative to one month before the commencement 
of the their unemployment spell. The proportion of the unemployed with 
(net) debt of more than £5000 is not much different at the two points in 
time. Instead, the number of the unemployed with debt of less than £1000 
has grown considerably (by about 11%) after the commencement of the un­
employment spell. In particular, the proportion of the unemployed that are 
in debt for small amounts of money, of less than £100, has almost doubled.
Table 7.6: The amounts of net savings before and after the commencement 
of the unemployment spell
Upper bound» Percentage of the unemployed thût reported such amounts
amounts reported One month before U At the first interview
x n £ % % n cum. % (*) % % n cum. % (*)
< -10000 0.6 i 1 0.6 0.9 0.9
< -5000 0.9 1.25 2.2 0.9 1.0 1.9
< -1000 6.2 i 0.2 12.4 9.6 I t .I 13.0
< -500 6.4 6.0 20.4 6.7 10.1 23.1
< -too 13.6 17.0 37.4 17.2 19.9 43.0
< 0 6 7.5 44-9 I t . 6 13.4 56.5
< too 10.4 13.0 57.9 9.0 10.4 66.9
< 500 11.3 14*1 72.0 6.5 7.5 74-4
< 1000 4-6 6.1 76.1 4-4 5.1 79.5
< 3000 6.7 j 10.* | 66.9 7.1 6.2 67.7
< 5000 3.4 j 4.2 ] 92.1 2.9 3.4 91.1
! < 10006 S.l :.e  | 94-t 2.6 3.0 94.1
> > 10006 i 3.4 | 4.2 j too 4.9 5.7 too
; The table relates to the male participants in both sample interviews. The (•)
1 indicates that the percentage 13 taken over the non-■zero's observatiionj. Net
{ savings are equal to total savtngs minus total debt. at a given point *n time.
. The unemployed that reported both zero amounts oj savings and zero amounts
: of debt (at a certain it t m e  ) are noi included tn the Table. These were 406 one
j month before the commencement of the unemployment spell and 261 at the
time of the first survey »ntfrriru.
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The proportion of the unemployed with positive net savings has gone 
down except for the unemployed that have (net) savings larger than £10000, 
whose number has slightly increased. This slight increase in the number of 
the unemployed with net savings of more than £10000 is likely to be due to 
the receipt of redundancy or severance payments. In Table 7.2, I show that 
about 3% of the unemployed received some “once-off” payments larger than 
£3000. This evidence seems to indicate that overall the financial situation 
of the unemployed has deteriorated since the commencement of their un­
employment spell except for the unemployed that received some “once-off” 
payments larger them £10000. Some evidence on the change in the individual 
level of net financial resources of the unemployed at the two points in time 
is presented in Table 7.8 below.
In Table 7 .7 ,1 distinguish two groups of the unemployed: the unemployed 
that exited from unemployment before the time of the second interview (with 
completed unemployment spells) and the unemployed that were still unem­
ployed at the second interview (with right-censored unemployment spells). I 
compare their “net savings” at the first survey interview.
Table 7.7: The net savings of the unemployed with completed or right-
censored unemployment spells
Upper bounds Percentage oj the unemployed that reported such amounts
amounts reported Completed spells Right-censored spells
in / % % n cum ■ % (*) % % n cum. % (*)
< -10000 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.2
< -5000 1.0 1.1 1.9 0.7 0.8 2.0
< -1000 10.4 11.9 13.6 6-4 10.0 12.0
< -500 8.7 9.9 23.7 6.7 10.4 22 4
< •100 17.0 19.4 4S.1 17.7 21.1 43.5
< 0 9.7 11.0 54-1 I4-S 16.9 60.4
< too 10.0 U.4 65.5 7.5 8.9 69.3
< 500 6.1 9.2 74.7 4.1 4.9 7 4.2
< 1000 4-7 5.4 80.1 4.0 4.6 7 9.0
< 3000 7.6 6.9 69.0 6.2 7.4 66.4
< 5000 3.2 3.6 92.6 2.5 3.0 69.4
< 10000 2.4 2.7 95.3 2.9 S.4 92.6
> 10000 4.0 4.e 100 6.1 7.3 100
The table relates to the male participants in both sample interviews. The
unemployed with completed spells oj unemployment are 1210. The unemployed
with right-censored unemployment spells are 825. The (*) indicates that the
percentage is taken over the non-zero 's observations. Net savings are equal to
total savings minus total debt, at a given point in time. The unemployed that
reported both zero amounts oj savings and zero amount* of debt (at a certain
time) are not included m the Table. These were 149 oj tht: unemployed with
completed spells and 132 oj the unemployed with right-censored spells. The
amounts reported by the spouses are inot considered in this table.
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The unemployed with completed unemployment spells are 1210 and about 
88% of them reported non-zero amounts of savings or debt at the time of the 
first interview. The unemployed with right-censored unemployment spells 
are 825 and about 84% of them reported non-zero amounts of savings or 
debt. The unemployed with zero net balances do not figure in the table 
below. They are 12% of the unemployed with completed spells and 16% of 
the unemployed with right-censored spell.
From Table 7.7, it emerges that the distribution of the “net savings” of the 
unemployed in the two groups does not differ substantially. The proportion 
of the unemployed with (net) debt is slightly higher among the right-censored 
group: about 60% of the right-censored group and about 54% of the com­
pleted spells group have negative assets balance at the time of the first survey 
interview. However, the proportion of the right-censored unemployed with 
net savings larger than £5000 is larger than that of the unemployed with 
completed unemployment spells.
Table 7.8: The change in net savings of the unemployed over time
Upper bounds Percentage of the unemployed that reported such
amounts
Absolute change net change tl net change t t
in £ % cum. % % cum. %
> - 5000 1.0 1.0 4-1 4-1
> - 3000 1.3 2.3 2.9 7.0
> - 1000 6.6 10.9 9.3 16.3
> - 500 7.6 16.5 6.7 23.0
> - 100 20.6 39.3 14-3 37.3
> - 10 12.7 52.0 6.5 45.6
< 0 1.5 53.5 7.6 53.4
0 17.7 71.2 1 0.6 54.0
< 10 1.5 72.7 2.0 56.0
< 100 6.3 61.0 10.2 66.2
< 500 7.7 66.7 15.4 61,6
< 1000 2.6 91.5 7.4 69.0
< 3000 3.2 94.7 6.3 95.3
< 5000 1.5 96,2 1.5 96.6
> 500C J 3.6 100.0 3.2 100,0
The table relates to the male parttctpants in both sample interviews.
The times tk. t l . t£ relate respectively to one month before the com• 
mencement of the unemployment spell, to the time oj the first inter­
view and to the ttme of the second interview. Net savings are equal 
to total savings mmvi total debt, at a given point m time. The ab­
solute change in net savings at the first interview ( t l ) is computed 
subtracting the net savings at time tk from the net savings at time t l . 
Similarly, the absolute change in net savings at the second interview 
(t2) is computed subtracting the net savings at time tl from the net 
j savings at ttme tk.
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Next, I look at the individual change in the level of net savings passing 
from one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell to the 
time of the first interview (three months into the spell) and from the time 
of the first interview to the time of the second interview (fifteen months into 
the spell). The results are summarized in Table 7.8.
About 53% of the unemployed experience a reduction in the level of their 
net financial resources passing from one month before the commencement 
of the unemployment spell to three months into the spell. About 1% of 
the unemployed sees their net financial balances decrease by less than £10. 
About 13% loses between 10 and 100 £ . About 21% loses between 100 and 
500 £ .  About 7% loses between 500 and 1000 £and about 8% loses between 
1000 and 3000 £ . About 2% loses more than £3000. Almost 18% experiences 
no change in the level of their net financial balances, passing from one month 
before the commencement of their unemployment spell to three months into 
the spell.
Almost 29% sees their financial resources increase after the commence­
ment of their unemployment spell. However, almost 10% gains less than 
£100. Almost 8% gains between 100 and 500 £. Almost 3% gains between 
500 and 1000 £and about 3% gains between 1000 and 3000 £ . About 5% 
experience an increase of more than £3000 in the level of net financial bal­
ances. The increases in the level of net financial balances are explained in 
large part by the receipt of “once-off” payments associated with the ending 
of a previous work contract and the commencement of the observed spell of 
unemployment, as discussed above.
Table 7.9: The total family savings
Upper bounds Percentage of tke unemployed tkat reported suck amounts
amounts reported Married people Single people
in £ % % n cum. %  ( * ) % % n cum. % ( * )
0 3iA 39.6
<  10 1.4 2.1 2.i 12.3 20.3 20.3
<  100 26.3 41.9 44.0 9.6 15.9 36.1
< 500 H .4 17.3 61.2 10.0 16.5 52.6
< ¡000 5.5 6.3 69.5 10.0 ¡6.5 69.1
<  2000 6.1 9.2 76.7 6.6 10.9 80.0
< 3000 3.2 4-6 63.5 2.3 3.6 63.6
< 5000 2.6 4-2 87.7 2.2 3.7 87.5
< ¡0000 3.2 4.6 92.5 2.2 3.7 91.2
< 20000 2.7 4.0 96.5 3.3 5.5 96.7
< 50000 2.2 3.3 99.3 1.2 2.0 96.7
> 50000 0.5 0.7 0 100 0.7 1.2 ¡00
Tke table relates to tke time of tke first interview. Tke family «avtnÿi are
equal to tke sum of tke savings of tke unemployed and tkeir spouses, for tke
unemployed tkat were married at tke time of tke first interview. Tke family
savings are equal to tke total savings of tke unemployed for tke unemployed
tkat were single persons at tke first interview. Tke married unemployed at tke
first interview were ¡765. Tke single unemployed were 270. Tke (*) indtcates
tkat tke percentage ut taken over tke non-zero 's observations.
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The proportion of the unemployed that see their net financial balances 
decrease passing from the first to the second survey interview is about 53%. 
This figure is almost identical to the corresponding figure for the change in 
net financial resources passing from one month before to three months into 
the unemployment spell. The proportion of the unemployed that experience 
no change in the level of their financial resources is now much smaller and 
equal to less than 1%. About 34% of the sample sees their financial resources 
increase passing from the first survey interview to the second. About 12% 
of the unemployed experience an increase of less than £100 in the level of 
their net financial balances. About 15% gains between 100 and 500 £and 
about 7% gains between 500 and 1000 £ . About 6% sees their net financial 
resources go up by more than £1000 and less than £3000. About 5% gains 
more than £3000.
Overall, the number of the unemployed that sees their net financial bal­
ances increase passing from the first to the second survey interview is higher 
than the corresponding number from one month to three months into the 
spell. This result is simply due to the fact that a large number of the un­
employed have gone back to work between the first and the second survey 
interview. In general, it is possible to conclude that the financial resources of 
the unemployed change considerably during the course of the unemployment 
spell. The largest number of the unemployed sees their net financial balances 
go down during the course of the unemployment spell.
In Table 7 .9 ,1 compare the savings and debt of the (married) unemployed 
and their spouses with those of the single persons in the sample, at the first 
interview. It is to be remembered that in the LSUS survey the unemployed 
are defined as "married” if they are “either married or cohabiting" with their 
partners. I compare the total family savings of the unemployed, which were 
computed adding the spouse's savings to the unemployed savings.
The number of families that report zero savings at the first interview is 
slighlty higher among the unemployed that are not married. About 39% 
of the married unemployed report amounts of family savings different from 
zero. The corresponding figure for the single people is about 34%. This seems 
plausible since the spouse s savings are taken into account in the figures for 
the married people. About 20%. of the single people that report positive 
amounts of savings have savings of less than £10. The proportion of married 
people with savings of less than £10 is, instead, much smaller and equal to 
about 2%. However, about the same proportion (about 83% of the positive 
replies) in both groups of married and single people report savings of less 
than £3000. Overall, the distribution of savings of the two groups of the 
unemployed does not appear particularly different.
The total family debt for the two groups is compared in Table 7.10. The 
proportion of married unemployed that reports some debt at the first inter­
view is slightly larger than that of single people. About 37% of the married 
people report zero amounts of debt. The same figure for the single people is 
about 42%,. The distribution of the amounts of debt owed is very similar for
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Table 7.10: The total fam ily debt
Percentage of the unemployed that reported n e k  
amounts
Upper bounds
amounts reported 
in I
Married people
% % n %o
Single people 
% % (•) JLilL
10
too
500
1000
2000
3000
5000
10000
10000
37.5
2.5 
13.9 
21.4 
12.1
6.5 
2.8 
2.1 
1.0 
0.7
4.0
22.2
34.2
19.3
10.3 
4-4
3.4
1.5 
0.9 0
4-0
26.2
60.4
79.7 
89.9 
94.3
97.7 
99.2
100
42.6
1.8
14.5
20.4
9.6
4.8
3.0
1.1 
1.1 
1.1
3.1
25.2
35.5
16.7
8.3
5.3
1.9
1.9
1.9
3.1
28.4
63.9 
80.6
88.9 
94.2 
96.1 
98.0
100
The table relates to the time of the first interview. The family debt tj 
equal to the sum of the debt of the unemployed and their spouses, for 
the unemployed that were married at the time of the first interview. 
The family debt is equal to the total debt of the unemployed for the 
unemployed that were not married at the first interview. The *nem- 
ployed married at the first interview were 1765. The unemployed not 
married were 270. The (*) indicates that the percentage 1« taien over 
the non-zero's observations.
the two groups of the unemployed. For instance, the proportion of married 
people with debt less than £500 is about 26%. The same figure for single 
people is about 28%. The proportion of the unemployed with debt of less 
than £3000 is the same for both groups (about 94%). Marital status does 
not seem to affect substantially the amount of debt run by the unemployed.
7.3.2 D escriptive sta tistics o f th e  explanatory vari­
ables
Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are given in Table 7.11 
below for the full sample considered (2030 observations) and for the unem­
ployed with positive amounts of savings or debt (1629 observations). The 
reader is referred to Section 5.2 for a definition of the explanatory variables. 
I discuss below the specification of the savings and debt variables. Some un­
employed and/or their spouses reported very large amounts of savings/debt, 
of more than six figures in pounds. In the survey, the amounts reported by 
these persons were coded as “-2” rather than the actual reported amount. 
Since it turns out that only five unemployed and/or their spouses reported 
such large amounts of savings and/or debt, these cases are dropped from 
the econometric analysis carried out in this Chapter. Indeed, they might 
have been misreporting their savings/debt, but even if they reported the 
true amounts, they would anyway be too few to be representative of the 
incredibly rich or incredibly poor unemployed.
The levels of savings and debt are measured one month before the com-
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mencement of the unemployment spell to avoid potential endogeneity prob­
lems. Indeed, the level of the financial resources of the unemployed may vary 
during the course of the unemployment spell as a function of the duration of 
the unemployment spell. As a consequence, the savings and debt of the un­
employed at the first (or the second) survey interview might be endogeneous 
to the model.
About 80% of the sample reported positive amounts of debt and/or sav­
ings one month before the commencement of their unemployment spell (see 
Table 7.6). I find that the distribution of savings and debt of the unemployed 
is very skewed, with some unemployed reporting, for example, amounts of 
(total) savings or (total) debt of less than £10 and some unemployed re­
porting amounts larger than £10000. Some unemployed did not report any 
amounts of savings and/or debt or refused to reply to these questions. It 
is of course possible, fis already discussed above that these people did not 
reply sincerely to the questions. Sensitivity of the results of estimation of 
the econometric model to the exclusion/inclusion of these observations is 
checked.
From Table 7.11, it emerges that the unemployed that report positive 
amounts of savings or debt have higher mean expected earnings (called “pre­
dicted” earnings in the Table) than the full sample, which includes the un­
employed that report zero amounts of savings or debt. No other substantial 
differences emerge between the two groups (except for differences in the mean 
levels of savings and debt).
The savings and debt variables are entered separately into the model. 
The expected impact of higher levels of savings is to raise the unemployed’s 
reservation wage by making the unemployed more ‘‘choosy” about accepting 
job offers (for a given degree of risk aversion). The expected impact of savings 
on the re-employment hazard rate is, therefore, negative. However, savings 
may also proxy risk aversion since the more risk averse individuals will tend 
to save more. Higher degrees of risk aversion are expected to result in lower 
reservation wages and shorter unemployment durations. If savings proxy 
risk aversion, then higher level of savings will be associated with shorter 
unemployment duration.
The expected impact of debt is not clearcut either. Higher levels of debt 
may lower the unemployed’s reservation wage and result in shorter unem­
ployment durations. However, debt may also proxy access to credit. In this 
case, the expected impact of higher levels of debt on the hazard rate is sim­
ilar to the expected impact of higher levels of savings (for a given degree of 
risk aversion). The unemployed that can borrow more can also afford to be 
more choosy about accepting job offers. If debt proxies access to credit, the 
expected impact of higher levels of debt on the hazard rate is negative.
The savings and debt variables are specified in levels. A logarithmic spec­
ification does not seem appropriate since it would imply that proportional 
increases in these variables have equi-proportionate effects on the hazard. 
It seems plausible that a 100% increase in debt (or savings) has a different
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impact if debt (or savings) increases, for instance, from £500 to £1000 than 
from £10 to £20. This choice is supported by the fact that the distribu­
tions of savings and debt are very skewed. However, savings and debt will 
be entered in logs for the purpose of sensitivity analysis.
The “once-off” payments associated with the ending of the previous work 
contract and the commencement of the unemployment spell may be seen as 
representing an (unexpected) increase in the level of savings. The expected 
impact of this variable on the hazard rate is negative. This variable is entered 
in levels for the same reasons given above. A logarithmic specification is also 
tried out.
The savings and debt variables considered relate to the unemployed per­
son. In the econometric analysis, I test also for the significance of the family's 
savings and debt. These are equal to the sum of the unemployed’s savings 
(or debt) and the spouse’s savings (or debt).
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Table 7.11: D escriptive sta tistics of the economic variables
Full sample Non zero wealth
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Left truncation period 13,407 1.057 13.395 1.040
Unemployment duration (weeks) 44-588 17.755 43.600 17.718
F /t work most part yecr before U. .653 .476 .692 .462
Unemployed most part yetr before U. .222 -415 .193 .395
Sick, no work most part year before U. .036 .187 .029 .169
Professional Occupation .019 .137 .021 •145
Intermediate Occupation .154 .361 .172 .378
Unskilled Occupation .058 .234 .048 .215
Occupation not available ,071 .256 .056 .230
Age 20-24 •124 .329 .112 .316
Age 25-34 .323 .468 .319 .466
Age 35-44 .248 .432 .249 .432
Age 45-54 .198 .398 .202 .402
Age 55-58 .108 .310 .118 .323
j Has any child old less than 5 .341 •474 .328 .470
j M amed .867 .339 .875 .330
! Spouse working 1 montn before U. .269 .443 .295 .456
' Searches less than before .096 •294 .096 .295
Values Leisure more than Labour .137 -344 .142 .350
! experiences some shortage of money .733 ■443 .726 .446
, House owner outnght/with mortgage .381 .486 .432 .495
1 County unemployment rate 13.586 3.205 13.500 3.224
\ Receives only UB at tl .362 .481 .38 J .486
j Receives no UB nor SB .046 .210 .050 .217
i benefit time varying (£  ) 3978.682 1855.357 3945.793 1877.564
Predicted earnings, in £ 9097.565 2257.838 920¡.237 2335.49 7
predicted earnings not available .011 .106 .012 .110
[ total savings one month before U. £ ¡440.582 5736.440 1799.622 6361.343
total debt one month before U. £ 618.¡16 2750.075 772.171 3054.499
total family savings one month before
U. £
¡688.0J 7559.100 ¡682.200 8133.040
total family debt one month before U. 
t
648.887 2765.740 689.290 2995.420
JL
mortgage capital outstanding, £ 2383.12 ¡7423.920 2675.89 19123.990
*once-off payments", £ 121 J.604 4423.350 ¡376.549 4584.826
The number of units that report non zero savings or non zero t ebt is ¡629. The total sample
t is made of 2030 unemployed. The dichotomous variables take value one when the condition 
| stated for each of them is satisfied. The mean unemployment duration is computed including the 
j  right-censored observations. The total family savings are equal to the sum of the savings of the 
; unemployed person and t h e i r  spouses for the married people and to the unemployed's savings for 
| the single people. The total family debt ts equal to the sum of the debt of the unemployed person 
I and their spouses for the married people and to the unemployed’s debt for the single people. UU. 
j " stands for **the unemployment speir.
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survivor function
unemployment duration
Figure 7.1: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions for the Re-employment Proba­
bility
7.4 Results of estim ation
Non parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates are provided first. Next, the results 
of estimation of the more complex econometric model are discussed. This is 
a competing risks model of the re-employment probability. Two destination 
states out of unemployment have been allowed for: full-time work and other 
states. 1 am interested in the results for the exit into full-time work. The 
likelihood function for the model is given by Equation 3.36 of Chapter 3. 
The baseline hazard rate, a piecewise linear, is allowed to vary each month.
7.4.1 N on param etric estim ates
I have carried out some non-parametric analysis of the re-employment prob­
ability for the unemployed with different levels of savings and debt. The 
survivor functions of different (mutually exclusive) groups of the unemployed 
have been estimated by Kaplan-Meier method. I compare the estimated sur­
vivor functions by means of visual inspection and also using the Log-Rank 
test3, which is based on the estimated standard errors of the survivor func­
tions.
The survivor function of the unemployed that reported zero levels of sav­
ings one month before the commencement of the their unemployment spell 
(776 observations) is compared in Figure 7.1 with the survivor function of
3A good reference for a description of this test is Kalbfleish and Prentice (1980).
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survivor function
unemployment duration
Figure 7.2: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions for the Re-employment Proba­
bility
the unemployed that reported positive amounts of savings at the same date 
(1254 observations). The survivor function for the unemployed with positive 
amounts of savings lies below that for the unemployed that reported zero 
amounts of savings. The Log-Rank test rejects strongly the null hypothe­
sis that the survivor functions of the two groups of the unemployed are not 
significantly different ( \ j  = 24.1). According to these non-parametric esti­
mates, the unemployed with positive levels of savings are more likely to exit 
from unemployment to take up a full-time job (at any time) than the unem­
ployed with no savings. However, the non-parametric estimates do not allow 
for heterogeneity o.f the two groups of the unemployed. It is possible that 
the unemployed with positive levels of savings have other ugood” character­
istics (unaccounted for here) which might contribute to explain the results 
illustrated in Figure 7.1.
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survivor function
unemployment duration
Figure 7.3: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions for the Re-employment Proba­
bility
In Figure 7.2, I compare the survivor function of the unemployed with 
savings larger than (or equal to) £1000 one month before the commencement 
of the their unemployment spell (415 observations) with the survivor function 
of the unemployed with savings of less than £1000 at the same date (1615 
observations). The estimated survivor functions of the two groups follow 
a similar pattern than that of the survivor functions of Figure 7.1. The 
survivor function of the unemployed with savings larger than (or equal to) 
£1000 lies below the survivor functions of the unemployed with savings of 
less than £1000. According to these results, higher levels of savings raise the 
individual re-employment probability.
However, the null hypothesis that the survivor functions of the two groups, 
are not significantly different cannot be rejected on the basis of the Log-Rank 
lest ( \ 2  =  1-74). I have obtained similar results by distinguishing the unem­
ployed with level of savings higher than £3000 (203 observations) one month 
before the commencement of the unemployment spell and the unemployed 
with savings of less than £3000 (1827 observations). The survivor function of 
the unemployed with savings larger than £3000 lies below that of the unem­
ployed with savings of less than £3000, at any point in time. The Log-Rank 
test can not reject the null hypothesis that the survivor functions of the two 
groups are not significantly different ( \ \  = 0.96).
In Figure 7.3, I compare the survivor function of the unemployed that
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reported zero amounts of debt (942 observations) one month before the com­
mencement of the their unemployment spell with the survivor function of the 
unemployed that reported positive amounts of debt (1088 observations) at 
the same date. The survivor function of the unemployed with no debt lies 
below that of the unemployed with positive debt, at any time. This implies 
that the unemployed in debt are less likely to exit unemployment to take 
up a full-time job than the unemployed that are not in debt. However, the 
Log-Rank test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the survivor functions 
of the two groups are not significantly different (x* =  5.1).
7.4.2 P aram etric estim ates
Alternative specifications of the savings and debt variables were tried out. 
The results of estimation are given in Table 7.12, Table 7.13 and Table 7.14 
below. The reader is referred to Chapter 5 for a discussion of the estimated 
impact of the explanatory variables of the model. The discussion below 
focus on the impact of the financial resources variables. I present first the 
results of estimation of a model where savings and debt are entered in level?. 
Next, I show my favourite model, where some spline functions are specified 
to capture the impact of savings and debt on the re-employment probability. 
I conclude this section with a discussion of some sensitivity analysis.
In specification (1) and (2) of Table 7.12, the model is estimated sepa­
rately for the full sample (specification 1) and for unemployed that reported 
positive amounts of savings or debt (specification 2). The impact of the 
explanatory variables does not differ much across the two models. In partic­
ular. higher level of savings are found not to affect significantly the individual 
re-employment probability. The sign of the coefficient on the level of savings 
is negative. This might confirm the view that higher levels of savings raise 
the reservation wage and lower the re-employment probability. The coeffi­
cient on debt is slightly significant and shows that debt affects negatively 
the individual re-employment probability. This finding supports the view 
that debt proxies access to credit. Access to credit may allow the unem­
ployed to be more choosy about accepting job offers and therefore lower the 
re-employment probability. The impact of debt is, however, very small. A 
10% increase in the level of debt evaluated at the mean (equal to about 14 
hundred £ )  lowers the re-employment hazard by less than 1%.
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Table 7.12: Results of estimation
All (1) 
unemployed
Reporting non-zero(2) 
Savings or Debi
Variable Coejff. SE Coeff. SE
P /t work year before 0,3713* 0.1368 0.4194* 0.1520
Unemployed year before 0.302 7* 0.1477 0.3729* 0.1672
Sick year before -0.3608 0.2900 -0.2692 0.3486
Profess. /Interm. Occ. 0.2110* 0.0985 " 0.2129* 0.1050
Unskilled Occupation -0.4393* 0.1720 -0.5629* 0.2100
Age 20-24 0.2230* 0.1075 0.1855 0.1228
Age 35-44 -0.1786* 0.0903 -O.I247 0.0979
Age 45-54 -0.5951* 0.1107 -0.5506* 0.1213
Age 55-58 -1,2643* 0.1734 -1.2035* 0.1825
Has any child aged < 5 -0.1989* 0.0871 -0.1886* 0.0962
Married 0.1404 0.1237 0.0935 0.1360
Spouse working 0.3656* 0.0873 0.3060* 0.0935
Searches less -0.7549* 0.1728 • 0.7659* 0.1919
Values Leisure more -0.2781* 0.1146 -0.3269* 0.1250
expenencess money shortage 0.1890* 0.0862 0.2224* 0.0963
House owner 0.3373* 0.0739 0.3022* 0.0800
County U rate -0.0202* 0.0106 -0.0194 0.0117
Receives only UB 0.2006* 0.0849 0.1913* 0.0930
Receives no UB, SB 0.0200 0.2799 -0.1269 0.2991
UB/SB time varying, logs -0.0325 0.0603 -0.0571 0.0630
Predicted earnings, logs. 0.64 8 8 * 0.2021 0.6330* 0.2175
So pred. earn. 2.9561* 0.9591 2.6823* 1.0409
Savings, in 100 £ -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0006
Debt, in 100 £ • 0.0037 0.0019 -0.0042* 0.0020
Maximum log-likehhood -643 6.9 -5317.2
The unemployed that reported amounts of savings or debt greater than 6 figures in pounds 
were excluded from the analysts. Savings and debt relate to the amounts reported as to 
one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell. The results relate to 
extt into full-time work. The maximum likelihood is computed by jotnt estimation of 
j the two competing risks. Descriptive itafuhcj of the explanatory variables are given in 
} Table 7.11.__________________________________________________________________
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In Table 7.13, the results of estimation of alternative specifications of the 
financial resources variables are presented. In specification (3), the level of 
“once off7’ payments is entered among the regressors. The estimated coeffi­
cient on the level of “once-off” payments is statistically significant and shows 
negative sign as expected. The “once-off” payments are assumed to repre­
sent (unexpected) increases in the level of financial resources associated with 
the commencement of the unemployment spell (and the ending of a previous 
work contract). According to the theoretical predictions, an increase in the 
level of financial wealth allows the unemployed to be more “choosy” about 
accepting job offers and therefore lowers the re-employment probability. The 
impact of “once-off” payments on the re-employment hazard is quite small. 
A 10% increase in the amount of “once-off” payments (evaluated at the mean 
of 12 hundred £ ) lowers the re-employment probability by less than 1%. The 
impact of debt (from specification 1) is unaffected by the additional regres­
sor. The estimated coefficient on savings (not significant) becomes slightly 
smaller in absolute value.
In specification (4) of Table 7.13, the savings and debt variables are spec­
ified using two spline functions. The rationale for this specification is the 
large skewness of the distributions of savings and debt of the unemployed. 
The impact of the continuous savings (or debt) variable is allowed to differ for 
different values of savings (or debt). The following three intervals of savings 
(or debt) values are considered:
• savings (or debt) less than £500;
• savings (or debt) greater or equal than £500 and less than £3000;
• savings (or debt) greater or equal than £3000.
The coefficients of the debt spline are not significantly different from zero.
However, they show negative sign except for the first one. which relates to 
small amounts of debt of less than £500. It is possible that amounts of 
debt of less than £500 signal “no access to credit” . There is, however, no 
firm explanation for this result. The impact of “once-off" payments does not 
vary much from specification (3). The coefficients of the savings spline are 
now statistically significant. The first two —on amounts of savings up to 
£500 and amounts of savings from £500 up to £3000— show positive sign 
while the last one —on amounts of savings larger than £3000— has negative 
sign. One possible explanation for this result is that smaller amounts of 
savings proxy, at least to a certain extent, individual risk aversion. In this 
case, then, higher levels of (small) savings represent higher degrees of risk 
aversion and higher degrees of risk avrsion result in lower reservation wages 
and shorter unemployment duration. Levels of savings larger than £3000 
might, instead, capture only to a limited extent individual risk aversion and 
to a larger extent the impact of higher levels of financial wealth on the re­
employment hazard, which is expected to be positive for a given degree of
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risk aversion. An increase of 10% in the level of savings (evaluated at the 
level of 2.5 hundred pounds of savings) raises the re-employment hazard by 
about 1%, for the persons with savings below £500. An increase of 10% in 
the level of savings (evaluated at the level of 12.5 hundred pounds of savings) 
raises the hazard rate by about 1%, for the unemployed with savings between 
£500 and £3000.
Table 7.13: Results of estimation
Specification (3) Specification (4) Specification (5) \
Variable Coeff. Coeff. SE
F /t work year before 0.3982* 0.1371 0.3816* 0.1377 0.3662* 0.1372
Unemployed year before 0.3090* 0.1477 0.3246* 0.1483 0.3094* 0.1478
Sick year before •0.3931 0.2901 -0.3188 0.2915 -0.34 86 0.2905
Profess. /Interm. Occ. 0.2151* 0.0980 0.1855 0.0983 0.1854 0.0981
Unskilled Occupation •0.4407 * 0.1720 -0.3874* 0.1726 -0.3893* 0.1725
Age 20-24 0.2325* 0.1076 0.2482* 0.1076 0.244 6* 0.1075
Age 35-44 -0.1808* 0.0903 -0.1848* 0.0910 -0.19440 0.0908
Age 45-54 -0.5703* 0.1104 -0.5990* 0.1116 -0.6068* 0.1114
Age 55-56 -1.2178* 0.1744 -1.3085* 0.1768 -1.3207* 0.1762
Has any child aged < J -0.1983* 0.0871 -0.1960* 0.0874 -0.1897* 0.0873
Mamed 0.1391 0.1237 0.1667 0.1236 0.1651 0.1236
Spouse working 0.3564* 0.0875 0.3487* 0.0879 0.3573* 0.0876
Searches less -0.7036* 0.1729 -0.6789* 0.1729 -0.6796* 0.1728
1 Values Leisure more -0.2540* 0.1147 -0.2660* 0.1151 -0.2728* 0.1149
Experiences money shortage 0.1509 0.0865 0.1804* 0.0873 0.1874* 0.0871
j House owner 0.3465* 0.0739 0.2757* 0.0765 0.2764* 0.0758
j County U rate -0.0326* 0.0106 -0.0225* 0.0106 -0.0220* 0.0106
j Receives only UB 0.2212* 0.0849 0.1824* 0.0857 0.1862* 0.0856
i Receives no UB. SB -0.0228 0.2802 -0.0692 0.2807 -0.0575 0.2805
j UB/SB  time varying, logs -0.0412 0.0604 -0.0397 0.0606 -0.0352 0.0605
• Predicted earntngs, logs. 0.7123* 0.2026 0.6545* 0.2035 0.6575* 0.2035
| Ao pred. earn. 3.2306* 0.9610 3.0001* 0.964 7 3.0194* 0.9646
\ Savings, in J00 £ -0.0006 0.0008
' Debt, in 100 £ • 0.0037* 0.0019 -0.0033 0.0018
i “Once-off payments, in 100 £ -0.0030* 0.0012 -0.0031 * 0.0013 -0.0031* 0.0013
Spline, 0> savings < £500, in 100 £ 0.0489* 0.0214 0.0482* 0.0213
Spline. £500 > savings < £3000, in 0.0123* 0.0062 0.0123* 0.0062
100 £
Spline, £3000> savtngs, in 100 £ -0.0028* 0.0013 -0.0028* 0.0013
| Spline, 0> debt < £500, in 100 £ 0.0223 0.0196
! Spline, £500 > debt < £3000, in 100
r
-0.0131 0.0077
Jl
' Spline, £3000> debt. in 100 £ -0.0022 0.0022
1 Maximum log-likelthood -6433.3 -6416.9 -6421.0
1 The estimation is carried out for the full sample except for the unemployed that reported amounts of saving» 
j or debt greater than 6 figures in pounds, who were excluded from the analysts. The level of savings and
| debt relate to the amounts reported as to one month before the commencement of the unemployment spell.
| The results relate to exit into full-time work. The maximum likelihood is computed by jotnt estimation of 
; the two competing risks, full-time work and other exits. Descriptive «tatutici of the explanatory variables 
■ are given in Table 7.11. _______________________________________________
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An increase of 10% in the level of savings (evaluated at 40 hundred pounds 
of savings) lowers the re-employment hazard by about 1%. The hypothesis 
that a linear relationship between savings and the re-employment probability 
(as in specification 3) is to be preferred to this piecewise linear specification 
is tested with a likelihood ratio test (x^ =  32.8). The null hypothesis that 
the additional spline coefficients are not significantly different from zero is 
rejected.
Specification (5) of Table 7.13, is the same as specification (4) except for 
the specification of the level of debt that is now entered linearly as before. 
The coefficient on the level of debt is not significant but shows negative 
sign, as expected. The coefficients on the savings spline and on the level of 
“once-off” payments do not change relative to specification (4).
To conclude, a spline specification of the savings of the unemployed per­
forms best. The robustness of the spline estimates is tested to alternative 
specifications of the savings and debt variables, as illustrated in Table 7.14. 
In specification (a), the savings and debt variables are entered in logarithms 
instead than in-levels. The implication of the logarithmic specification is that 
of a constant elasticity, as already discussed in the data section above. The 
coefficient on (logs) savings is significant and positive. It is close in absolute 
value to the coefficient on the first spline segment in specification (4). The 
coefficient on debt is not significant and shows negative sign, as before. The 
impact of the “once-off” payments is close to that found in previous speci­
fications. The impact of “once-ofP payments becomes not significant if this 
variable is entered in logs (specification b).
In specification (c), the family's levels of savings and debt are entered 
among the regressors (instead of the unemployed's level of savings and debt). 
None of the two variables is found to affect significantly the re-employment 
probability. The estimated impact of ‘'once-ofT* payments is larger in abso­
lute value with respect to previous specification.
In specification (d). some dummies that take value one for given levels 
of savings and debt are entered among the regressors instead of the actual 
levels of savings or debt. The intervals of savings and debt levels considered 
are the same used for the splines of specification (4) and (5) above. All the 
savings dummies show positive sign (and are statistically significant). The 
estimated coefficient on the last savings dummy is however smaller than the 
coefficients on the previous two savings dummies.
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Table 7.14: Some more results
Specification Coeff. SE Max. log-lik.
(a) Same specification at (S) but tavingt and debt variables
are entered in logs
(a) Savings, in logt of 100 £
(a) Debt, tn logt of in 100 £
(a) Once off payments, in 100 £
0.0412* 
-0.0223 
-0.0031*
0.0198
0.0268
0.0012
-6433.9
(b) Same as (a) but “once-ofi” payments are also in logs 
(b) Savings, in logs of 100 £
(b) Debt, in logs of in 100 £
(b) Once off payments, in logs of 100 £
0.0387* 
-0.0231 
-0.0283
0.0198
0.0269
0.0269
-6437.6
(c) Same specification as (3) but J consider the family sav- 
! mgs and debt 
(c) Total family savings, in £100 
(c) Total family debt, »n £100 
(c) Once off payments, in 100 £
-0.0009 
0.000¡ 
0.0050*
0.0014
0.0004
0.0017
-6310.3
(d) Same as specification (1) but some dummies are used 
to capture the impact of savings and debt levels 
; (d) Dl = l if 0 > savings < £500 
(d) D2=l if £500 > savings < £3000 
(d) DS= 1 if £500 > savings < £3000 
(d) D4 = l if 0>  debt < £500 
(d) D5=l if £500 > debt < £3000 j ( i )  DS=1 ij £500 > debt < £3000
0.2155* 
0.4629* 
0.414S* 
-0.0359 
0.0396 
-0.4623*
0.0810
0.1016
0.1427
0.0818
0.0885
0.2001
-6423.7
j (c) Same as specification (4) except for the exclusion of 
| uonce-off* payments
! ( t)  Spline, 0> savings < £500, in 100 £
| (e) Spline, £500 > savings < £3000, in ¡00 £
| (e) Spline, £3000> savings, in 100 £
| (e) Spline, 0> debt < £500, tn ¡00 £  
j (e) Spline, £500 > debt < £3000, in 100 £
1 (e) Spline. £3000> debt, in ¡00 £
0.04760 
0.0120 
-0.00290 
0.0194 
-0.0126 
• 0.0022
0.0234
0.0062
0.0012
0.0214
0.0078
0.0022
-5301.7
j ( f) So regressors are entered except for the variables below 
' and the monthly constants of the baseline hazard rate j ( f) “Once-off payments, in ¡00 £  
i ( f) Spline. 0> savings < £500 
( f) Spline, £500 > savings < £3000 
( f ) Spline, £3000'> savings 
1 ( f) Spline, 0> debt < £500 
, (f)  Splint, £500 > debt < £3000 
\ (f)  Splint, £3000> debt
0.0003 
0.09389 
-0.0021 { 
-0.0007 
-0.0734 
0.034 O0 
-0.0036
0.0012 
0.0376 
0.0106 
0.0013 
0.04 ¡5 
0.0135 
0.0038
-6564-8
. The model is estimated for all the unemployed but those that reported amounts of savings 
! or debt greater than 5 figure in pounds, as tn model (¡) above. The level of savings and 
! debt relate to the amounts reported as to one month before the commencement of the 
unemployment spell. The results relate to exit into full-time work. The maximum like- 
i  lihood is computed by joint estimation of the two competing risks. Descriptive statistics 
J of the explanatory variables are given in the Appendix.
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This confirms the results obtained with the spline specification of the im­
pact of savings. The coefficient on the last debt dummy —which takes value 
one for the unemployed with debt of more than £3000— is significantly dif­
ferent from zero and negative. The differences with the results of estimation 
of specification (4) are not so large since none of the estimated coefficients 
on the splines nor on the dummies are strongly significant. For the purpose 
of comparison, specification (e) is equivalent to specification (4) except for 
the exclusion of the “once-off ” payments (which were also excluded from 
specification d).
In specification (f), only the savings and debt variables (and the piecewise 
constants of the baseline hazard rate) are entered among the regressors. The 
level of “once-off” payments is now not significant. Only the first of the 
estimated coefficients on the savings spline is significant and shows positive 
sign. The coefficient on the second segment of the debt spline is significant 
and negative.
None of these alternative specifications of the savings and debt variables is 
found to perform better than specification (4). The detection of a significant 
but small impact of the level of financial resources of the unemployed on the 
individual re-employment probability is confirmed.
7.5 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter. I have investigated the impact of the level of financial re­
sources of the unemployed on the re-employment probability, using the LSUS 
data.
From the descriptive analysis of the savings and the debt of the unem­
ployed, the following facts emerged. The savings and debt of the unemployed 
vary in some cases considerably during the course of the unemployment spell. 
In particular, while the savings of some unemployed increase because of the 
receipt of "once-off" payments (for example redundancy payments) associ­
ated with the commencement of the unemployment spell, the number of the 
unemployed in debt increases as well. The net financial resources deteriorate 
for about 53% of the unemployed, passing from one month before the com­
mencement of the unemployment spell to three months into the spell (when 
the first survey interview took place). The corresponding figure, passing 
from the first to the second survey interview, is also 53%. About 43% of the 
unemployed reported “once-offr payments due to the ending of the previous 
work contract. The amounts of such payments vary considerably across the 
unemployed, going from less than £100 to over £10000.
On the basis of this descriptive analysis, it is not possible to conclude on 
any association between the level of net financial resources of the unemployed 
and their exiting from unemployment before the time of the second survey 
interview. The distribution of the net resources of the unemployed with 
right-censored or completed unemployment spell does not differ substantially.
176
Marital status is not found to affect to a large extent the financial wealth of 
the unemployed.
The conclusion of the econometric analysis are the following. I find 
some evidence that the level of financial resources affects the individual re­
employment probability. In particular, I find that the receipt of redundancy 
payments or other “once-off” payments associated with the commencement 
of the unemployment spell and the ending of a previous work contract has a 
negative impact on the re-employment hazard rate. This type of payments 
represent an (unexpected) increase in the level of individual savings and their 
expected impact on the hazard rate is negative (Danforth, 1979). The magni­
tude of the impact of these “once-off” payments on the re-employment hazard 
is, however, very small. A 10% increase in the level of “once-off” payments 
(measured in hundred pounds) is found to raise the re-employment hazard 
rate by about 1%.
The savings of the unemployed have a significant non-lineax impact on 
the re-employment probability. The impact of savings is significantly differ­
ent from zero if a non-linear specification of the savings variable is adopted, 
such as for instance a linear spline or a logarithmic specification or a series 
of dummies taking value one for given intervals of savings. Savings are found 
to affect positively the re-employment probability. An explanation is that 
higher levels of savings proxy higher degrees of risk aversion. According to 
the theoretical predictions (Kohn and Shavell, 1974 and Pissarides, 1974), 
more risk averse individuals have lower reservation wages and shorter unem­
ployment durations. The evidence on the sign and the significance of the 
impact of savings is. however, not very robust. The impact of savings on the 
re-employment hazard (when significant) is quite small.

Chapter 8
Conclusions
In this thesis, my aim was to gain new insights into the determinants of 
unemployment duration in the UK. For the analysis, I have used the “Survey 
of Living Standards during Unemployment (LSUS)”, which was collected by 
the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys on behalf of the Department of 
Social Security. These data had not yet been analysed except for the reports 
made by the survey planners (Heady and Smith, 1989). The objectives of 
the analysis carried out in the thesis were laid out in detail in Chapter 1. I 
resume below the main results obtained and the conclusions that I have been 
able to draw.
In Chapter 2, I provided a discussion of the LSUS data. From a de­
scriptive points of view, I analysed the information on the exit states out of 
unemployment and the receipt of unemployment benefit. The major findings 
of Chapter 2 are summarized below.
• It emerged that the LSUS data are well worth using for the analysis of 
individual unemployment duration in the UK. The longitudinal struc­
ture of the survey allows one to observe the duration of the individual 
unemployment spells and the economic states entered upon leaving 
unemployment. This is especially interesting since only one previous 
study had access to and made use of similar information on the exit 
states out of unemployment for Britain (Narendranathan and Stewart, 
1993).
• The LSUS survey covers a period of time (1983/84) when the rate of 
unemployment in the UK was quite high (averaging about 12-13%) 
and close to the current levels. Previous published UK studies relate 
instead to the late seventies, which were characterized by much lower 
unemployment rates.
• An advantage of the LSUS data is that they contain rich information 
on many socio-economic characteristics and psychological attitudes of 
the unemployed.
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• The main drawback of the survey is that it contains limited information 
on the pattern of unemployment benefit receipts over time.
•  The descriptive analysis of the data highlighted the importance of al­
lowing for the variety of economic states that exist in reality.
•  The analysis of unemployment benefit receipts revealed how the type 
and the amount of unemployment benefit received may vary consider­
ably across the unemployed persons and over time. However, the lim­
ited information on any changes in the pattern of unemployment benefit 
receipts available made necessary some imputation of these changes.
In Chapter 3, I have laid out the econometric model that I use in the 
thesis. This is a reduced form model of the individual probability of leaving 
unemployment. The dependency on time of the (conditional) probability 
of leaving unemployment is modelled using a flexible specification for the 
baseline hazard rate, a piecewise linear. Two exit states out of unemployment 
are distinguished, full-time work and other states, and modelled by means of 
a competing risks specification.
A comparison of the results of estimation of single and competing risks 
models of the (conditional) probability of leaving unemployment, using the 
LSUS data, has been carried out in Chapter 4. In the same Chapter, alter­
native specifications of the baseline hazard rate (using the LSUS data) were 
tested. The following conclusions were drawn.
• I found that some of the estimated coefficients on the explanatory vari­
ables differed considerably across the single and competing risks mod­
els. In particular, some variables relating to individual previous work 
history turned out to affect significantly but in opposite directions the 
two cause-specific hazard rates of the competing risks model while they 
were not significant in the single risk model.
• These results contrast with the findings of Narendranathan and Stewart 
(1993) who used a similar competing risks specification of thr individual 
probability of leaving unemployment for the UK and concluded that 
most variables affected the single hazard and the re-émployment hazard 
in a similar manner. However. I do actually find that the impact of the 
level of unemployment benefit —which is the focus of interest of most 
previous U. K. studies— does not differ considerably across the single 
and competing risks hazards.
• The equality of the single and competing risks hazards was rejected on 
the basis of the tests suggested in Narendranathan and Stewart (1991).
• No significant pattern of time dependency could be detected. This 
finding is in line with previous UK studies that used more restrictive 
specifications of the baseline hazard rate but allowed for unobserved 
heterogeneity.
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• Slightly significant negative time dependency emerged in the full-time 
work hazard rate if a Weibull model were imposed on the data (without 
allowing for unobserved heterogeneity). This finding is also line with 
those of previous UK studies.
• The impact of the explanatory variables did not differ considerably if 
a Weibull baseline hazard rate were specified instead of a piecewise 
linear. This conclusion confirms previous findings of Narendranathan 
and Stewart (1993) who investigated the same issue.
Estimating the impact of socio-economic and institutional factors on the 
individual re-employment probability is the object of Chapter 5. Most of 
the explanatory variables considered are found to affect significantly the re­
employment probability and to have the expected sign. In particular, the 
following results were obtained.
• The effect of the level of unemployment benefit was found to be not 
significantly different from zero. This result was robust to alternative 
specifications of the benefit variable and to the inclusion (exclusion) of 
groups of variables.
• The estimated coefficient on the level of benefit became slightly sig­
nificant only when controls for the spouse’s labour force participa­
tion (measured some time before the commencement of unemployment 
spell) and for the presence (in the family) of any child aged less than 
five are dropped from the model. It is difficult to find an explanation 
for this result.
• The estimated coefficient on a proxy for search activity indicated that 
the individuals that search less show significantly lower chances (by 
50%) to find a full-time job. Valuing leisure more than labour was also 
found to lower the re-employment probability by about a quarter.
• Age was found to affect significantly the unemployed’s chances of find­
ing a full-time job. In particular, the unemployed aged between 45 and 
54 have about 50% lower chances of finding a full-time job and the un­
employed aged between 55 and 58 have about 70% lower re-employment 
probability.
• The unemployed with higher expected earnings were found to have 
significantly shorter unemployment duration. A 10% increase in mean 
expected earnings results in a reduction of about 15 weeks in expected 
mean unemployment duration.
• The unemployed that feel financially restrained have instead about 22%. 
higher chances of finding a full-time job, all things equal.
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•  The unemployment rate in the geographical area of residence considered 
(the county) was found to affect significantly but to a limited extent 
the unemployed’s chances of finding a full-time job. This result is in 
line with previous UK findings.
In Chapter 6, I investigated the relationship between the duration of en­
titlement to unemployment benefit and the individual probability of leaving 
unemployment. There are no previous UK studies that looked at this issue 
using micro data. I have distinguished two groups of the unemployed with 
respect to unemployment benefit receipts at the commencement of their un­
employment spell: the first group is made up of recipients of “only UB” —UB 
has a limited duration of 52 weeks; the second groups includes the recipients 
of SB (now called Income Support), either by itself or in addition to UB 
—SB has unlimited duration. On the basis of the analysis carried out, the 
following conclusions can be drawn.
• There is quite firm evidence (using the LSUS data) that the expected 
exhaustion of UB affects the individual probability of leaving unem­
ployment.
• The estimated size of the impact of the duration of unemployment 
benefit is sensitive to the specification of the baseline hazard rate.
• 1 find that the hazard rate of the “only UB’' group increases as the 
time of expected exhaustion of entitlement to unemployment benefit 
approches. However, the exhaustion of the benefit is found to “push” 
the unemployed into states other than full-time work. The estimation 
of a single risk model would have prevented one from detecting such 
behaviour.
• The two groups of benefit recipients were found to differ significantly 
with respect to their job finding experience.
In Chapter 7. I looked at the relationship between the level of financial 
resources of the unemployed and the re-em ploym ent probability. The results 
obtained can be summarized as follows.
• Higher levels of savings are expected to raise the re-employment hazard 
rate for a given degree of risk aversion. Savings may proxy individual 
risk aversion. Higher degrees of risk aversion are expected to lower 
the reservation wage and therefore to raise the re-employment hazard. 
Therefore, it is not possible to conclude a priori on the expected impact 
of savings on the re-employment hazard.
• The receipt of rendundancy payments or other uonce-off” payments 
associated with the ending of a previous work contract and the com­
mencement of the unemployment spell can be seen as an (unexpected)
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increase in the unemployed’s financial wealth. The expected impact of 
an increase in the level of financial wealth on the re-employment hazard 
is negative. The unemployed that become wealthier can afford to be 
more “choosy” about accepting job offers.
• Debt is expected to affect the re-employment hazard by lowering the 
unemployed’s reservation wage. However, debt may proxy the unem­
ployed’s access to credit and therefore exercise a negative impact on 
the re-employment hazard. The unemployed that have access to credit 
can afford to be more “choosy” about accepting job offers.
• Some descriptive analysis of the financial resources of the unemployed 
led to the conclusion that the distributions of savings and debt of the 
unemployed are very skewed with some unemployed reporting very 
small amounts of savings and debt (smaller than £10) and some un­
employed reporting considerably large amounts (larger than £10000).
• It emerged that the net financial resources of the unemployed tend to 
vary considerably following the commencement of the unemployment 
spell. Although a large proportion of the unemployed experience a 
reduction in the level of their financial assets during the course of the 
unemployment spell, some of them see their net balances improve. This 
is possibly explained by the receipt of “once-off" payments associated 
with the ending of a work contract and the commencement of the un­
employment spell.
• The level of savings was found to affect significantly the re-employment 
probability, if a non-linear specification of the savings variable is adopted 
The coefficients in alternative non-linear specification of savings were 
(generally) significant and positive. The estimated magnitude of the 
impact was however quite small. A 10% increase in the level of savings 
would raise the re-employment hazard by about 1%. in my preferred 
specification (4).
• The eimpact of the level of debt on the re-employment hazard is not 
particularly significant. It shows negative sign.
• The receipt of “once-off” payments associated with the commencement 
of the unemployment spell and the ending of a previous work contract 
was found to affect significantly the hazard rate. The impact of “once- 
off” payments is quite small. A 10% increase in the level of such “once- 
off” payments raises the re-employment hazard by less than 1%.
To sum up, I think that the analysis carried out in the thesis led to some 
interesting results. Future studies should aim at gathering more evidence on 
the impact of the duration of unemployment benefit and of the unemployed’s 
financial resources on the re-employment probability.
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Appendix

Table 8.1: Variables of the earnings equation
Subsample Sample
Variable Variable description Mean SE Mean SE
age 38.28 11.45 37.80 11.19
married .87 .33 .85 .35
manager .15 .36 .13 .34
foreman .12 .32 .09 .29
employee 1.00 .03 .90 .30
selfemp self-employed .00 .00 .11 .32
Indl Energy ¿L Water .05 .22 .04 .19
Ind2 Minerals & Chemicals .06 .23 .07 .25
lnd3 Engineering .17 .37 .17 .38
Ind4 Other Manufacturing .31 .10 .30
lnd5 Construction .21 .41 .18 .38
lnd6 Hotels fc Catering .17 .38 .17 .37
lnd7 TVansport .07 .26 .07 .26
lnd8 Finance .04 .21 .04 .19
Ind9 Other Services .10 .30 .11 .31
Noind Information not available .01 .12 .05 .22
G1 Employers/managers large firm .03 .16 .02 .15
G2 Employers/managers small firm .02 .15 .02 .15
G3 Professional/self-employed .00 .06 .01 .09
G4 Professional/employees .03 .17 .03 .17
G5 Intermediate non-manual .09 .29 .10 .29
G6 Junior non-manual .03 .17 .03 .17
G7 Personal service workers .04 .20 .04 .21
G8 Foremen/supervisors manual .02 .15 .02 .15
G9 Skilled manual workers .06 .23 .05 .21
i G10 Semi-skilled manual .02 .14 .02 .14
1 G il Unskilled manual .09 .28 .08 .28
S G12 Own account workers .22 .42 .21 41
! G13 Farmers employers/managers .04 .18 .05 .21
G14 Farmers own account .12 .32 .10 .30
| G15 Agricultural workers .17 .37 .15 .36
G16 Members of armed forces .02 .15 .02 .15
NOOCGR Information not available .00 .03 .04 .19
! In this table, the “subsample” is the subgroup for which the earnings equa- 
| tion is estimated, 1407 people; the ‘‘sample” are the first interview male 
| participants , 2717. __________
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Occupational groups
1. Employers and managers in central and local government, industry, commerce, etc. — large 
establishments. Employers is  industry, commerce, etc. ; Persons who employ others in non- 
agricultural enterprises employing 25 or more persons. Managers in central and local government, 
industry, commerce, etc. ; Persons who generally plan and supervise in non-agri cultural enterprises 
employing 25 or more persons.
2. Employers and managers in industry, commerce, etc. — small establishments. Employers in 
industry, commerce, etc. — small establishments; as corresponding point above, but in estab­
lishments employing fewer than 25 persons. Managers in industry, commerce, etc. — small es­
tablishments. As in corresponding point above, but in establishments employing fewer than 25 
persons.
3. Professional workers — self-employed. Self-employed persons engaged in work normally requiring 
qualifications of university degree standard.
4. Professional workers — employees. Employees engaged in work normally requiring qualifications 
of university degree standard.
5. Intermediate non-manual workers: (a) Ancillary workers and artists; Employees engaged in non- 
manual occupations ancillary to the professions, not requiring qualifications of university degree 
standard; Person* engaged in artistic work and not employing others therein; Self-employed nurses, 
medical auxiliaries, teachers, work study engineers and technicians, (b) Foremen and supervisors 
non-manual; Employers (other than managers) engaged in occupations included in group 6 below, 
who formally and immediately s u p e r v is e  others engaged in such occupations.
6. Junior non-manual workers. Employees, not exercising general planning or supervisory powers, 
engaged in clerical, sales and non-manual communications occupations, excluding those who have 
additional and formal supervisory functions (these are including in the group just above).
7. Personal service workers. Employees engaged in service occupations caring for food, drink, cloth­
ing and other personal needs.
8. Foremen and supervisors — manual. Employees (other than managers) who formally and imme­
diately supervise others engaged in manual occupations, whether or not themselves engaged in 
such occupations.
9. Skilled manual workers. Employees engaged in manual occupations which require considerable 
and specific skills.
10. Semi-skilled manual workers. Employees engaged in manual occupations which requirt* slight but 
specific skills.
11. Unskilled manual workers. Other employees engaged in manual occupations.
12. Own account workers (other than professional). Self-employed persons engaged in any trade, per­
sonal service or manual occupation not normally requiring training of university degree standard 
and having no employees other than family workers.
13. Farmers — employers and managers. Persons who own, rent or manage farm*, market garden* 
or forests, employing people other than family workers in the work of the enterprise.
14. Farmers — own account. Persons who own or rent farms, market gardens, or forests and having 
no employees other than family workers.
15. Agricultural workers. Persons engaged in tending crops, arumals, game or forests, or operating 
agricultural or forestry machinery
lt>. Members of armed forces
17. Inadequately described and not stated occupations.
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Table 8.2: Reported, amounts of UB at the 1st interview
Value
pence Freq. Pen.
Cum
Perc.
Value
pence Preq. Perc.
Cum
Perc.
684 1 .1 .1 2510 2 .3 46.9
800 1 ■1 .3 2515 2 .3 47.1
834 1 .1 •4 2517 1 .1 47.3
1250 .7 1.1 2520 4 47.8
1625 1 .1 1.2 2530 49 6.7 54.5
1666 1 .1 1.4 2550 4 55.0
1667 1 .1 1.5 2555 l .1 55.2
1700 1 .1 1.6 2560 27 3.7 58.8
1730 1 .1 1.8 2570 5 .7 59.5
1775 1 .1 1.9 2588 1 .1 59.6
1800 1 .1 2.0 2590 6 60.5
1825 1 .1 2.2 2600 3 ■4 60.9
1850 1 .1 2.3 2601 1 .1 61.0
1875 ■4 2.7 2615 1 .1 61.1
1900 1 .1 2.9 2620 4 61.7
1982 1 .1 3.0 2630 3 ..4 62.1
2023 2 3.3 2650 1 .1 62.2
2050 2 3.5 2674 1 .1 62.4
2083 3 ■4 3.9 2750 2 62.6
2100 1 .1 4-1 2752 1 .1 62.8
2108 1 .1 4-2 2760 3 ■4 63.2
2110 1 .1 4.3 2770 1 .1 63.3
2133 1 .1 4-5 2856 1 .1 63.5
2300 1 .1 4.6 2879 1 .1 63.6
2310 .1 4-8 2880 1 .1 63.7
2318 1 .1 4.9 2917 1 .1 63.9
2450 5 .3 5.2 2931 1 .1 64.0
2500 305 41-4 46.6 2950 1 .1 64.1
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Reported amounts of UB at the 1st interview.continued
Value
pence Freq. Pen.
Cum 
Perc.
Value
pence Freq. Perc.
Cum
Perc.
3033 1 .1 64.3 4170 6 .8 92.3
3070 1 .1 64-4 4175 1 .1 92.4
3100 1 .1 64-5 4180 1 .1 92.5
3114 1 .1 64.7 4195 1 .1 92.7
3135 1 .1 64.8 4200 .3 92.9
3200 .3 65.1 4330 1 .1 93.1
3300 1 .1 65.2 4433 1 .1 93.2
3345 1 .1 65.4 4450 ■4 93.6
3465 1 .1 65.5 4530 1 .1 93.8
3490 1 .1 65.6 4540 1 .1 93.9
3500 1 .1 65.8 4590 1 .1 94.0
3545 1 .1 65.9 4600 1 .1 94.2
3750 1 .1 66.0 4630 1 .1 94.3
3780 1 .1 66.2 4634 1 .1 94.4
3800 1 .1 66.3 4650 ■4 94.8
3805 1 .1 66.4 4700 1 .1 95.0
3900 1 .1 66.6 4840 1 .1 95.1
3974 1 .1 66.7 4850 1 .1 95.2
4000 1.2 67.9 4888 1 .1 95.4
4003 1 .1 68.1 4900 1 .1 95.5
4009 1 .1 68.2 4904 1 .1 95.7
4020 .3 68.5 4940 .3 95.9
4025 4 .5 69.0 5085 1 .1 96.1
4030 l .1 69.2 5090 1 .1 96.2
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Reported amounts of UB at the 1st intermew.continued
Value
pence Preq. Perc.
Cum
Perc.
Value
pence Preq. Perc.
Cum
Perc.
4040 5 .7 69.8 5100 1 .1 96.3
4045 71 9.6 79.5 5110 1 .1 96.5
4050 4 .5 80.0 5130 .3 96.7
4055 1 .1 80.2 5200 .5 97.3
4060 1 .1 80.3 5235 1 .1 97.4
4065 1 .1 8O.4 5270 .3 97.7
4067 1 .1 80.6 5300 1 .1 97.8
4070 2 .3 80.8 5337 1 .1 98.0
4073 1 .1 81.0 5405 1 .1 98.1
4075 26 3.5 84.5 5465 1 .1 98.2
4080 1 .1 84.6 5473 1 .1 98.4
4090 4 .5 85.2 5770 1 .1 98.5
4095 1 .1 85.3 5800 1 .1 98.6
4100 7 1.0 86.3 5897 1 .1 98.8
4105 17 2.3 88.6 6120 1 .1 98.9
4110 2 .3 88.9 6150 1 .1 99.0
4111 1 .1 89.0 6175 1 .1 99.2
4120 3 ■4 89.4 6313 1 .1 99.3
4130 2 .3 89.7 6914 1 .1 99.5
4132 1 .1 89.8 7000 1 .1 99.6
4133 1 .1 89.9 7311 1 .1 99.7
4135 8 1.1 91.0 7756 1 .1 99.9
4150 3 ■4 91.4 13020 1 .1 100.0
4170 6 .8 92.3 Total 736 100.0
4175 1 .1 92.4
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Table 8.3: Product Lim it Estim ates: single risk model
Weeks Events No. Cens. No. Risk Set Survivor fn. Error Std. Cum. Rate
11 0 0 0 1.00000 0.00000
12 4 0 23 0.82609 0.07903 0.19106
13 25 0 382 0.77202 0.07460 0.25874
14 44 0 1127 0.74188 0.07182 0.29856
15 4?. 0 1692 0.72347 0.07010 0.32370
16 43 0 1845 0.70661 0.06851 0.34728
17 39 0 1864 0.69182 0.06712 0.36843
18 33 0 1838 0.67940 0.06595 0.38654
19 31 0 1805 0.66773 0.06485 0.40387
20 26 0 1774 0.65795 0.06393 0.41863
21 27 0 1748 0.64778 0.06297 0.43420
22 18 0 1721 0.64101 0.06233 0.44471
23 21 0 1703 0.63310 0.06159 0.45712
24 27 0 1682 0.62294 0.06063 0.47330
25 27 0 1655 0.61278 0.05967 0.48975
26 31 0 1628 0.60111 .  0.05857 0.50898
27 27 0 1597 0.59095 0.05761 0.52603
28 31 0 1570 0.57928 0.05651 0.54597
29 25 0 1539 0.56987 0.05563 0.56235
30 26 0 1514 0.56008 0.05471 0.57967
31 36 0 1488 0.54653 0.05343 0.60416
32 22 0 1452 0.53825 0.05265 0.61943
33 38 0 1430 0.52395 0.05130 0.64636
34 29 0 1392 0.51303 0.05027 0.66742
35 21 0 1363 0.50513 0.04953 0.68294
36 12 0 1342 0.50061 0.04910 0.69193
37 27 0 1330 0.49045 0.04814 0.71244
38 24 0 1303 0.48141 0.04729 0.73103
39 23 0 1279 0.47276 0.04648 0.74917
40 18 0 1256 0.46598 0.04584 0.76361
41 18 0 1238 0.45921 0.04520 0.7782542 12 0 1220 0.45469 0.04477 0.78814
I 43 18 0 1208 0.44791 0.04413 0.80315
44 28 0 1190 0.43738 0.04314 0.82696
45 21 0 1162 0.42947 0.04239 0.84520
46 18 0 1141 0.42270 0.04176 0.86110
47 22 0 1123 0.41442 0.04098 0.88089
48 15 0 1101 0.40877 0.04044 0.89460
49 23 0 1086 0.40011 0.03963 0.91601
1 50 24 0 1063 0.39108 0.03878 0.93885
51 10 0 1039 0.38731 0.03842 0.94852
52 19 0 1029 0.38016 0.03775 0.96715
53 25 0 1010 0.37075 0.03686 0.99222
54 19 0 985 0.36360 0.03618 1.01170
55 15 0 966 0.35796 0.03565 1.02735
56 15 0 951 0.35231 0.03512 1.04324
57 11 0 936 0.34817 0.03473 1.05507
58 16 0 925 0.34215 0.03416 1.07252
59 15 0 909 0.33650 0.03363 1.08915
60 14 0 894 0.33123 0.03313 1.10494
61 13 0 880 0.32634 0.03267 1.11982
62 12 0 867 0.32182 0.03224 1.13376
63 11 0 855 0.31768 0.03185 1.14671
64 10 9 835 0.31388 0.03149 1.15876
65 7 135 690 0.31069 0.03120 1.16895
66 2 300 383 0.30907 0.03105 1.17419
71 0 381 1 0.30907 0.03105 1.17419
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Table 8.4: Product Lim it Estimates: Exit to full-tim e work
Weeks Events No. Cens. No. Risk Set Survivor fn. Error Std. Cum. Rate
11 0 0 0 1.00000 0.00000
12 2 0 23 0.91304 0.05875 0.09097
13 16 3 382 0.87480 0.05707 0.13376
14 27 8 1127 0.85384 0.05584 0.15801
15 35 17 1692 0.83618 0.05476 0.17891
16 33 7 1845 0.82122 0.05385 0.19696
17 34 10 1864 0.80625 0.05293 0.21537
18 27 5 1838 0.79440 0.05220 0.23017
19 27 6 1805 0.78252 0.05147 0.24524
20 22 4 1774 0.77281 0.05087 0.25772
21 23 4 1748 0.76265 0.05025 0.27096
22 16 4 1721 0.75556 0.04981 0.28030
23 18 4 1703 0.74757 0.04932 0.29093
24 23 1 1682 0.73735 0.04869 0.30470
25 21 4 1655 0.72799 0.04812 0.31747
26 23 6 1628 0.71771 0.04748 0.33170
27 22 8 1597 0.70782 0.04688 0.34557
28 25 5 1570 0.69655 0.04618 0.36162
29 21 6 1539 0.68704 0.04560 0.37536
30 21 4 1514 0.67751 0.04501 0.38933
j 31 24 5 1488 0.66659 0.04434 0.40559
32 20 12 1452 0.65740 0.04378 0.41946
33 33 2 1430 0.64223 0.04285 0.44280
34 25 5 1392 0.63070 0.04214 0.46093
35 17 4 1363 0.62283 0.04166 0.47348
36 11 4 1342 0.61773 0.04135 0.48171
37 21 3 1330 0.60797 0.04075 0.49762
38 16 4 1303 0.60051 0.04029 0.50998
39 17 8 1279 0.59253 0.03980 0.52336
! 40 15 6 1256 0.58545 0.03937 0.53537
! 41 13 3 1238 0.57930 0.03899 0.54593
! 42 12 5 1220 0.57360 0.03864 0.55581
43 15 0 1208 0.56648 0.03821 0.56831
44 24 3 1190 0.55506 0.03751 0.58868
45 16 5 1162 0.54741 0.03704 0.60255
46 15 4 ' 1141 0.54022 0.03660 0.61578
47 1 7  1 3 I 1123 0.53204 0.03610 0.63104i 48 13 1 5 I 1101 0.52576 0.03572 0.64291
i 49 12 ; 3 ! 1086 0.51995 0.03536 0.65403
50 15 j 11 1063 0.51261 0.03491 0.66824
51 7 1 9 1039 0.50916 0.03470 0.67500
52 ii ! 4 1029 0.50372 0.03437 0.68574
53 16 i 6 1010 0.49574 0.03388 0.70171
54 14 j 9 985 0.48869 0.03345 0.71603
55 n  j 5 1 966 0.48312 0.03311 0.72748
56 9 1 * i 951 0.47855 0.03284 0.73699
57 8 ! 4 ! 936 0.47446 0.03259 0.74557
58 10 1 3 925 0.46933 0.03227 0.75644
59 10 7 909 0.46417 0.03196 0.76750
! 60 12 4 894 0.45794 0.03158 0.78102
i 6 1 • j 2 880 0.45430 0.03136 0.78900
62 6 8 867 0.45115 0.03117 0.79595
1 63 9 5 855 0.44640 0.03088 0.80653
64 8 10 835 0.44213 0.03062 0.81616
65 6 137 690 0.43828 0.03040 0.82489
66 2 301 383 0.43599 0.03028 0.83013
71 0 381 1 0.43599 0.03028 0.83013
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Table 8.5: Product L im it Estim ates: Exit to other states
Events No. Cens. No. Riik Set Survivor in. Error Std. Cum. Rat«
11 0 0 0 1.00000 0.00000
12 2 1 23 0.91304 0.05875 0.09097
13 9 1 382 0.89153 0.05781 0.11481
14 16 18 1127 0.87887 0.05707 0.12911
15 7 33 1692 0.87524 0.05685 0.13326
16 9 32 1845 0.87097 0.05659 0.13815
17 5 33 1864 0.86863 0.05645 0.14083
18 6 34 1838 0.86580 0.05628 0.14410
19 3 34 1805 0.86436 0.05619 0.14577
20 4 24 1774 0.86241 0.05607 0.14802
21 4 34 1748 0.86044 0.05595 0.15032
22 2 11 1721 0.85944 0.05589 0.15148
23 3 10 1703 0.85792 0.05580 0.15324
24 4 24 1682 0.85588 0.05568 0.15562
25 6 23 1655 0.85278 0.05549 0.15925
26 8 18 1628 0.84859 0.05524 0.16418
27 5 30 1597 0.84593 0.05508 0.16732
28 5 14 1570 0.84324 0.05491 0.17051
29 4 32 1539 0.84105 0.05478 0.17311
30 5 19 1514 0.83827 0.05462 0.17642
31 12 22 14 88 0.83151 0.05421 0.18451
32 1 30 1452 0.83094 0.05418 0.18520
33 5 24 1430 0.82803 0.05400 0.18871
34 3 30 1392 0.82625 0.05389 0.19086
35 4 14 1363 0.82382 0.05375 0.19380
36 1 21 1342 0.82321 0.05371 0.19455
37 6 6 1330 0.81949 0.05349 0.19907
38 8 27 1303 0.81446 0.05319 0.20523
39 6 12 1279 0.81064 0.05297 0.20993
40 3 18 1256 0.80870 0.05285 0.21232
41 5 13 1238 0.80544 0.05266 0.21637
43 3 25 1208 0.80344 0.05254 0.21885
! 44 4 20 1190 0.80074 0.05238 0.22222
! 45 5 18 1162 0.79729 0.05218 0.22653
| 46 3 18 1141 0.79520 0.05206 0.22917
! 47 5 14 1123 0.79166 0.05185 0.23363
48 2 20 1101 0.79022 0.05176 0.23545
49 10 9 1086 0.78294 0.05134 0.24470
50 8 13 1063 0.77705 0.05099 0.25225
1 51 3 16 1039 0.77481 0.05086 0.25514
! 52 8 7 1029 0.76878 0.05051 0.26295
i  53 9 14 1010 0.76193 0.05011 0.27190
! 54 5 17 985 0.75806 0.04989 0.27699
j 55 4 11 966 0.75492 0.04971 0.28114
1 56 5 10 951 0.75095 0.04948 0.28641
i 5 7 3 11 936 0.74855 0.04934 0.28962
I 58 6 9 925 0.74369 0.04906 0.29613
| 59 5 8 909 0.73960 0.04882 0.30164
60 2 14 894 0.73795 0.04873 0.30388
61 6 10 880 0.73292 0.04844 0.31072
62 6 5 867 0.72784 0.04815 0.31767
63 2 6 855 0.72614 0.04805 0.32001
64 2 20 835 0.72440 0.04795 0.32241
71 0 831 1 0.72440 0.04795 0.32241
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Table 8.6: Baseline hazard: Single and Competing risks models
Sing]e risk Competing risks
Weekly Pull-time Work Other exits
Baseline Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Week 11 -15.4745 966.2355 -20.3138 1885.278 -13.9144 2576.1550
Week 12 -5.1155* 0.9744 -7.4675* 1.1684 -0.0234 1.8638
Week 13 -4.3693* 0.8588 -6.4728* 0.9626 0.3871 1.7527
Week 14 -4.2298* 0.8489 -6.3554* 0.9491 0.5713 1.7380
Week 15 -4.3369* 0.8489 -6.1789* 0.9443 -03430 1.7599
Week 16 -4.3433* 0.8488 -6.2427* 0.9451 -0.1064 1.7500
Week 17 -4.3979* 0.8498 -6.1933* 0.9446 -0.6752 1.7751
Week 18 -4.5436* 0.8528 -6.4036* 0.9489 -0.4673 1.7664
Week 19 -4.6184* 0.8544 -6.3822* 0.9487 -1.1421 1.8127
Week 20 -4.7439* 0.8575 -6.5700* 0.9532 -0.8341 1.7897
Week 21 -4.6898* 0.8568 -6.5101* 0.9524 -0.8134 1.7900
Week 22 -5.0834* 0.8675 -6.8608* 0.9622 -1.4964 1.8584
Week 23 -4.9138* 0.8626 -6.7267* 0.9583 -1.0790 1.8125
Week 24 -4.6432* 0.8566 -6.4622* 0.9520 -0.7722 1.7897
Week 25 -4.6210* 0.8568 -6.5296* 0.9545 -0.3486 1.7668
Week 26 -4.4598* 0.8539 -6.4143* 0.9522 -0.0410 1.7550
Week 27 -4.5766* 0.8567 -6.4369* 0.9532 -0.4910 1.7762
Week 28 -4.4489* 0.8545 -6.2853* 0.9503 -0.4731 1.7763
Week 29 -4.6105* 0.8583 -6.4376* 0.9542 -0.6786 1.7902
Week 30 -4.5504* 0.8571 -6.4157* 0.9539 -0.4383 1.7758
Week 31 -4.1969* 0.8508 -6.2531* 0.9507 0.4628 1.7428
Week 32 -4.7176* 0.8622 -6.4157* 0.9549 -2.0084 1.9882
Week 33 -4.0902* 0.8499 -5.8798* 0.9446 -0.3667 1.7756
Week 34 -4.3709* 0.8554 -6.1313* 0.9497 -0.8570 1.8129
Week 35 -4.6364* 0.8623 -6.4948* 0.9596 -0.5471 1.7896
Week 36 -5.1863* 0.8829 -6.9202* 0.9763 -1.9243 1.9883
| Week 37 -4.3533* 0.8562 -6.2511* 0.9537 -0.1126 1.7662
| Week 38 -4.4490* 0.8590 -6.5006* 0.9617 0.1966 1.7545
Week 39 -4.4729* 0.8599 -6.4211* 0.9596 -0.0724 1.7662
Week 40 -4.7031* 0.8670 -6.5306" 0.9637 -0.7531 1.8127
Week 41 -4.6843* 0.8666 -6.6543* 0.9686 •0.2242 1.7754
Week 42 -5.0751* 0.8825 -6.7192* 0.9719 -14.0259 447.0093
Week 43 -4.6506* 0.8666 -6.4771* 0.9632 -0.7028 1.8127
Week 44 -4.1794* 0.8550 -5.9769* 0.9501 -0.3898 1.7893
Week 45 -4.4476* 0.8620 -6.3622* 0.9612 -0.1503 1.7754
Week 46 -4.5821* 0.8666 -6.4058* 0.9633 -0.6451 1.8126
j Week 47 -4.3570* 0.8606 -6.2566* 0.i>591 -0.1091 1.7749j Week 48 -4.7264* 0.8727 -6.5102* 0.9684 -1.0152 1.8572
! Week 49 -4.3179* 0.8604 -6.5658* 0.9716 0.6234 1.7465
! Week 50 -4.2496* 0.8594 -6.3204* 0.9631 0.4300 1.7536
j  Week 51 -5.0727* 0.8916 -7.0728* 1.0018 -0.5413 1.8119
! Week 52 -4.4127* 0.8647 -6.6030* ) 0.9756 0.4589 1.7535
! Week 53 -4.1114* 0.8573 -6.2017* ! 0.9608 0.6033 1.7494j Week 54 -4.3643* 0.8646 -6.3132* 0.9654 0.0357 1.7746
j Week 55 -4.5835* 0.8728 -6.5362* 0.9756 -0.1728 1.7888I Week 56 -4.6334* 0.8754 •6.7173* 0.9857 0.0688 1.7747
Week 57 -4.8599* 0.8863 -6.8194* 0.9925 -0.4298 1.8117
Week 58 -4.4668* 0.8700 -6.5781* 0.9797 0.2825 1.7649
Week 59 -4.5113* 0.8724 -6.5572* 0.9797 0.1174 1.7741
Week 60 -4.5594* 0.8753 -6.3522* 0.9713 -0.7833 1.8571
Week 61 -4.6160* 0.8783 -6.8726* 1.0013 0.3305 1.7652
Week 62 -4.6759* 0.8822 -7.0069* 1.0134 0.3517 1.7657
Week 63 -4.7361* 0.8864 -6.5738* 0.9856 -0.7221 1.8577
Week 64 -4.6504* 0.8914 -6.5128* 0.9924 -0.5317 1.8581
1 Week 65 -4.7023* 0.9043 -6.3312* 0.9910 -14.0406 646.9083
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Table 8.7: The significance of the differences between the estimated weekly
baseline coefficients
Coefficients »/ -  û |+1 SE(ai -  oj+ i)
»13 — »12 0.9947 0.75004
»14 — Ofl3 0.1174 0.31549
015 — <*14 0.1765 0.25613
»1« ~ »15 0.0638 0.24632
ofi7 -  »ie 0.0494 0.24438
»18 “  ÛT17 0.2103 0.25778
»19 -  ûris 0.0214 0.27214
020 -  0fl9 0.1878 0.28721
021 -  »20 0.0599 0.29822
»22 — Or21 0.3507 0.32554
023 -  022 0.1341 0.34359
024 — 023 0.2645 0.31471
025 “* 024 0.0674 0.38034
026 — 025 0.1153 0.30184
027 — 026 0.0226 0.29823
028 — 027 0.1516 0.29232
029 — 028 0.1523 0.29599
030 — 029 0.0219 0.30861
O31 — 030 0.1626 0.29879
032 ~ »31 0.1626 0.30275
033 ”  032 0.5359* 0.28337
<*34 -  033 0.2515 0.26514
»35 “  »34 0.3635 0.31436
036 — O35 0.4254 0.38696
037 -  036 0.6691 * 0.37221
038 “  »37 0.2495 0.34512
039 “  036 0.0795 0.34829
040 -  039 0.1095 0.35424
041 “  040 0.1237 0.37895
042 “* 041 0.0649 0.40033
O43 “  042 0.2421 0.40029
044 — O43 0.5002* 0.31915
045 — »44 0.3853 0.32276
046 ”  »45 0.0436 0.35435
04 7 “  04e 0.1492 0.35423
048 ”  O47 0.2536 0.36843
O49 — O4* 0.0556 0.40031
»50 “  Û49 0.2454 0.38731
»51 "  »50 0.7524* 0.45841
j »52 ~ »51 0-4698 0.48349
»53 -  »5? 0.4013 0.39166
»54 “  »53 0.1115 0.36590
»55 — »54 0.2230 0.40290
»56 “  »55 0.1811 0.44945
»57 “  »56 0.1021 0.48591
»58 -  »57 0.2413 0.47434
»59 — »56 0.0209 0.44721
»60 “  »59 0.205 0.42818
061 “  »60 0.5204 0.47558
The first 11 weeks are not considered because of left trun­
cation of the sample at the three months point The table
relates only to the baseline hazard rate for the exit into
full-time work. A * indicates statistical significance at the
two-sided 5% level. The estimated weekly coefficients and
their standard error are shown in the Appendix.
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Table 8.8: The significance of the differences between the estimated monthly
baseline coefficients
Monthly «»efficients 0/ -  Ô/+4 SE (oi -  a ¡+4)
a4 -  a3 0.2378 0.04868
a 5 -  a 4 0.3146 0.10890
0 6  — Os 0.035 0.15205
07 — Oe 0.1367 0.15205
0 00 1 Q 0.2371 0.1405
0 CO 1 0 00 0.3618 0.15868
QlO — Q9 0.0569 0.18149
Q 11 — <*10 0.2872 0.17841
Û12 — ÛU 0.1186 0.17844
q 13 — O12 0.1277 0.1974
û 14 ~ q 13 0.1531 0.21716
<*is -  a J4 0.0041 0.23428
û 16 — Û15 0.1773 0.26158
The first three months are not considered
because of left truncation of the sample at
the three months point. The table relates
only to the baseline hazard rate for the exit
into full-time work.
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Table 8.9: Restricted, model fo r testing equality of the baselines
variable Coeff . . . . . . . . . . . SE'
PtwarkYb •0.8061* 0.1758
UnemplYb -0.6251* 0.1998
SickYb -0.3014 0.2970
PrlntmOc 0.4506* 0.1788
UiwkilOc -0.2916 0.2890
Age 20-24 -0.1748 0.2281
Age35-44 -0.0113 0.1802
Age45-54 -0.3978* 0.1990
Age *»5-58 -0.5235* 0.2267
ChildLt5 -0.4130* 0.1735
Married -0.0389 0.1739
Money bad 0.0781 0.1406
HouseOwn 0.3781* 0.1378
CountyUn -0.0462* 0.0168
OnlyUBTl 0.4649* 0.1527
NoUBSBTl -0.2265 0.4995
U Benefit -0.3831* 0.1218
P red Earn -0.7789* 0.3024
NoPredEa -3.1767* 1.4433
z*FtworkYb 1.1357* 0.2171
z* UnemplYb 0.8878* 0.2422
z-SickYb 0.4426 0.4119
z*PrlntmOc -0.4938" 0.2055
z*UnskilOc 0.0655 0.3368
z*Age20-24 0.3065 0.2487
z*Age35-44 -0.0556 0.2012
z*Age45-54 0.1363 0.2266
z*Age55-58 -0.1522 0.2831
!  I'ChildLtr, 0.2962 0.1933
j z*Mamed \ 0.1839 | 0.2104
z* Money bad ! 0.1434 j 0.1621
I z*CountyLn j -0.2909 J 0.1575
j  r"HouseOwn | 4.3050* 1.8337
z* OnlyUBTl ! -0.3629 * 0.1784
z-NoUBSBTl ! -0.8733" 0.3360
z*UBenef»t 0.0001“ 0.0000
z*PredEam 0.0001* 0.0000
z*NoPredE* 0.5494 0.6534
Max. likelihood>5731 .171. A * indicates statisti-
cal significance at the 5% one-sided level.
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Table 8.10: Unemployment duration by the exit states
Unemployment duration 
in Week»
Recipients o. 
Frequency 
Full-Time Work Exit
f only UB 
of Exit»
Other States Exit
Recipient* 
Frequency 
Full-Time Work Exit
i of SB 
of Exit»
Other State» Exit
12 0 0 1 1
13 7 5 9 3
U 9 6 15 8
15 17 3 15 4
IB U 2 18 4
17 15 4 17 1
IS 18 0 9 5
19 9 0 17 2
to 12 3 9 1
SI 6 1 14 2
22 8 0 8 2
ts 5 1 12 1
u 7 1 16 1
25 6 • 4 14 2
26 6 1 17 7
27 10 3 11 2
28 12 2 13 3
29 7 3 13 1
30 9 1 11 4
31 t i 6 13 6
32 6 0 13 0
33 12 2 19 2
! *4 11 1 14 2
| 35 7 1 8 2
! 55 3 1 8 0i 37 5 2 15 4
36 5 4 11 3
39 5 4 12 2
10 3 1 12 m
41 2 ¡2 9 n
42 6 0 5 0
43 5 2 9 1
44 12 1 11 3
45 5 2 10 3
4e 7 0 6 3
4 7 3 3 13 2
4* 4 1 9 1
! 49 4 2 8 5
j 50 5 5 8 3
! 51 m 2 5 1
52 2 5 3
53 7 7 9 2
! 5^ 5 3 9 1
55 0 2 11 1
56 5 2 4 2
57 3 0 5 2
58 « 3 7 «
59 5 1 5 4
60 1 0 11 2
61 3 5 4 1
62 4 1 2 3
63 5 I 4 1
64 £ 0 6 2
65
66
3 0 2
1
Sum 347 1 112 548 126
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Table 8.11: Baseline hazards: model with time varying benefit entitlement 
duration dummies
Weekly niS>time exit Other states exit
Baseline Coeff SE Coeff SE
Week 11 -22.3227 3561.8353 -15.6797 3561.8353
Week 12 -8.9468* 1.3949 -1.0158 1.3949
Week 13 -7.2835* 1.0039 -0.0352 1.0039
Week 14 -7.2893* 0.9929 0.0726 0.9929
Week 15 -7.0883* 0.9874 -0.6833 0.9874
Week 16 -7.0966* 0.9874 -0.8675 0.9874
Week 17 -7.0782* 0.9872 -1.0390 0.9872
Week 18 -7.2289* 0.9903 -1.0022 0.9903
Week 19 -7.2477* 0.9907 -1.9192 0.9907
Week 20 -7.4478* 0.9955 -1.2434 0.9955
Week 21 -7.4855* 0.9967 -1.4816 0.9967
Week 22 -7.6970* 1.0030 -1.8848 1.0030
Week 23 -7.6206* 1.0008 -1.8546 1.0008
Week 24 -7.3033* 0.9931 -1.8626 0.9931
Week 25 -7.4183* 0.9967 -0.7222 0.9967
Week 26 -7.2530* 0.9933 -0.4059 0.9933
Week 27 -7.3249* 0.9955 -0.8591 0.9955
Week 28 -7.1240* 0.9916 -0.8841 0.9916
Week 29 -7.3260* 0.9965 -1.0862 0.9965
Week 30 -7.3031* 0.9962 -0.8430 0.9962
Week 31 -7.0911* 0.9918 0.0847 0.9918
Week 32 -7.3085* 0.9969 -15.5589 0.9969
Week 33 -6.7858* 0.9867 -1.0143 0.9867
Week 34 -6.9685* 0.9909 -1.2301 0.9909
Week 35 -7.4561* 1.0044 -1.2150 1.0044
Week 36 -7.7557* 1.0165 -2.3279 1.0165
Week 37 -7.1348* 0.9961 -0.4855 0.9961
Week 38 -7.3331* 1.0025 -0.3234 1.0025
Week 39 -7.2520* 1.0005 -0.4451 1.0005
Week 40 -7.3587* 1.0042 -1.1677 1.0042
Week 41 -7.6509* 1.0158 -0.8189 1.0158
Week 42 -8.1353* 1.0201 -15.8033 1.0201
Week 43 -7.8684* 1.0105 -1.4831 1.0105
Week 44 -7.3347* 0.9967 -1.1379 0.9967
Week 45 -7.7404“ 1.0084 -0.8929 1.0084
Week 46 -7.4818* 1.0057 -1.6555 1.0057
Week 47 -7.3926“ 1.0037 -1.1205 1.0037
j Week 48 -7.5866* 1.0108 -2.0238 1.0108
Week 49 -7.6414“ 1.0139 -0.7489 1.0139
! Week 50 -7.5400* 1.0107 -0.5855 1.0107
I Week 51 -8.3098“ 1.0655 -3.4033 1.0655
| Week 52 -7.8311* 1.0229 -0.8688 1.0229
Week 53 -7.3296* 1.0042 -0.7110 1.0042
Week 54 -7.4382“ 1.0086 -1.5000 1.0086
Week 55 -7 6639* 1.0184 -1.7766 1.0184
Week 56 -7.8969“ 1.0258 -1.0794 1.0258
Week 57 -7.9989“ 1.0324 -1.7609 1.0324
Week 58 -7.8621* 1.0255 -0.8294 1.0255
Week 59 -7.7348* 1.0200 -0.8108 1.0200
Week 60 -7.5311“ 1.0119 -1.7127 1.0119
Week 61 -8.0475* 1.0406 -0.5945 1.0406
Week 62 -8.1849* 1.0520 -0.9857 1.0520
Week 63 -7.7474* 1.0251 -1.6517 1.0251
Week 64 -7.6964* 1.0319 -1.4670 1.0319
Week 65 -7.7799“ 1.0492 -15.9100 1.0492
\ A * indicates statistical significance at the two-sided 5% level.
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Table 8.12: Results of estimation of the re-employment probability
Variable Recipients of only UB S B / joint SB and UB All benefits
label Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
F jt work year before -0.1398 0.2535 0.5969* 0.1778 0.3584* 0.1556
Unemployed year before 0.1673 0.2859 0.4420* 0.1868 0.4197* 0.1446
Sick year before -0.6378 0.5591 -0.3729 0.3765 -0.4257 0.3113
Profes. / Jnterm. Occ. 0.3244* 0.1609 0.0739 0.1337 0.2034 0 0.1003
Unskilled Occupation -0.5214 0.2999 •0.4298* 0.2158 -0.4485* 0.1744
Age 20-24 0.3357 0.1993 0.1531 0.1318 0.2035 0.1087
Age 35-44 -0.1134 0.1617 -0.2378* 0.1133 -0.2084* 0.0919
Age 4&’54 -0.8165* 0.1693 -0.4552* 0.1590 -0.6067* 0.1123
Age 55-58 -1.4538* 0.2243 -0.7950* 0.3173 -1.2036* 0.1742
Has any child aged < 5 -0.6509* 0.1767 -0.0672 0.1070 -0.2355* 0.0883
Married 0.5777* 0.2366 -0.0791 0.1554 0.1682 0.1244
Spouse working month before 0.2697* 0.1292 0.3375* 0.1323 0.4071* 0.0874
Searches less than before -1.1211* 0.2712 -0.4995* 0.2368 -0.7646* 0.1794
Values Leisure more -0.1046 0.1730 -0.3279* 0.1659 -0.2588* 0.1182
Experiences money shortage 0.1861 0.1269 0.2213 0.1281 0.1905* 0.0875
House owner 0.1981 0.1253 0.2815* 0.0988 0.3000* 0.0748
County unemployment rate -0.0273 0.0172 -0.0144 0.0141 -2.OOI4 1.0881
UB/SB time varying -0.0958 0.0791 0.0852 0.1155 -0.0706 0.0556
Predicted earnings 0.6910* 0.3551 0.7417* 0.2612 0.6522* 0.2076
No pred. earn. 3.8496* 1.6559 3.1346* 1.2504 3.0254* 0.9831
only UB max. Itk. -2328.1; SB /  joint SB, UB max. lik. -3655; all benefit recipients max. Itk.
- 6077.0. Likelihood ratio test: 186.6 ** X?so* Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables are
provided in the preceding table, in the data section. A * indicates statistical significance at the
two-sided 5% level. The estimated baseline coefficients are given in the Appendix.
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Table 8.13: Baseline hazard: Benefit recipients types. Exit into full-time 
work.
Weekly Recipients of only UÈ Recipients of SB, joint SÈ and ÌJB All benefit recipients
Baseline Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Week 11 -23.4951 14613.5149 -24.2043 6777.3044 -21.0798 2052.2847
Week 12 -23.6266 2839.1168 -9.3265* 1.6010 -8.8373* 1.3882
Week 13 -6.7597* 1.6600 -8.3058* 1.2917 -7.1689* 0.9950
Week 14 -6.9255* 1.6497 -8.2095" 1.2738 -7.1730* 0.9838
Week 15 -6.3620* 1.6321 -8.2986* 1.2741 -O.SfOsfO 0.9783
Week 16 -6.5565* 1.6362 -8.1309* 1.2699 -6.9776* 0.9784
Week 17 -6.4617* 1.6349 -8.1742* 1.2707 -6.9587* 0.9781
Week 18 -6.2430* 1.6323 -8.7997* 1.2913 -7.1078* 0.9813
Week 19 -6.9114* 1.6491 -8.1414* 1.2703 -7.1230* C.9817
Week 20 -6.5914* 1.6407 -8.7670* 1.2908 -7.3189* 0 9864
Week 21 -7.2682* 1.6660 -8.3106* 1.2754 -7.3538* 0.9877
Week 22 -6.9659* 1.6531 -8.8584* 1.2963 -7.5634* 0.9939
Week 23 -7.4240* 1.6753 -8.4371* 1.2798 -7.4886* 0.9918
Week 24 -7.0725* 1.6587 -8.1290* 1.2715 -7.1676* 0.9841
Ì Week 25 -7.1925* 1.6658 -8.2428" 1.2756 -7.2835* 0.9877
| Week 26 -7.1624* 1.6645 -8.0237* 1.2708 -7.1186* 0.9843
| Week 27 -6.6246* 1.6447 -8.4419* 1.2833 -7.1887* 0.9864
! Week 28 -6.3996* 1.6392 -8.2546* 1.2776 -6.9871* 0.9824
Week 29 -6.9071* 1.6571 -8.2370* 1.2775 -7.1879* 0.9873
Week 30 -6.6239" 1.6462 -8.3829* 1.2827 -7.1650" 0.9870
j Week 31 -6.3785* 1.6408 -8.1923* 1.2768 -6.9528* 0.9826
i Week 32 -6.9613* 1.6639 -8.1711* 1.2761 -7.1646* 0.9879
t Week 33 -6.2185* 1.6382 -7.7610* 1.2668 -6.6389* 0.9776
I Week 34 -6.2630* 1.6408 -8.0445" 1.2740 -6.8252* 0.9816
| Week 35 -6.6758* 1.6570 -8.5874* 1.2949 -7.3141" 0.9952
1 Week 36 -7.5065* 1.7140 -8.5781" 1.2949 -7.6139* 1.0074
1 Week 37 -6.9767* 1.6747 -7.9216* 1.2718 -6.9923* 0.9867
j Week 38 -6.9492* 1.6745 -8.2119* 1.2818 -7.1920* 0.9933
Week 39 -6.9257* 1.6742 -8.1062" 1.2785 -7.1124* 0.9913
1 Week 40 -7.4184* 1.7128 -8.0878* 1.2787 -7.2203* 0.9952
| Week 41 -7.8158* 1.7607 -8.3574" 1.2890 -7.5152" 1.0070
! Week 42 -6.6765" 1.6617 -8.9392* 1.3232 -7.5007" 1.0068
Week 43 -6.8241" 1.6716 -8.3364" 1.2891 -7.2394* 0.9972
Week 44 -5.9046* 1.6374 -8.1152" 1.2809 -6.7143* 0.9831
Week 45 -6.7555" 1.6732 -8.1915" 1.2846 -7.1209* 0.9951
Week 46 -6.3731" 1.6558 -8.3993* 1.2942 -7.0984" 0.9950
Week 47 -7.1891" 1.7138 -7.8888* 1.2750 -7.0093* 0.9929
Week 48 -6.8860* 1.6890 -8.2425" 1.2882 -7.2025" 1.0000
Week 49 -6.8626" 1.6888 -8.3347" 1.2934 -7.2573" 1.0031
Week 50 -6.6192" 1.6737 -8.3157" 1.2937 -7.1564" 1.0000
Week 51 -7.6157* 1.7487 -8.7769" 1.3223 -7.7896" 1.0282
Week 52 -7.5969" 1.7485 -8.2883" 1.2939 -7.4155* 1.0074
Week 53 -6.3004* 1.6430 -8.1480* 1.2884 -6.9170* 0.9885
Week 54 -6.6039* 1.6607 -8.1289" 1.2883 -7.0279* 0.9930
' Week 55 -23.4084 1999.8754 -7.9049" 1.2808 -7.2512" 1.0029
Week 56 -6.5535* 1.6589 -8.9047" 1.3414 -7.4315" 1.0128
Week 57 -7.0485" 1.6987 -8.6652" 1.3222 -7.5327* 1.0194
Week 58 -7.4357" 1.7468 -8.3134" 1.3003 -7.3978* 1.0125
Week 59 -6.4868" 1.6580 -8.6316" 1.3222 -7.2705* 1.0069
j Week 60 -8.0879" 1.8836 -7.8104" 1.2806 -7.0618" 0.9986
Week 61 -6.9569* 1.6967 -8.8117" 1.3412 -7.5828" 1.0279
! Week 62 -6.6389" 1.6718 -9.4933* 1.4313 -7.7212" 1.0394
Week 63 -6.3788" 1.6567 -8.7743* 1.3411 -7.2858* 1.0123
: Week 64 -7.1095* 1.7445 -8.1976" 1.3090 -7.2269* 1.0189
1 Week 65 -6.5076* 1.6894 -8.6855" 1.3708 -7.3085" 1.0371
A * indicates statistical significance at the 59t two-sidec
level.
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